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ABSTRACT
Tuo, Ling. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August 2015. Three Essays on
the Voluntary Disclosure and Managerial Incentive. Major Professor: Zabihollah
Rezaee, Ph.D.
The importance of an effective corporate communication with all stakeholders
has been extensively debated in the business literature in the aftermath of 2007-2009
global financial crisis. To satisfy the demands of information users, companies are
expected to disclose more inside information to outside public through the voluntary
disclosure.
The first dissertation investigates the role of sustainability report which is a
type of voluntary nonfinancial disclosure. I find that the release of sustainability
report is positively correlated with innate earnings quality and negatively correlated
with discretionary earnings quality. Moreover, the positive (negative) correlation
between sustainability report and innate (discretionary) earnings quality is more (less)
pronounced when the voluntary disclosure quality is high. I also find that the release
of sustainability report is associated with higher audit fees, which suggests that the
sustainability report cannot substitute the traditional financial statement.
The second dissertation investigates how the firm’s cost stickiness strategy is
associated with the firm’s management earnings forecast (MEF). Through the
empirical tests, I find that the firm’s level of sticky cost is positively associated with
the firm’s propensity to issue MEF and the frequency of MEF. Moreover, I find that
the firm’s level of sticky cost is associated with more good earnings news forecasted
by managers. Finally, I find that the relation between cost stickiness and MEF
behaviors is more pronounced when the MEF is long-horizon oriented and when the
firm efficiency is high.
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This third dissertation investigates how industry peer firms tend to influence
the specific firm’s voluntary disclosure strategy. Through implementing the 2SLS
regressions, I find that the specific firm’s disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and
the disclosure of bad news are significantly influenced by its peers firms’ disclosure
behaviors. Moreover, certain types of firms tend to be more sensitive to their peer
firms’ voluntary disclosure strategy. Finally, I find that the specific leader-follower
relation doesn’t exist in the peer effects of disclosure strategy and thus the herding
theory and free rider theory are not major reasons to explain this phenomenon. My
dissertation contributes to accounting literature by providing new evidence in
explaining the managerial incentive behind the voluntary disclosure.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter

Page

1

Introduction

2

Can Sustainability Reports Substitute the Traditional Financial Statements:
Evidence from Disclosure Quality, Earnings Quality and Audit Fee?
Introduction
5
Literature Review
12
Hypotheses Development
17
Sample Selection
22
Research design
25
Empirical Results
30
Additional Tests
48
Conclusions
51

3

Cost Stickiness and Management Earnings Forecast
Introduction
Literature Review
Hypotheses Development
Research Design
Empirical Results
Additional Tests
Conclusions

4

1

How Industry Peer Firms Influence the Voluntary Disclosure Strategy?
Introduction
Literature Review
Hypotheses Development
Research Design
Sample
Empirical Results
Additional Tests
Conclusions

54
59
65
69
76
89
94

98
103
107
110
117
122
139
146

References

148

Appendix: Variable Definitions

158

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

1. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation

33

2. Earnings Quality and Disclosing and Nondisclosing Firms

34

3. Audit Fees for the Disclosing and Nondisclosing Firms

39

4. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation for the OLS
Regression Sample

42

5. The Relation between Earnings Quality and Disclosure Quantity/Quality

45

6. The Relation between Audit Fees and Disclosure Quantity/Quality

48

7. Earnings Quality and Audit Fees for the Firm Before/After the
First Time Disclosure

49

8. Descriptive Statistics of the Relation between Cost Stickiness
and MEF Issuance

77

9. Pearson Correlation to Test the Relation between Cost Stickiness
and MEF Issuance

78

10. The Relation between Cost Stickiness and MEF Issuance

80

11. Descriptive Statistics to Test the Relation between Cost Stickiness
and MEF Expectation

83

12. Pearson Correlation to Test the Relation between Cost Stickiness
and MEF Expectation

84

13. The Relation between Cost Stickiness and MEF Expectation

87

14. The Effect of Cost Stickiness on Long-horizon and Short-horizon
Management Earnings Forecast

90

15. The Effect of Firm Efficiency on the Relation between Cost
Stickiness and MEF

95

16. Descriptive Statistics to Test the Effect of Industry Peer Firms on
Voluntary Disclosure

120

17. Pearson Correlation to Test the Effect of Industry Peer Firms on
Voluntary Disclosure

124

18. The Effect of Peer Firms’ MEF Characteristics on the Specific Firm’s
MEF Characteristics

127

vii

19. The Effect of Peer Firms’ Management Earnings Expectation on
the Specific Firm’s Management Earnings Expectation

131

20. The Effect of Peer Firms’ MEF Change on the Specific Firm’s
MEF Change

133

21. The Effect of Peer Firms’ Management Earnings Expectation Change
on the Specific Firm’s Management Earnings Expectation Change

137

22. Which Firms are More Sensitive to Peers’ Voluntary Disclosure Strategy?

141

23. The Leader-Follower Relationship in the Peer Firms’ Effect on MEF
– Reduced Form

145

viii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The importance of an effective corporate communication with all stakeholders
including shareholders has been extensively debated in the business literature in the
aftermath of 2007-2009 global financial crisis. The key indicator of business value
have shifted from accounting profits and stock market performance, formerly, to firm
reputation and sustainability performance, currently. Therefore, the transparency and
value-relevance of conventional financial reporting has been questioned in terms of its
capability to satisfy increasing information needs of all stakeholders. Many doubt
whether those traditional financial metrics derived from financial statements can
appropriately capture firm’s long-term value creation ability. In recent years, users of
corporate reports are demanding more relevant financial and non-financial on key
performance indicators and forward looking information above and beyond
conventional financial statements. To satisfy the demands of information users and
decision makers, companies are expected to not only increase their reporting
transparency in conventional financial statements but also disclose more inside
information to outside public through different types of voluntary disclosure.
The first dissertation investigates the role of sustainability report through
examining the associations among voluntary disclosure, earnings quality and audit
fee. Recently more and more firms begin to release sustainability reports, one
important channel of voluntary disclosure, to satisfy the needs of information users
and increase the transparency of financial reporting. In this paper, I especially
examine the effect of voluntary disclosure quality on those associations. Through
Difference-in-Difference test, I find that the release of sustainability report is
positively correlated with innate earnings quality and negatively correlated with
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discretionary earnings quality. Moreover, the positive (negative) correlation between
sustainability report and innate (discretionary) earnings quality is more (less)
pronounced when the voluntary disclosure quality is high. I also find that the release
of sustainability report is associated with higher audit fees and thus it suggests that the
sustainability report cannot substitute the traditional financial statement. My
conclusions are robust through additional tests of OLS regressions. This paper has
important political, academic and industry application.
The second dissertation investigates how the firm’s cost stickiness strategy is
associated with the firm’s management earnings forecast (MEF). I conjecture that the
managerial incentive regarding the cost strategy and voluntary disclosure strategy are
interdependent. When managers choose their cost management, they will also choose
the corresponding management earnings forecast strategy to align their interests.
Through the empirical tests with a sample between year 2005 and 2011, I find that the
firm’s level of sticky cost is positively associated with the firm’s propensity to issue
MEF and the frequency of MEF. Moreover, I find that the firm’s level of sticky cost is
associated with more good earnings news forecasted by managers. Finally, I find that
the relation between cost stickiness and MEF behaviors is more pronounced when the
MEF is long-horizon oriented and when the firm efficiency is high. My research
builds a link between financial accounting information and managerial accounting
information, and also provides new evidence to understand the managerial incentives
behind each strategy chosen by managers.
This third dissertation investigates how industry peer firms tend to influence
the specific firm’s voluntary disclosure strategy. Through examining the empirical
example of management earnings forecast between 2005 and 2011 and implementing
the 2SLS regressions, I find that the specific firm’s disclosure frequency, disclosure
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horizon and the disclosure of bad news are significantly influenced by its peers firms’
disclosure behaviors. Specifically, the increase in the peers’ disclosure frequency,
disclosure horizon and disclosure of bad news tend to encourage the specific firm to
increase its disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and disclosure of bad news.
Moreover, certain firms (such as firms with S&P credit rating, higher profit, larger
size or higher market-to-book ratio) tend to be more sensitive to their peer firms’
voluntary disclosure strategy. Finally, I find that the specific leader-follower relation
doesn’t exist in the peer effects of disclosure strategy and thus the signaling theory,
litigation risk and CEO reputation are more major reasons than herding theory and
free rider theory in explaining this phenomenon.
The Figure 1 illustrate the framework of the dissertation and how the
dissertation contributes to the current accounting literature. In the first paper, I
investigate the association between financial statements and voluntary disclosure
within the financial reporting system. Specifically, I examine how voluntary
disclosure, measured as sustainability report, is associated with earnings quality and
audit fee which are metrics derived from financial statements. In the second paper, I
build a bridge between managerial accounting and financial accounting to investigate
the interdependence between managers’ strategies within the accounting information
system. Finally, in the third paper, I discuss how the industry peer firms, which is an
external factor outside the firm, can influence the specific firm’s inside managerial
strategy of voluntary disclosure. In conclusion, the dissertation can provide new
evidence for the role of managerial incentive and managerial behaviors in the
voluntary disclosure and has the academic, industry and political applications.
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CHAPTER 2
CAN SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS SUBSTITUTE THE TRADITIONAL
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: EVIDENCE FROM DISCLOSURE QUALITY,
EARNINGS QUALITY AND AUDIT FEE?

1. Introduction
The importance of an effective corporate communication with all stakeholders
including shareholders has been extensively debated in the business literature in the
aftermath of 2007-2009 global financial crisis. The key indicator of business value
have shifted from accounting profits and stock market performance, formerly, to firm
reputation and sustainability performance, currently. Therefore, the transparency and
value-relevance of conventional financial reporting has been questioned in terms of its
capability to satisfy increasing information needs of all stakeholders. Many doubt
whether those traditional financial metrics derived from financial statements can
appropriately capture firm’s long-term value creation ability. In recent years, users of
corporate reports are demanding more relevant financial and non-financial on key
performance indicators and forward looking information above and beyond
conventional financial statements. To satisfy the demands of information users and
decision makers, companies are expected to not only increase their reporting
transparency in conventional financial statements but also disclose more nonfinancial
information related to firm long-term sustainability performance. In earlier years,
sustainability reporting is limited to firm’s performance related to green project or
carbon emission control. Today, the sustainability reports are popular in worldwide
and expanded to convey information related to every aspect of firm sustainability
operation and performance. In this paper, I use the sustainability report compiled by
Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) to measure voluntary disclosure. A sustainability
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report is a report published by a company or organization about the economic,
environmental and social impacts caused by its everyday activities. According to the
Value of Sustainability Reporting of Ernst & Young published in 2014 1, firms
implement the sustainability reporting as one of new communication methods to gain
better reputation, meet the expectation of employees, improve access to capital,
increase operation efficiency and reduce waste. The KPMG Survey of Corporate
Responsibility Reporting 2013 suggests that more than 80 percent of reporting
companies identify both business risks and commercial opportunities from the
sustainability reports (KPMG, 2013).
Following this trend, till now, more than 40 countries’ regulators are
developing proposals or have updated disclosure requirements for firm sustainability
reporting2. For example, in 2014 the Australia Stock Exchange (ASX) have developed
a new version of nonfinancial information disclosure regulations to require listed
companies to inform investors the environmental and social sustainability risk faced
by firms and firms’ related risk management strategies. European Commission
developed the proposal for mandatory sustainability disclosure in 2013 and finally in
April 15, 2014 has passed the regulation that companies with more than 500
employees must release sustainability report. The scope of this regulation includes
approximately 6000 large companies and groups across European Union (EU
Commission, 2014) 3.

1

The Value of Sustainability Reporting by Ernst & Young is available at:
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY__Value_of_sustainability_reporting/$FILE/EY-Value-of-Sustainability-Reporting.pdf .
2

According to the Report of Current Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure
Efforts by National Governments and Stock Exchanges by Initiative for Responsible
Investment (IRI) at Harvard University.
3

Data from website of European Commission.
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According to GRI, 95% percent of the Global 250 issue sustainability reports.
However, this new reporting channel has not yet obtained sufficient attention from
accounting academic research. Jones (2007) finds that firms with a lower book-tomarket ratio are more likely to disclose more detailed information about R&D
activities. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) suggest that firms issuing corporate social (CSR)
reports enjoy a lower cost of equity capital and attract more equity capital raising.
Dhaliwal et al. (2012) suggest that CSR reports can effectively reduce information
asymmetry through decreasing financial analysts’ earnings forecast errors. In this
paper, I examine the association between voluntary disclosure measured by
sustainability report and the metrics, such as earnings quality and audit fee, derived
from financial statements.
Results of prior research on the association between voluntary disclosure and
earnings quality are inconclusive. For a long time, accounting research argues
whether voluntary disclosure is a substitute or a complement to earnings quality. The
former research suggests that more voluntary disclosures are substitutable to the lower
earnings quality (Milgrom, 1981; Verrecchia, 1983; Sengupta, 1998; and Tasker,
1998). In contrast, the latter research suggests that more voluntary disclosures are
complementary to the higher earnings quality (e.g., Dye, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1988;
Verrecchia, 1990; Penno, 1997; Francis et al., 2008). Moreover, recent papers argue
whether management earnings forecast, a type of voluntary disclosure, can shift
managers’ attention from long-term performance to short-term earnings and lead to
myopic behaviors, such as earnings management. Call et al. (2014) suggest firms
issuing short-term management earnings forecast exhibit a better earnings quality and
less earnings management. In contrast, Feng et al. (2012) and Koch et al. (2012) find
that management earnings forecast is associated with a lower earnings quality and a
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higher probability of earnings management. Moreover, Acito (2014) finds no
statistical relation between quarterly management earnings forecast and the likelihood
of earnings management. Acito suggests that guiding firms recognize large abnormal
accruals to beat management forecasts but non-guiding firms recognize large
abnormal accruals to beat financial analysts’ forecasts. Furthermore, Moon (2014)
suggests that management earnings forecast is positively correlated with innate
earnings quality and negatively correlated with discretionary earnings quality. In
conclusion, the controversial arguments in prior papers intrigue my interests in
revisiting the association between voluntary sustainability disclosure and earnings
quality.
Following Moon (2014), I classify earnings quality into two different
perspectives, innate earnings quality and discretionary earnings quality. Innate
earnings quality refers to earnings quality derived from firm innate traits and
discretionary earnings quality refers to earnings quality which is not derived from
firm innate traits. I conjecture that sustainability disclosure is positively correlated
with innate earnings quality and negatively correlated with discretionary earnings
quality due to following two reasons. First, an increasing number of companies and
organizations want to make their operations sustainable and contribute to sustainable
development, because sustainability reporting can help managers to measure,
understand, and communicate firms’ economic, environmental, social and governance
performance. Hence sustainability disclosure can help managers plan and control firm
operations and strategies and thus may improve the firm’s innate earnings quality
through meeting the firm’s sustainable performance. Second, the sustainability report
is a type of voluntary disclosure and its format, content and timing are all controlled
and determined by managers. Moreover, currently most of sustainability reports are
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not required to be verified by the independent third party. Hence sustainability
disclosure provides managers with more discretion in communicating firms’ inside
information to outsiders. Therefore, the higher possibility of managerial opportunism
caused by sustainability report tends to reduce the firm’s discretionary earnings
quality.
From these two aspects, I expect that sustainability reporting is positively
associated with innate earnings quality (the supplementary relation) and negatively
associated with discretionary earnings quality (the substitutable relation). Moreover,
the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings quality depends on the
quality of disclosure. Most of prior papers pay more attention to the quantity of
voluntary disclosure instead of the quality. However, unclear and illogical disclosure
without specific numeric description cannot satisfy the demands of accounting
information users (Li, 2008; Lehavy et al. 2011). The inclusion of important key
words based on reasonable framework is also an important indicator of disclosure
quality, which can guide investors to make decisions (Li et al., 2013). Furthermore,
the tone of disclosure also affects the usefulness of disclosure through influencing the
perceptions and behaviors of investors and financial analysts (Kothari et al., 2009; Li
et al., 2011). In conclusion, better quality of disclosure can increase the efficiency and
effectiveness information communication, and thus firm will experience better
performance in the operation and the capital market. Therefore, I conjecture that
disclosure quality can significantly influence the relation between innate/discretionary
earnings quality and sustainability disclosure.
After the discussion of benefit of sustainability disclosure, I also examine
whether sustainability reports can substitute our traditional financial statements,
because sustainability reports are advantageous in not only improving earnings quality
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but also providing insight into long-term future of environmental, social and
governance performance. I investigate this question by examining the relation
between sustainability reports and audit fees. If sustainability reports can substitute
traditional financial statements, accounting information users then will reduce the
requirement of verification level on financial statements and thus auditors tend to
charge lower audit fees.
I collect the data of sustainability disclosures from GRI database between
1999 and 2013. I use both matching group approach based on market value and
industry benchmark and the OLS regression approach to test my hypotheses. Through
both methods, I find that sustainability disclosure is positively correlated with innate
earnings quality and negatively correlated with discretionary earnings quality.
Moreover, through the DID test, I find that the disclosure quality, measured as the
application level of GRI framework in preparing sustainability report, can strengthen
the positive correlation between innate earnings quality and sustainability report and
mitigate the negative correlation between discretionary earnings quality and
sustainability report. In other words, when disclosure quality is high, the positive
correlation between innate earnings quality and sustainability report is more
pronounced and the negative correlation between discretionary earnings quality and
sustainability report is less pronounced. Moreover, I find that sustainability report is
positively associated with audit fees, which suggests that sustainability reports are
complementary not substitutable to traditional financial statements. After releasing
sustainability reports, accounting information users don’t reduce the verification level
required on financial statements, and thus auditors will charge higher audit fee
premium because they view sustainability reports as higher litigation risk or more
managers’ discretion. However, this audit fee premium will reduce, if the
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sustainability reports are with better quality. In conclusion, my results suggest that
regulators should provide more guidance to help companies to release good-quality
voluntary disclosures and companies should also governance and oversee their quality
of voluntary disclosure.
Because prior research has not paid sufficient attention to sustainability
reporting, I believe this paper can contribute accounting literature by filling the
research gap. First, Paper 1 of my dissertation is different from most of prior papers
which focus on financial disclosure, such as management earnings forecasts. I
examine sustainability reporting which has been released by most of big companies
across worldwide. Recently, more and more regulators are also considering updating
the related regulations to encourage or mandatorily require companies to release
sustainability reporting to increase transparence and usefulness of accounting
information. Thus my paper has significant implications for both practitioners and
regulators. Second, I suggest the importance role of disclosure quality which is
neglected by most prior research. The results suggest disclosure quality is
significantly correlated with the efficiency and effectiveness of information
communication. Although both Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) and Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board (SASB) are continuously developing the guidance which
provides the useful framework for firms to create sustainability reporting with high
quality, I suggest that a more comprehensive and internationally recognized standard
of disclosure quality need to be established and that regulators should encourage
companies to follow that kind of disclosure quality standards to improve the reliability
and comparability of sustainability reporting. Finally, the paper provides new
evidence for the current accounting research debate. Following Moon (2014), I
investigate the relation between earnings quality and voluntary disclosure through
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classifying the earnings quality into innate and discretionary earnings quality.
Through implementing the measures of different types of earnings quality, this paper
provides new evidence for the controversial issue regarding the relation between
earnings quality and voluntary disclosure and especially point outs that the disclosure
quality plays a moderator role in this relation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: I review the related
literature in the section 2 and develop the theory-driven hypotheses in the section 3.
Then I discuss the sample selection and descriptive statistics in the section 4. Detailed
research design, including measurements and models, are described in the section 5.
After that, I present the empirical results and additional tests in the section 6 and
section 7 respectively. Finally, I present the conclusion in section 8.
2. Literature Review
2.1 Nonfinancial Disclosure
Prior research has once paid more attention to financial disclosure instead of
nonfinancial disclosure, because the limited access to database. Robb et al. (2001) is
one of the earliest studies which examine firms’ strategies of voluntary nonfinancial
disclosure. The authors find that larger firms and firms with a global focus tend to
voluntarily disclose more nonfinancial information. Vanstraelen et al. (2003)
investigate the benefits of nonfinancial disclosure and find that the quantity of
nonfinancial disclosure is negatively correlated with the errors and dispersions of
financial analysts’ earnings forecasts. Both Robb et al. (2001) and Vanstraelen et al.
(2003) construct their variables of nonfinancial disclosure by self-counting the
nonfinancial information conveyed in financial annual reports. Another stream of
nonfinancial disclosure study is to investigate the MD&A. Although MD&A contains
financial information related to past earnings and future earnings forecast, it also
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provides investors with supplementary nonfinancial information related to
management strategies and planning. Prior research suggest MD&A is determined by
firm specific characteristics and managers’ strategies (Clarkson et al., 1994; Clarkson
et al., 1999 ) and can reduce information asymmetry and help information users make
decisions (Barron et al., 1999; Cole and Jones, 2004;Sun, 2010; Wheeler et al., 2014).
Although MD&A can provide investors with certain nonfinancial information and
perspective information, regulators are still concerned about the informativeness of
MD&A. Brown and Tucker (2011) find that the frequency of MD&A modification
has declined in the past decade and the price reaction to MD&A modification scores
has also weakened although the length of MD&A has become longer. Because the
usefulness of MD&A has reduced, to satisfy the demands of information users,
managers are releasing more and more standalone reports related to firm nonfinancial
information, such as environmental reports, corporate social responsibility (CSR)
reports and sustainability reports. However, there is a long-term argument
surrounding the benefits and costs of these types of standalone nonfinancial reports.
Especially many argue that the increased environmental and CSR reporting can
increase the litigation risk and thus reduce economic performance (socio-political
theories). Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) develop a simultaneous equation approach and
find that environmental disclosure is positively correlated with both environmental
performance and economics performance. Clarkson et al. (2008) revisit the relation
between environmental performance and environmental disclosure and also reject the
socio-political theories. Consistently, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) and Dhaliwal et al.
(2012) respectively provide USA and international evidence on the informativeness of
standalone CSR report by showing an information asymmetry reduction after CSR
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reporting. In conclusion, prior research suggests that nonfinancial disclosure is
informative and can benefit the firm in long-run.
2.2 Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings Quality
Prior research has once debated the relation between voluntary disclosure and
earnings quality for a long-time period. Earlier papers (Milgrom, 1981; Verrecchia,
1983; Sengupta, 1998; Tasker, 1998) suggest that voluntary disclosure is associated
with worse earnings quality (substitutive relation). For example, Milgrom (1981)
examines how market interprets the good news and bad news in the information
economy. By building the analytical models, the author finds manager will fully
disclose at every sequential equilibrium, because investors hold skeptical view of any
information the manager conceals. Verrecchia (1983) finds a similar result that the
firm tries to disclose more information, because otherwise the market will interpret
the silence as bad news and then discount the firm’s value. Sengupta (1998) concludes
the disclosure is more important where there is greater market uncertainty about the
firm. This stream of research considers earnings quality as exogenous and usually
uses information asymmetry to measure the earnings quality. They conclude firm with
lower earnings quality (higher information asymmetry) will be more likely to disclose
private information.
However, some other works show there is an endogenous relation between
disclosure and earnings quality (Dye, 1985; Waymire, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1988;
Verrecchia, 1990; Francis et al., 2008). This research stream indicates that firm with
higher earnings quality tends to disclose more information (the complementary
relation). For example, using the model of voluntary disclosure provided by
Verrecchia (1983), Verrecchia (1990) uses the precision of information observed by
manager to measure information quality, instead of information asymmetry, and then
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finds that the disclosure is positively related to the quality of private information.
Francis et al. (2008) re-examine this issue by using the self-constructed measurement
to capture voluntary disclosure in the 10-Ks and using the accruals quality, earnings
variability and absolute abnormal accruals to measure earnings quality. Their
empirical results suggest there is a positive relation between voluntary disclosure and
earnings quality. Thus their work supports the complementary relation that firms with
higher earnings quality tend to release more voluntary disclosures.
However, the relation between voluntary disclosure and earnings quality still
remains inconclusive. The analytical research in Penno (1997) concludes that the
relation between information quality and voluntary disclosure depends on how
information quality influences the probability of being informed. In some region of
the function, as the probability of being informed increases, the author finds the
reduction in information quality makes disclosure less likely. However, if higher
information quality significantly decreases the probability of being informed, the
author finds disclosure may have negative relation with information quality. Thus the
author concludes the relation between earnings quality and disclosure depends on the
probability that manager obtains information. Moreover, when Francis et al. (2008)
use management forecast behavior and conference call activity to measure voluntary
disclosure, they find weak evidence of a substitutive relation instead of
complementary relation. Thus the measurements of voluntary disclosure may matter.
Even if using the same measurement to capture voluntary disclosure, prior
research has controversial conclusion regarding the relation between management
earnings forecast and earnings quality. McKinsey (2006) reports: “the practice of
guidance has become ‘misguided’ as there is an excessive focus on short-term
‘number games’ rather than long-term firm health and future business condition.”
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Moreover, both Proposals by CFA Institute (CFA Institute 2006, 2) and U.S. Chamber
of Commerce (2007) suggest that management earnings forecasts should be
discontinued. Many executives have viewed MEF as impractical and irresponsible
given the current financial crisis and market volatility (Corporate Counsel report,
2010). Therefore, many people express concerns whether management earnings
forecast will shift managers’ attention from long-term sustainable performance to
short-term earnings and thus will encourage myopic earnings management. Consistent
with this concern, Feng et al. (2011) suggest that firms manipulating earnings
strategically use management earnings forecast to conceal their misstatements and to
delay the detection of those misstatements. Koch et al. (2012) argue that the
probability of management earnings forecast is inversely correlated with constraints
on future earnings management and thus guiding firms tend to manage their earnings
to meet their own forecasts. In contrast, Acito (2014) find that both guiding firms and
non-guiding firms tend to conduct earnings management and thus there is no statistic
relation between management earnings forecast and earnings quality. Moreover, Call
et al. (2014) find strong and consistent evidence that firms releasing management
earnings forecasts exhibit better earnings quality instead of worse earnings quality.
Recently, Moon (2014) provides evidence for both complementary and substitutive
relation by classifying the earnings quality into innate and discretionary earnings
quality. The author finds that management earnings forecast is positively correlated
with innate earnings quality and negatively correlated with accrual earnings quality.
In conclusion, the usefulness of nonfinancial disclosure is incompletely
answered and the relation between voluntary disclosure and earnings quality remains
controversial. This inspires me to investigate the relations among sustainability
disclosure, sustainability disclosure quality and earnings quality in this paper.
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3. Hypotheses Development
3.1 Sustainability Disclosure and Earnings Quality
Different from financial disclosure, such as management earnings forecast,
sustainability reporting is a type of nonfinancial disclosure. Sustainability reporting
provides information related to firm operations structure, strategies, suppliers,
customers, production, employees, and research and the like, and thus introduces the
firm’s business philosophy. In contrast, financial statements use only numbers to
describe firm accounting profits. Therefore, the sustainability reporting can inform not
only outsiders but also managers of the firm’s potential opportunities and problems.
The goal of sustainability reporting is to help managers design strategies for firm
future operation and help accounting information users to estimate the firm’s longterm value. Because sustainability disclosure comprehensively reviews and forecasts
the firm financial and nonfinancial performance and focuses on long-term sustainable
performance, this will also improve the firms’ innate traits in every aspect. Therefore,
I expect that innate earnings quality derived from firm purchases, sales and
capitalization will increase with the release of sustainability disclosure.
However, the release of sustainability disclosure also provides more discretion
for managers. As a type of voluntary disclosure, managers can control and determine
the format, content, tone and disclosing timing of sustainability report. Because of
more managerial discretion, managers have the incentive to choose the partial
disclosure instead of full disclosure. Specifically, through sustainability disclosure,
managers can deliberately leak the information they want investors and analysts to
know and withhold the information they don’t want investors and analysts to know.
Kothari et al. (2009) provide evidence that managers tend to immediately disclose
good news and delay the release of bad news to reduce the negative reaction from
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stock market caused by bad news. Moreover, prior research finds that managers may
disclose earnings forecasts to adjust market expectation towards beatable earnings
target (Baik and Jiang, 2006; Cotter et al., 2006). Because the sustainability disclosure
will encourage managerial opportunism, I expect that discretionary earnings quality
will decrease due to more managerial discretion, when the firm releases the
sustainability report. In conclusion, based on the two reasons mentioned above, I
develop the hypotheses as following:
H1a: Sustainability reporting is positively associated with innate earnings quality.
H1b: Sustainability reporting is negatively associated with discretionary earnings
quality.
3.2 Disclosure Quality and Earnings Quality
Because sustainability reporting is a type of voluntary disclosure, managers
have more discretion to determine the content, volume and timing of disclosure. Prior
papers suggest that managers are myopically motivated to withhold certain
information or delay certain disclosure to achieve strategical purposes (Patell and
Wolfson, 1982; Baginski et al.,1995; Hirshleifer and Teoh,2003; Hirshleifer et
al.,2009) .Moreover, voluntary disclosure may also be unconsciously or intentionally
biased by managers. Therefore, the usefulness of sustainability reporting is directly
influenced by the disclosure quality. The quality of disclosure includes the accuracy,
transparency, logicality of disclosure. First, accuracy of disclosure suggests that there
is no significant bias in the sustainability reporting. Coram et al. (2009) and Simnett et
al. (2009) find that assurance is an important indicator of the credibility of
sustainability reporting. Second, transparency of disclosure is related to the texture
analysis of disclosure content, and prior paper suggests the tone and readability of
disclosure are indicators of disclosure quality (Li, 2008; Kothari et al. 2009; Li, 2010;
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Lehavy et al. 2011). For example, lower performed firms tend to use reports which
are hard to read to conceal the potential financial and operational problems and to
mislead the market (Li, 2008; Lehavy et al. 2011). Kothari et al. (2009) and Li (2010)
find that the appropriate tone of disclosure can significantly influence the usefulness
of disclosure through affecting users’ behaviors and perceptions. Finally, the
logicality of disclosure indicates that the disclosure is constructed based on logical
framework and contains the relevant and complete information needed by users. For
example, Li et al. (2013) suggest that appropriate key words contained in the report
can increase the usefulness of disclosure. In conclusion, disclosure quality is
associated with the effectiveness and efficiency of information communication, and
firms have propensity to conceal their financial or operating problems through
releasing voluntary disclosures with low quality. Sustainability reporting with good
quality indicates that managers have a greater propensity to reduce information
asymmetry and reduce myopic behaviors to achieve long-term reputation and
sustainable performance.
As mentioned above, prior papers have controversial conclusions of the
relation between sustainability reporting and earnings quality. One potential reason is
that prior papers considered the quantity of disclosure but neglected the quality of
disclosure. In fact, the accuracy, readability, tone and logicality of disclosure can
significantly influence how investors perceive and implement related information
contained in the sustainability reporting. Therefore, the relation between sustainability
reporting and earnings quality is influenced by disclosure quality. Specifically, better
disclosure quality can further improve firm operations derived from preparing the
sustainability disclosure and thus can strengthen the positive relation between
sustainability disclosure and innate earnings quality. Moreover, the higher level of
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requirements for disclosure quality can limit managerial discretion in preparing
sustainability disclosure and thus will alleviate the negative relation between
sustainability disclosure and discretionary earnings quality. Therefore, I develop
following hypotheses:
H2a: The positive relation between sustainability reporting and innate earnings quality
is more (less) pronounced for firms with better (worse) disclosure quality.
H2b: The negative relation between sustainability reporting and discretionary
earnings quality is less (more) pronounced for firms with better (worse) disclosure
quality.
3.3 Sustainability Disclosure, Disclosure Quality and Audit Fees
There is a trend that more and more firms are releasing sustainability reports
which focus on firm long-term value. The European Commission also has passed the
law which requires big companies to release their financial reports based on
sustainability framework. Because sustainability reports provide a comprehensive
illustration of firm future financial and nonfinancial performance, I are considering in
the future whether sustainability reports can substitute the traditional financial
statements which only focus on short-term financial performance. Following Ball et
al. (2012), I examine this issue through the confirmation hypothesis. If sustainability
reports can substitute the traditional financial statements, accounting information
investors will require a lower level of verification on financial statements, because the
usefulness of audited financial statements decreases significantly. The lower level of
verification on financial statements will also reduce the resources and skills needed
for auditing, and thus the audit fees will decrease. In contrast, if sustainability reports
cannot substitute the traditional financial statements and the level of verification on
financial statements required by information users doesn’t change, the audit fees will
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not change after the release of sustainability reports. However, there is also a
possibility that information users still need the high level of verification on financial
statements and auditors view the release of sustainability reports as higher litigation
risk or more managers’ discretion. Then audit fees may increase, because auditors
need to devote additional resources into reading the information contained in the
sustainability report to ensure that the major content of sustainability report is
consistent with the financial statements. Because all the three explanations are
plausible, I don’t conjecture a specific relation between audit fees and sustainability
reports. In contrast, I construct a null hypothesis:
H3: There is no correlation between sustainability disclosure and audit fees.
As mentioned above, disclosure quality plays a significant role in explaining
the effectiveness and efficiency of information communication, and thus I believe the
disclosure quality can influence the relation between sustainability disclosure and
audit fees. If the sustainability reports can substitute audited financial statements and
the sustainability reports are with good quality, then sustainability disclosure with 100
percent of assurance will make the third-party assurance, such as audit service,
become meaningless and thus the audit fees will become zero. If the sustainability
reports are complement to audited financial statements, the good-quality sustainability
reports can reduce the litigation risk and thus reduce the audit fees. Because both the
two explanations are plausible, I don’t conjecture the specific effect of disclosure
quality on the relation between sustainability disclosure and audit fees, and thus
develop a null hypothesis:
H4: Disclosure quality is not the factor which may influence the relation between
sustainability disclosure and audit fees.
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4. Sample Selection
I collect the data of sustainability reporting from database of Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI), a not-for-profit organization which “promotes the use of
sustainability reporting as a way for organizations to become more sustainable and
contribute to sustainable development”. GRI provides the list of organizations
releasing sustainability reports since 1999 and also evaluate the quality of
sustainability reports based on GRI Sustainability Reporting Framework. GRI
provides the information of sustainability reports released by organizations from all
over the world. However, in this paper I only use the data of sustainability reports
released by USA corporates. I select GRI database over other corporate sustainability
report databases, because of following reasons. First, GRI is a USA not-for-profit
organization found in 1997 and is supported by the Coalition for Environmentally
Responsible Economies and the Tellus Institute. Thus GRI has longer history and
better technique support compared to other organizations which also collect the data
of sustainability reports. Second, GRI has established its own frameworks and
guidelines to regulate the sustainability reports and has updated the guidelines for four
versions. These guidelines enjoy the synergies with the guidance of the International
Finance Corporation, the international Organization for Standardization’s ISO 26000,
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Earth Charter
Initiative. Thus the high quality of GRI guidelines can improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of sustainability report database established by the GRI. Thirdly, the GRI
has a very strong network structure through cooperating with government bodies
(such as Swedish International Development Organization, the Swiss-based State
Secretariat for Economic Affairs, the UK department for International Development,
and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and building partnership with various
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international organizations (such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, the United Nations Environment Programme, and the United Nations
Global Compact). The strong network and these strategic partners can help GRI to
build more comprehensive database and thus reduce the possibility of selection bias.
Moreover, the GRI has established its board of directors, governance bodies,
secretariat, government advisory group and organizational stakeholders. This wellestablished organizational structure can improve the quality of service and database
provided by GRI. Finally, the GRI receives the grants from nearly 600 organizations
from more than 60 countries (including 32 developing countries). Some examples of
donators include the European Commission, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the
United States Environment Protection Agency, UN Foundation, World Bank and
governmental bodies from Germany and Norway. Because the GRI receives grants
from a diverse range of organizations, this can guarantee the independence of the GRI
operations and thus improve the quality of GRI database. In conclusion, the rigorous
governance, various grants, strategic partnership with governance bodies, and the selfestablished sustainability report guideline guarantee the quality of GRI database and
thus provide better data source of sustainability reports.
I also collect fundamental variables and stock market performance from the
COMPUSTAT and CRSP database respectively. Audit fees and auditor information
are collected from AuditAnalytics. After database mergers, my final sample of OLS
regressions without missing values includes 1,858 firm-years between 1999 and 2013,
including 929 firm-year with sustainability disclosures and 929 matched firm-year
without sustainability disclosures. Through matching procedure, the criticism
regarding the representativeness of disclosure data may be lessened, because the
disclosing firms occupy only a small portion of the original sample. When I test the
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effect of sustainability disclosure on the audit fees, the sample size reduces to 1,570
without missing values. Finally, when I include the variables of disclosure quality into
the test, the sample size also correspondingly reduces significantly.
Moreover, to test the effect of disclosure quality on the relation between
voluntary disclosure and earnings quality/audit fees, I need to construct the interaction
term between disclosure quantity and disclosure quality. However, due to database
limit, the disclosure quantity is the dummy variable and thus the interaction term
cannot be generated, because the sample firm will have no available data of disclosure
quality if its disclosure quantity is zero. To solve this problem, I also employ the
Difference-in-Difference (DID) tests for my matched sample. DID is a more attractive
technique when I want to explain a causal relation and I am not access to the data of
certain control variables. In this paper, I construct the matched group based on both
firm size and firm performance. Following Bath et al. (2012), I first match the firms
which disclose at least one sustainability report according to GRI database
(Disclosing Firms) with firms which never disclose sustainability reports according to
GRI database (Non-disclosing Firms) in the same industry (two-digit SIC code). Then
I match the disclosing firms and those non-disclosing firms based on market value to
mitigate cost of capital and other economic differences un-attributable to
sustainability disclosure. I select the matched non-disclosing firms with market value
which is the nearest to disclosing firms’ market value. I believe my matching
procedure based on market value and industry can rule out the influences of many
other factors and can attribute the changes in earnings quality/audit fees to the release
of sustainability reports.
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5. Research Design
5.1 Sustainability disclosure and disclosure quality
Following Dhaliwal et al. (2011, 2012), I employ a dummy variable to proxy
the firms’ sustainability reporting behaviors. Disclose is equal to 1 if the firm releases
a sustainability report in the sample year and the report has been recorded in GRI
database. Otherwise Disclose is equal to zero.
To measure the quality of sustainability disclosure, I construct two
measurements. First, I determine whether the sustainability report is produced based
on GRI Framework. According to introduction on the website of GRI, “GRI's mission
is to make sustainability reporting standard practice for all companies and
organizations. Its Framework is a reporting system that provides metrics and methods
for measuring and reporting sustainability-related impacts and performance.” The
GRI Framework includes guidelines, sector guidance and other resources which help
organizations release a systematical disclosure of their governance approach and of
their environmental, social and economic performance and also improve the
usefulness of disclosure which can be easily used and understood by shareholders,
potential investors, financial analysts and experts, labor, civil society and government.
Till 2014, GRI has already released several versions of sustainability reporting
frameworks, including G1, G2, G3, G3, and G4. The G1 is the earliest version and
implemented by sustainability reports released in early 21th century. G4 is the latest
version of GRI Framework and employed by most recent sustainability reports. The
GRI database evaluates whether the sustainability reports follow the GRI Framework
and classifies the sustainability reports into seven ranks, including following G1,
following G2, following G3, following G3.1, following G4, following GRI only
referenced, and non-following GRI. The first disclosure quality variable (DIS_Q1) is
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equal to 1 if the firms release sustainability reports following GRI Framework G1,
G2, G3, G3.1 or G4. The variable (DIS_Q1) is equal to 0 if the firms release
sustainability reports which are not based on any GRI Framework or which mention
GRI Framework as only reference. I believe those sustainability reports following
GRI Frameworks have better disclosure quality than those reports which don’t follow
any GRI Framework.
The second measurement of disclosure quality (DIS_Q2) is how disclosing
firms apply GRI Frameworks in preparing their sustainability reports. GRI classifies
the sustainability reports’ application level of GRI Frameworks into 11 ranks. I give
corresponding scores to each firm based on their application level. I respectively give
1 to 9 scores to each firm with application level as “Undeclared”, “Reference Only”,
“In Accordance” or “In accordance – Core”, “Content Index Only”, “C”, “C+”, “B”,
“B+”, “A” and “A+”. Higher scores indicate better application level of GRI
Framework and thus better disclosure quality.
5.2 Earnings Quality
I employ modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach as the measurement
of earnings quality. Following McNichols (2002), Dechow and Dichev (2002) and
Francis et al. (2004), I estimate the following cross-sectional regression for each firmyear:
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(1)

where 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 is the total current accrual in year t. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 is the average total assets in
year t and year t-1. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 , and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1 are respectively cash flow from year
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t-1, t and t+1, measured as total accruals minus net income before extraordinary items
and discontinued operations. I obtained residuals from above regression (1) for each
firm and each year. The earnings quality (EQ) is measured as the standard deviation
of the residuals during the 5-year period prior to the year t.
To investigate the controversial augments regarding the relation between
earnings quality and voluntary disclosure, this paper also distinguishes the innate and
discretionary earnings quality. Following Moon (2014), the innate (discretionary)
earnings quality refers the degree of estimation error attributable (not attributable) to
the inherent firm trait. Therefore, innate earnings quality is associated with the
inherent operating uncertainty, such as firms’ cash flow or sales volatility. In contrast,
discretionary earnings quality reflects the management discretionary behaviors.
Therefore, the innate earnings quality (IEQ) is the predicted value and the
discretionary earnings quality (DEQ) is the residual from the equation (2) developed
by Moon (2014).

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 +
𝛽𝛽6 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝜀

(2)

This equation regresses of the earnings quality on inherent firm traits,
including firm size (SIZE) defined as the natural logarithm of total assets, cash flow
volatility (CFVOL), sales volatility (SALEVOL), operating cycle (OPCYCLE)
defined as the natural logarithm of operating cycle, the frequency of negative earnings
realizations during the previous five years (NEG), intangible assets scaled by total

27

assets 4(INT), and capital expenditures scaled by total assets (CAP). Specifically,
CFVOL (SALEVOL) is the standard deviation of cash flows (sales) scaled by total
assets over the previous five year window. I also include a dummy variable
(INTDUM), if research and development expenditure or advertising expenditure is the
missing value. To run the regression of equation 2, I winsorize all variables based on
the top and bottom 1 percentile level, except dummy variables. Following Moon
(2014), I also implement the BOX-COX transformation method to improve the linear
fit of the Model 2. Finally, I multiply EQ, IEQ and DEQ by -1 except in the
regression of Equation 2 and thus higher value of EQ, IEQ and DEQ is associational
with better quality.
I also implement several control variables associated with the costs of accrual
earnings managements. First, following Zang (2012), I use dummy variable, BIG8, to
proxy the quality of auditors. I believe BIG8 auditors are access to more resources
and better trainings and thus are associated with lower possibility of accrual earnings
managements. Second, the flexibility of firms’ accounting systems also influences the
accruals level. Following Barton and Simko (2002), I use net operating assets at the
beginning year (NOA t-1 ) to proxy managers’ accounting choice. If firms have more
net operating assets at the beginning year, the firms have less pressure in accruals
manipulations and thus have better earnings quality. Following Zang (2012), I
measure NOA that is equal to 1 if firm net operating assets at the beginning year
scaled by beginning sales are above the median of corresponding industry’s net
operating assets; zero otherwise. I also use the firm operating cycle (Cycle) to
measure the flexibility of firms’ accounting system. Firms with longer operating cycle

4

Following Moon (2014), intangible assets are measured as the sum of R&D
expenditures and advertisement expenditures, and missing values are set to zero.
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in accounts receivables and inventories will have more flexibility in accruals
management and thus have higher likelihood of lower earnings quality. I also include
natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE), book-to-market ratio at the beginning year
(BTM), return on assets (ROA), current assets to total assets ratio (Current) and
leverage ratio (Leverage) to control firm characteristics. I control year fixed effect for
macro economy condition and Fama-French 48 industry fixed effect for industry
tradition. The standard errors of regressions are adjusted for firm-level clustering. To
test the hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2, I construct following equations:

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸= α 0 + α 1 Disclosure + α 2 BIG8 + α 3 NOA + α 4 Cycle + α 5 ROA + α 6 SIZE +

α 7 *BTM + α 8 Current + α 9 Leverage + α 10 Year + α 11 Industry + ε 1

(3)

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸= α 0 +α 1 *Disclosure_Quality + α 2 *BIG8 + α 3 *NOA + α 4 *Cycle +
α 5 *ROA + α 6 *SIZE + α 7 *BTM + α 8 *Current + α 9 *Leverage +

α 10 *Year + α 11 *Industry+ ε 1

(4)

where EQ refers alternatively to innate earnings quality (IEQ) and discretionary
earnings quality (DEQ). Disclosure_Quality refers alternatively to whether firms
prepare sustainability reports following the GRI Framework (DIS_Q1) or the
application level of GRI Framework (DIS_Q2).
5.3Audit Fees
Audit fees are collected from AuditAnalytics Database. I measure audit fees
(Audit_Fee) as the natural logarithm of total audit fees in the sample year. Following
Ball et al. (2012), I employ several variables to control the audit complexity and audit
risk which may influence the total audit fees. First, I use the total accruals scaled by
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total assets (ACCR), the current assets scaled by total assets (Current), and the
number of business segments (Segment) to control the audit risk. For audit risk, I
control reporting lag, which is the time lag between earnings announcement date and
financial statement date (Report_Lag), firm performance level measured as ROA,
firm liability ratio which is the total liabilities scaled by total assets (Leverage), and
dummy variable (Loss) if the firm experiences a negative net income during the
sample year. Prior research suggests that firm size is positively correlated with audit
fees, and I use the natural logarithm of total assets to proxy firm size. Finally, I
construct a dummy variable (DEC) which equals to 1 if the firm has a December
fiscal year end to control for audit cost during peak season. Both year fixed effect and
industry fixed effects are controlled. I adjust the standard errors for firm-level
clustering. Therefore, I construct following regressions:

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹= α 0 + α 1 *Disclosure + α 2 *ACCR + α 3 *Current + α 4 *Segment +

α 5 *DEC + α 6 *Report_Lag + α 7 *SIZE + α 8 *ROA + α 9 *Leverage +
α 10 *Loss + α 11 *Year + α 12 *Industry + ε

(5)

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹= α 0 + α 1 *Disclosure_Quality + α 2 *ACCR + α 3 * Current + α 4 *Segment
+ α 5 *DEC + α 6 *Report_Lag + α 7 *SIZE + α 8 *ROA + α 9 *Leverage + α 10 *Loss +
α 11 *Year + α 12 *Industry + ε

(6)
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6. Empirical Results
6.1 Matching Group Procedure
6.1.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation for the DID
matching group sample. The Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for the four
variables examined in the DID test, including earnings quality (EQ), innate earnings
quality (IEQ), discretionary earnings quality (DEQ) and audit fees (Audit_Fee). Panel
B displays the Pearson correlation among the different components of earnings
quality and the audit fees. I find that total earnings quality is significantly and
positively correlated with either innate earnings quality or discretionary earnings
quality. Consistent with Moon (2014), I find that innate earnings quality and
discretionary earnings quality are not significantly and highly correlated to each other.
This suggests that my measurements of innate earnings quality and discretionary
earnings quality are valid, because the independent variable, IEQ, is not correlated
with the residual, DEQ, in the Equation 2. Finally, I find that innate earnings quality is
highly positively correlated with audit fees. However, I find that higher discretionary
earnings quality is associated with slightly lower audit fees. Panel C displays the
regression results of Equation 2 after the BOX-SOX transformation. As mentioned in
Section 5, the innate earning quality and discretionary earnings quality are
respectively the predicted value and the residual obtained from the Equation 2. My
regression results are consistent with prior research, and I find that firm size,
operating cycle and capital expenditure ratio are significantly and negatively
correlated with total earnings quality and that cash flow volatility, sales volatility,
frequency of negative earnings and intangible assets ratio are significantly and
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positively correlated with total earnings quality. This suggests my measurements of
different components of earnings quality are valid.
6.1.2 Earnings quality and sustainability disclosure
Table 2 illustrates the results of matching group procedure for hypothesis 1
and hypothesis 2. In Panel A, I employ a matching group procedure by matching
1,050 firm-years which release sustainability reports (disclosing firms) and
corresponding firms which don’t release any sustainability reports (non-disclosing
firms) during sample year 1999 to 2013, based on both market value and industry
benchmark. For innate earnings quality, I find that the disclosing firms’ mean value
(Mean IEQ disclosing = 4.4268) is higher than the non-disclosing firms’ mean value
(Mean IEQ nondisclosing = 4.167) and the difference is significant at the 1 percent level.
For discretionary earnings quality, I find that the disclosing firms’ mean value (Mean
DEQ disclosing = -0.2337) is lower than the matched non-disclosing firms’ mean value
(Mean DEQ nondisclosing = -0.0999) and the difference is significant at the 5 percent
level. Therefore, the sustainability disclosure is associated with better innate earnings
quality and in contrast is associated with worse discretionary earnings quality.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
EQ
IEQ
DEQ
LnFee

Mean
3.6282589
3.8441604
-0.21625
13.27346

Panel B: Pearson Correlation
EQ
EQ
1

Median
3.4870723
3.8969479
-0.2278504
13.31214

Std Dev
2.008519
1.119956
1.675275
1.535106

25th Pctl
2.1243557
3.0103912
-1.295371
12.119027

IEQ

DEQ

LnFee

-0.08821

1

IEQ

0.53439

DEQ

0.82669

-0.0303

LnFee

0.19159

0.47742

75th Pctl
4.9081508
4.6625982
0.8686067
14.344549

Panel C: Validity Test of Measurements of Earnings Quality
Variables
Intercept
SIZE
CFVOL
SALEVOL
OPCYCLE
NEG
INT
INTDUM
CAP
Adjusted R-Square

Coefficient
-2.95518
-0.427254
0.004501
0.001865
-0.000548
0.654011
3.308889
-0.16281
-15.82432

P-value
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0951
<.0001
<.0001
0.2477
<.0001

0.3144

Table 1 describes the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation for variables examined in the DID test. Panel A
provides the descriptive statistics. Panel B displays the Pearson correlation among the variables examined in the DID
test. Bold figures indicate the correlation is significant at less than 5 percent level. Panel C tests the validity of
measurements of earnings quality (EQ). The innate earnings quality (IEQ) is the predicted value of the regression
and the discretionary earnings quality (DEQ) is the residual obtained from the regression. I use the BOX-COX
transformation method to improve the linear fit of model, following Moon (2014).
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Table 2: Earnings Quality for Disclosing and Nondisclosing Firms
IEQ

DEQ

4.4268
4.167
0.2599***

-0.2337
-0.0999
-0.1338**

Panel A: Disclosing versus Nondisclosing firms
Disclosing Firms (N=1050)
Nondisclosing Firms (N=1050)
Disclosing - Nondisclosing

Panel B: Following GRI Guidance versus Non-Following GRI Guidance
Following Firms (N=894)
Disclosing Firms
Non-disclosing Firms
Disclosing - Nondisclosing

4.4072
4.1603
0.2468***

-0.3313
-0.1631
-0.1681***

Non-Following Firms (N=156)
Disclosing Firms
Non-disclosing Firms
Disclosing - Nondisclosing

4.5248
4.2021
0.3226***

-0.3018
-0.2238
-0.078

-0.0758

-0.0901

Following - Nonfollowing

Panel C: High versus Low GRI Framework Application level
High GRI Framework Application Level (N=495)
Disclosing Firms
Nondisclosing Firms
Disclosing - Nondisclosing

4.4242
4.1768
0.2474***

-0.2545
-0.2124
-0.0421

Low GRI Framework Application Level (N=151)
Disclosing Firms
Nondisclosing Firms
Disclosing - Nondisclosing

4.2196
4.1703
0.0493

-0.8306
-0.6646
-0.166***

0.1981***

0.1239**

High - Low Application Level

Table 2 presents the DID test for the relation betweeen earnings quality and sustainability report.
The first (second) column tests the difference in innate (discretionary) earnings quality between the
firms with sustainability report and firms without sustainability report. Panel B and C examine
whether disclosure quality can influence the relation between earnings quality and sustainability
report and the disclosure quality is respectively measured as the dummy variable whether the
sustainability report is prepared based on GRI framework and the application level of GRI
framework in preparing the sustainability report. The *, **, and *** repsectively indicate the
difference is significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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My results are consistent with Moon (2014) which suggests that management
earnings forecasts are positively (negatively) correlated with innate (discretionary)
earnings quality. When firms voluntarily disclose sustainability reports which include
both financial and nonfinancial information, managers will review and plan the firms
operating, financing and investing activities based on sustainable benchmark and thus
they will be more familiar with the every aspect of running the firms. Because the
innate earnings quality is derived from firm inherent operations, the disclosure of
sustainability report will also improve the firm’s innate earnings quality. However, the
voluntary sustainability disclosure will also provide more discretion for management
opportunism, especially when current laws have not yet required the voluntary
sustainability reports to be verified by the auditors. Therefore, the discretionary
earnings quality will be contaminated when managers have more discretion in
preparing the sustainability report to conceal or partially release the firm inside
information. In conclusion, voluntary sustainability disclosure has the different effects
on the innate earnings quality and the discretionary earnings quality. Specifically, the
voluntary sustainability disclosure is positively correlated with innate earnings quality
and negatively correlated with discretionary earnings quality.
Panel B suggests how the disclosure quality, whether following the GRI
guidance, influences the diffidence in earnings quality between disclosing firms and
non-disclosing firms. In my DID sample, there are 895 firm-year observations which
followed the GRI guidance in sustainability disclosure and 157 firm-year observations
which didn’t follow the GRI guidance in sustainability disclosure. I find for firms
following GRI guidance, the disclosing firms’ mean IEQ value (mean DEQ value) is
significantly higher (lower) than the matched non-disclosing firm’s mean IEQ value
(mean DEQ value). I also find for firms non-following GRI guidance, the disclosing

35

firms mean IEQ value is significantly higher than the matched non-disclosing firm’s
mean IEQ value but the disclosing firms mean DEQ value is not significantly lower
than the matched non-disclosing firm’s mean DEQ value. Finally, I find both the
difference of IEQ and the difference of DEQ between following firms and matched
non-following firms are not significant at 5 percent level. This suggests that my first
measurement of disclosure quality, whether following the GRI guidance in
sustainability disclosure, cannot significantly influence the relation between innate
earnings quality and sustainability disclosure and the relation between discretionary
earnings quality and sustainability disclosure. I conjecture two possible explanations.
First, the GRI framework may be still need improvement. The current GRI guidance
maybe cannot help preparers to better evaluate and plan firm operations and strategies
and thus cannot be linked to better earnings quality. Therefore, new version of
guidance can be released by GRI to continue improving the quality of sustainability
disclosure. Second, firms which don’t follow GRI framework may prepare their
sustainability reports based on other framework or guidance with good quality. Thus
there is no difference of firm operations between GRI following firms and GRI nonfollowing firms. Therefore, whether following GRI framework will not influence the
relation between innate/ discretionary earnings quality and sustainability disclosure.
Panel C suggests how the application level of GRI Framework (DIS_Q2)
influences the relation between earnings quality and sustainability disclosure. If the
DIS_Q2 is equal to at least 5, the application level of GRI framework is defined as
high. Otherwise, the application level of GRI framework is defined as low. First, for
firms with high GRI framework application level, I find that disclosing firms have a
significant higher mean value of innate earnings quality than matched non-disclosing
firms do. In contrast to the full sample, I don’t find a significant lower mean value of
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discretionary earnings quality for disclosing firms compared to non-disclosing firms.
This suggests that disclosing firms which prepare their sustainability disclosure based
on stricter framework will reduce the managerial discretion and thus the voluntary
disclosure will not significantly reduce the discretionary earnings quality. Second, for
firms with low GRI framework application level, I find that disclosing firms don’t
have a significant higher mean value of innate earnings quality than matched nondisclosing firms do. But I find a significant lower mean value of discretionary
earnings quality for disclosing firms compared to matched non-disclosing firms. This
suggests that if firms don’t strictly follow the GRI framework to prepare the
sustainability disclosure, they cannot enjoy the improvement in innate earnings
quality and they also tend to have lower discretionary earnings quality due to the
higher possibility of managerial opportunism. Finally, I find that both the difference
of mean IEQ value and the difference of mean DEQ value between high and low
application level are significantly positive (0.1981 and 0.1239 respectively). This
suggests that the level of applying GRI framework in preparing sustainability reports
will significantly influence the relation between innate/discretionary earnings quality
and sustainability report. Specifically higher disclosure quality can strengthen the
positive correlation between sustainability disclosure and innate earnings quality and
mitigate the negative correlation between sustainability disclosure and discretionary
earnings quality. In other words, the positive (negative) correlation between
sustainability disclosure and innate (discretionary) earnings quality is more (less)
pronounced when the disclosure quality is high. In conclusion, the quality of
disclosure plays a significant role in examining the relation between earnings quality
and voluntary disclosure.
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6.1.3 Audit fees and sustainability disclosure
Because sustainability reports provide a comprehensive illustration of firm
future financial and nonfinancial performance, I examine whether sustainability
reports can substitute the traditional financial statements which only focus on shortterm financial performance. If sustainability reports can substitute the traditional
financial statements, the audit fees of financial statements may decrease, since
investors may require a lower level of verification on financial statements when they
already have a more comprehensive report (the sustainability report). Table 3 suggests
the relation between audit fees and sustainability disclosure using the matching group
approach.
In Panel A, I find that the disclosing firms’ mean value of audit fees (mean
value = 15.6876) is higher than the matched non-disclosing firms’ mean value of
audit fees (mean value= 14.2535) and the difference is significant at the one percent
level. This suggests that the sustainability report cannot substitute the traditional
financial statements because the investors don’t reduce the requirement of verification
level on financial statements. Moreover, because auditors are required to examine
nonfinancial information according to the GAAS, the disclosure of sustainability
reports in fact will increase auditors’ efforts and then increase the corresponding audit
fees. Therefore, the sustainability reports are complementary instead of substitutable
to traditional financial statements.
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Table 3: Audit Fees for the Disclosing and Nondisclosing Firms
Panel A: Disclosing versus Nondisclosing firms

Audit Fees

Disclosing Firms (N=1026)
Nondisclosing Firms (N=1026)
Disclosing - Nondisclosing

15.6876
14.2535
1.4341***

Panel B: Following GRI Guidance versus Non-Following GRI Guidance
Following Firms (N=873)
Disclosing Firms
Non-disclosing Firms
Disclosing - Nondisclosing

15.6983
14.2215
1.4768***

Non-Following Firms (N=153)
Disclosing Firms
Non-disclosing Firms
Disclosing - Nondisclosing

15.631
14.4291
1.2019***

Following - Nonfollowing

0.2749*

Panel C: High versus Low GRI Framework Application level
High GRI Framework Application Level (N=484)
Disclosing Firms
Nondisclosing Firms
Disclosing - Nondisclosing

15.6436
14.3198
1.3238***

Low GRI Framework Application Level (N=151)
Disclosing Firms
Nondisclosing Firms
Disclosing - Nondisclosing

15.8125
14.0091
1.8054***

High - Low Application Level

-0.4816***

Table 3 illustrates the DID test for the relation betweeen audit fee and sustainability report. Panel
A tests the difference in audit fee between firms with sustainability report and firms without
sustainability report. Panel B and C examine whether disclosure quality can influence the relation
between audit fee and sustainability report and the disclosure quality is respectively measured as
the dummy variable whether the sustainability report is prepared based on GRI framework and the
application level of GRI framework in preparing the sustainability report. Ths *, **, and ***
repsectively indicate the difference is significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
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Panel B suggests whether following the GRI guidance (DIS_Q1) influences
the diffidence in audit fees between disclosing firms and non-disclosing firms. First, I
find that for firms following GRI guidance in preparing sustainability disclosure, the
mean value of audit fees is significantly higher than the matched non-disclosing firms.
And for firms non-following GRI guidance, the mean value of audit fees is also
significantly higher than the matched non-disclosing firms. However, the difference of
mean audit fees between following and non-following firms is not significant at 5
percent level. This suggests that following GRI framework in preparing sustainability
disclosure cannot lead to better disclosure quality and thus cannot reduce auditors’
uncertainty. Similarly, the possible reasons include that GRI framework needs
improvement or that firms non-following GRI framework may follow other voluntary
disclosure guidance with high quality. Therefore, whether follow GRI framework in
preparing sustainability disclosure (DIS_Q1) cannot significantly influence the
relation between audit fees and sustainability disclosure.
Panel C illustrates how the application level of GRI Framework (DIS_Q2)
influences the relation between audit fees and sustainability disclosure. If the DIS_Q2
is equal to at least 5, the application level of GRI framework is high. Otherwise, the
application level of GRI framework is low. First, for firms with both high and low
GRI framework application level, I find that disclosing firms have a significant higher
mean value of audit fees than matched non-disclosing firms do. However, I find that
the mean difference between disclosing and matched non-disclosing firms with high
DIS_Q2 is significantly lower than the mean difference between disclosing and
matched non-disclosing firms with lower DIS_Q2 (Audit_Fee

HighDIS_Q2 – LowDIS_Q2

=-

0.4816). This suggests that auditors will require higher fees to compensate the higher
risk derived from sustainability disclosure which don’t strictly follow the GRI
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framework. Therefore, the higher disclosure quality, better application of GRI
framework, can significantly reduce the auditing risk premium caused by voluntary
sustainability disclosure. In other words, the positive correlation between
sustainability disclosure and audit fees is less pronounced when sustainability
disclosure quality is high. In conclusion, the quality of disclosure plays a significant
role in examining the relation between audit fees and voluntary disclosure.
6.2 OLS regression approach
In this section I conduct the OLS regression approach to test the relation
among sustainability disclosure, disclosure quality, earnings quality, and audit fees.
Table 4 illustrates the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation for OLS regression
sample. In the Panel A, I contrast the descriptive statistics between disclosing firms
and matched non-disclosing firms. In the Panel B, the Pearson correlation is
presented. And I find that the Disclosure, the release of sustainability report, is
significantly associated with innate earnings quality and audit fee and is negatively
associated with discretionary earnings quality, consistent with my results of DID tests.
All the variables are winsorized at top and bottom one percentile except for
Disclosure, BIG8 and Segment. All the coefficients’ standard errors from OLS
regressions have been adjusted for both firm level and year level clustering.

41

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation for the OLS Regression Sample
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
LnFee
IEQ
DEQ
Current
Segment
Report_Lag
firmsize
ROA
BTM
Leverage

Mean
15.7001
4.4336
-0.5110
0.4001
8.7338
57.3554
9.6340
0.0692
0.3673
0.2172

Panel B: Pearson Correlation
Audit_Fee
IEQ
Audit_Fee

Disclosing Firm Sample
Median
Std Dev 25th Pctl
15.7382
0.8635
15.2230
4.4349
0.9327
3.8004
-0.3672
1.9842
-2.0931
0.3955
0.1673
0.2767
8.0000
4.4368
6.0000
57.0000
13.2331
51.0000
9.6246
1.5153
8.7673
0.0751
0.1810
0.0415
0.3291
0.6832
0.2196
0.2037
0.1317
0.1202

DEQ

Disclose

75th Pctl
16.4067
4.9401
0.8338
0.5030
10.0000
62.0000
10.6318
0.1096
0.5200
0.2965

ACCR

Big8

1

IEQ

0.02083

1

DEQ

-0.09294

-0.00453

1

Disclose

0.36459

0.01842

-0.0904

Non-Disclosing Matched Firm Sample
Mean
Median Std Dev 25th Pctl 75th Pctl
14.1298
14.2734
1.4108 13.4270 15.2882
4.1115
4.0712
1.0932
3.6558
4.6999
0.2839
0.4971
1.5898 -1.0055
1.3118
0.5165
0.4950
0.2166
0.3663
0.6772
7.2955
7.0000
3.7414
5.0000
9.5000
71.7955
64.5000 24.2080 53.0000 84.5000
8.2149
8.2473
2.0580
8.2831
9.8857
0.0859
0.0610
0.5548
0.0236
0.1081
0.2474
0.3043
0.9217
0.1571
0.4726
0.2980
0.1715
0.3493
0.0265
0.4414

1
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Current

Segment Report_Lag

Size

ROA

Leverage

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation for the OLS Regression Sample – Continued
ACCR

0.18471

0.02926

-0.09439

0.16319

1

Big8

0.4061

0.147

0.2949

0.39059

0.36813

1

Current

-0.27875

0.33461

0.08469

-0.15181

-0.06799

-0.13338

1

Segment

0.38456

-0.00647

-0.03892

0.17411

0.06924

0.1261

-0.1083

Report_Lag

-0.31817

-0.05091

-0.02327

-0.22528

-0.05185

-0.3118

0.11788 -0.11704

Size

0.75625

0.06163

0.13981

0.32381

0.15943

0.3837

-0.2808

0.29859

-0.41872

1

ROA

0.32309

0.1451

-0.02576

0.22724

0.54776

0.51843

-0.0873

0.13025

-0.23744

0.46434

Leverage

0.14071

0.12942

-0.00665

-0.11943

-0.30782

-0.20924

-0.3257

-0.1526

0.04877

1
1

1

-0.25987 -0.40827

Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for variables examined in the OLS regressions. Bold figures indicate the correlation
is significant at less than 5 percent level. All variables are winsoried at top and bottom one percentile except for Disclose, Big8, Segment.

43

1

6.2.1 Sustainability Disclosure and Earnings Quality
Table 5 suggests the relation between sustainability disclosure and earnings
quality using the OLS regressions. Specifically, in Panel A, I investigate the relation
between sustainability disclosure/disclosure quality and innate Earnings Quality
(IEQ). First, I find that the dummy variable, whether releasing sustainability report in
the sample year (Disclose), is significantly positively correlated with the IEQ
(Coefficient=0.0326, P-value =0.0012). This suggests that the release of sustainability
disclosure is associated with better innate earnings quality. Moreover, I find that
control variables, such as net operating assets (NOA), operating cycle, ROA, firm size
and current assets, are positively correlated with the innate earnings quality. In
contrast, earnings volatility, book-to-market ratio, and leverage ratio are negatively
correlated with the innate earnings quality. Second, I don’t find a significant
correlation between following the GRI framework (DIS_Q1) and innate earnings
quality (IEQ). Finally, I find that a significant and positive correlation between the
application level of GRI framework (DIS_Q2) and IEQ (coefficient = 0.0139 and pvalue=0.0085). Therefore, consistent with the results of Difference-in-Difference
approach, the sustainability disclosure and the application level of GRI framework in
preparing sustainability disclosure is positively associated with innate earnings
quality.
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Table 5: the relation between earnings quality and disclosure quantity/quality
Panel A: Innate Earnings Quality
Dependent Variable = IEQ
Intercept
Disclose
DIS_Q1
DIS_Q2
BIG8
NOA
EarnVol
Cycle
ROA
SIZE
BTM
Current
Leverage
Year Fixed Effect
Industry Fixed Effect
Adjusted R-square
Observations

3.3327
0.0326

<.0001
0.0012

3.8701 <0.0001
-0.0182

4.0961

<.0001

0.0139

0.0085

-0.0044
-0.0007
-0.0574
0.2773
0.1442
0.0676
-1.7
0.0578

0.9574
<.0001
0.2961
0.5667
<.0001
0.044
<.0001
0.8465

0.1795

-0.1095 0.2297
0.2283 <.0001
-0.0008 <.0001
0.2676 <.0001
0.3465 0.0159
0.1117 <0.0001
-0.1416 <.0001
1.0174 <.0001
-0.5791 <.0001

0.2122 0.2645
-0.0123 0.8487
-0.0008 <0.0001
-0.0765 0.0474
0.1226 0.7564
0.1689 <0.0001
0.058 0.0427
-1.6827 <0.0001
0.2454 0.2872

Yes
Yes
0.6184
1,858

Yes
Yes
0.5888
873

Yes
Yes
0.6069
544

Panel B: Discretionary Earnings Quality
Dependent Variable = DEQ
Intercept
Disclose
DIS_Q1
DIS_Q2
BIG8
NOA
EarnVol
Cycle
ROA
SIZE
BTM
Current
Leverage
Year Fixed Effect
Industry Fixed Effect
Adjusted R-square
Observations

0.6214
-0.2160

0.7428
-0.0466
0.0005
-0.1476
-0.6454
0.1149
0.1374
0.6323
-0.3512

0.1548
0.0157

0.0033
0.6109
<.0001
<.0001
0.0277
0.0055
0.0456
0.0866
0.2247

Yes
Yes
0.5134
1,858

0.077

0.8946

-0.0181

0.8946

1.526
-0.2429
0.0004
0.0755
-0.3477
-0.0701
-0.1969
0.02552
0.6469

<.0001
0.0661
<.0001
0.3817
0.6482
0.1533
0.0085
0.6059
0.1833

Yes
Yes
0.6045
873

2.1155

0.0121

0.0978

0.0342

-0.2181
0.0005
0.003
-0.3072
-0.1725
-0.1616
0.3752
0.1053

0.1995
<0.0001
0.9807
0.7551
0.0122
0.0806
0.566
0.867

Yes
Yes
0.6102
554

Table 5 illustrates the OLS regressions to test the relation between earnings quality and sustainability report.
In the Panel A, the dependent variable is the innate earnings quality. And in the Panel B, the dependent variable
is the discretionary earnings quality. The interesting variables in each column are respectively Disclosure, a
dummy variable whether the firm issues the sustainabiliy report during the sample year, DIS_Q1, a dummy
variable whether the sustainability report is prepared based on GRI framework, DIS_Q2 which is the application
level of GRI framework in preparing the sustainability report.
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Panel B suggests the relation between sustainability disclosure/disclosure
quality and discretionary earnings quality. First, I find that the dummy variable,
Disclose, is significantly and negatively correlated with discretionary earnings quality
(coefficient=-0.2160, p-value=0.0157). This suggests that sustainability disclosure is
associated with worse discretionary earnings quality due to more managerial
discretion. Second, I find that whether following GRI framework in preparing
sustainability disclosure (DIS_Q1) is not significantly correlated with discretionary
earnings quality. Finally, I find that the application level of GRI framework in
preparing sustainability disclosure is significantly and positively correlated with
discretionary earnings quality (coefficient=0.0978, p-value=0.0342). Therefore, my
results of OLS regression are consistent with the results of DID tests. Although
sustainability disclosure is associated with worse discretionary earnings quality,
stricter application of GRI framework in preparing sustainability disclosure can limit
managerial discretion and thus is associated with better discretionary earnings quality.
6.2.2 Sustainability disclosure and audit fees
In this section, I investigate the association between sustainability disclosure,
disclosure quality and audit fees. Table 6 illustrates the results of OLS regression.
First, in Column 1, I find that sustainability disclosure is positively correlated with
audit fees and the coefficient is significant at 1 percent level (coefficient=0.3347, Pvalue=0.0063). This suggests that sustainability disclosure will increase auditors’ risk
expectation and thus is associated with higher audit fees. Second, I don’t find a
significant correlation between following GRI framework in preparing sustainability
disclosure (DIS_Q1) and audit fees. Finally, I find that the higher application level of
GRI framework in preparing sustainability disclosure is significantly associated with
higher audit fees (coefficient=0.0582, p-value=0.0006). However, this doesn’t
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indicate the conclusion from OLS regression is different from the DID conclusion
which suggests that disclosure quality will mitigate the negative correlation between
sustainability disclosure and audit fees. Because my measurement of sustainability
disclosure is a dummy variable, I cannot construct an interaction term between
sustainability disclosure and disclosure quality. The lack of investigation in the
interaction term, the results obtained from OLS regression are limited and need more
careful interpretation.
In conclusion, most of my conclusions from OLS regressions are consistent
with original conclusions from DID tests. I find that sustainability disclosure is
associated with better firm operations and more managerial discretion, and thus
sustainability disclosure is positively correlated with the innate earnings quality and
negatively correlated with the discretionary earnings quality. Moreover, I find that
better application level of GRI framework in preparing sustainability disclosure will
reduce the managerial discretion and thus is associated with better innate earnings
quality and also better discretionary earnings quality. Finally, auditors increase their
estimation of risk for voluntary sustainability disclosure due to more managerial
discretion and thus will charger higher audit fees. Therefore, sustainability reports are
complementary instead of substitutable to traditional financial statements.
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Table 6: the relation between audit fees and disclosure quantity/quality
Dependent Variable = Audit Fees
Intercept
Disclose
Dis_Q1
Dis_Q2
ACCR
Current
Segment
DEC
Report_Lag
Size
ROA
Leverage
LOSS
Year Fixed Effect
Industry Fixed Effect
Adjusted R-square
Observations

10.5292
0.3347

0.2306
-0.3836
0.0435
0.1417
-0.0006
0.3667
-0.1985
0.6433
0.2244

<.0001
0.0063

0.0121
0.0466
<.0001
0.0114
0.7501
<.0001
0.7026
0.0009
0.0609

Yes
Yes
0.7049
1,570

10.8568

<.0001

0.0228

0.7036

-0.0074
-0.1083
0.0469
0.1119
-0.0005
0.3851
-2.381
0.9265
-0.1109

0.661
0.5708
<.0001
0.0429
0.809
<.0001
0.0002
<.0001
0.3602

10.8844

<.0001

0.0582
-0.0181
-0.4309
0.0625
-0.0529
0.0007
0.3483
-2.8948
0.7667
-0.1285

0.0006
0.4092
0.0894
<.0001
0.4352
0.5929
<.0001
0.0011
0.0031
0.396

Yes
Yes
0.6368
785

Yes
Yes
0.6623
472

Table 6 illustrates the OLS regressions to test the relation between audit fee and sustainability report. The
interesting variables in each column are respectively Disclosure, a dummy variable whether the firm issues the
sustainabiliy report during the sample year, DIS_Q1, a dummy variable whether the sustainability report is
prepared based on GRI framework, DIS_Q2 which is the application level of GRI framework in preparing the
sustainability report.

7. Additional Tests
In this section, I conduct additional DID tests to check the robustness of my
results from main tests. Here I employ the matching procedure by matching firm-year
observations which is just one year after the first time release of sustainability reports
and firm-year observations which is just one year before the first time release of
sustainability reports. Therefore, I use the disclosing firms themselves to construct the
matched group and thus control all other factors. Table 7 compares the earnings quality
and audit fees of disclosing firms before and after the first time disclosure.
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Table 7: Earnings Quality and Audit Fees for the Firms Before/After the First Time Disclosure
IEQ

DEQ

Audie Fees

-0.2476
-0.0709
-0.1767***

15.3243
15.2433
0.0809***

Panel A: Before and After the first release of sustainability reports
Firms: After first time disclosure(N=257)
Firms: Before first time disclosure (N=257)
After - Before

4.5736
4.4397
0.1339***

Panel B: Following or Non-following GRI framework
Following GRI Guidance (N=190)
Firms: After first time disclosure
Firms: Before first time disclosure
After - Before

4.5656
4.5011
0.0645*

-0.3636
-0.3102
-0.0534

15.3594
15.2712
0.0882***

Non-following GRI Guidance (N=67)
Firms: After first time disclosure
Firms: Before first time disclosure
After - Before

5.5966
4.5556
0.041

0.3167
0.4411
-0.1255**

15.2245
15.1643
0.0603

Following - Nonfollowing

0.0235

0.0721

0.0279

High GRI Framework Application Level (N=81)
Firms: After first time disclosure
4.6622
Firms: Before first time disclosure
4.4125
After - Before
0.2498**

-0.3183
-0.479
0.1607

15.2254
15.2062
0.01926

Low GRI Framework Application Level (N=151)
Firms: After first time disclosure
4.3796
Firms: Before first time disclosure
4.3581
After - Before
0.0215

-0.7417
-0.3564
-0.3853***

15.5574
15.3185
0.2389**

0.546***

-0.2396**

Panel C: High versus Low GRI Framework Application level

High - Low Application Level

0.2283**

The table 7 displays the robustness tests of the difference in innate earnings quality, discretionary
earnings quality, and audit fee between the firms before the first time disclosure of sustainability report
and the firms after the first time disclosure of sustainability report. The *, **, and *** respectively
indiacte the difference is significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent level

49

Panel A suggests the relation between disclosing firms just before the year of
first time disclosure of sustainability report and just after the year of first time
disclosure of sustainability report. Consistent with the main conclusions, I find that
after the first release of sustainability disclosure, firms will experience higher innate
earnings quality, lower discretionary earnings quality and higher audit fees.
Panel B investigates the associations under different settings of following or
non-following GRI framework in preparing sustainability disclosure (high DIS_Q1
versus low DIS_Q2). I find that compared to the year just before the first time
sustainability disclosure, during the year which is just one year after the first time
sustainability disclosure, firms following GRI framework tend to have higher audit
fees. And I find that firms non-following GRI framework will have lower
discretionary earnings quality after the first time release of sustainability reports.
However, other associations are not significant at 5 percent level. Therefore, I don’t
find a significant effect of following GRI framework (DIS_Q1) on the relation
between innate earnings quality and sustainability disclosure, the relation between
discretionary earnings quality and sustainability disclosure, and the relation between
audit fees and sustainability disclosure.
Finally, in Panel C, I compare the firms before and after the first time
sustainability disclosure when the application level of GRI framework in preparing
sustainability disclosure is either high or low (High DIS_Q2 versus Low DIS_Q2).
Consistent with my main conclusions, I find that the positive correlation between
innate earnings quality and sustainability disclosure is more pronounced when the
application level of GRI framework is high and that the negative correlation between
discretionary earnings quality and sustainability disclosure is more pronounced when
the application level of GRI framework is low. Moreover, the higher risk premium
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charged by auditors for firms with voluntary sustainability disclosure is more (less)
pronounced when the application level of GRI framework is low (high). In
conclusion, the quality of sustainability disclosure plays a significant role in
explaining the relations among voluntary disclosure, earnings quality and audit fees.
8. Conclusions
This paper investigates the relations among voluntary disclosure, disclosure
quality, earnings quality, and audit fees. Specifically, I first examine whether
voluntary disclosure is substitute or complement to earnings quality. Prior research
has long-time debates regarding the relation between voluntary disclosure and
earnings quality. Following Moon (2014), I classify earnings quality into innate
earnings quality and discretionary earnings quality and respectively investigate their
relations to sustainability disclosure. Through both DID test and OLS regression, I
find that sustainability disclosure is positively correlated with innate earnings quality
and negatively correlated with discretionary earnings quality. Moreover, I find the
disclosure quality, measured as the application level of GRI framework in preparing
sustainability disclosure, can significantly influence the relation between earnings
quality and sustainability disclosure. Specifically, the positive correlation between
sustainability disclosure and innate earnings quality is more pronounced when
disclosure quality is high and the negative correlation between sustainability
disclosure and discretionary earnings quality is less pronounced when disclosure
quality is high. Finally, I investigate whether the sustainability disclosure, which is a
type of more comprehensive financial and nonfinancial report, can substitute the
traditional financial statements which provide only financial and historical
information. Through examining the relation between audit fees and sustainability
disclosure, I find that auditors will charge higher risk premium when firms release
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sustainability disclosure and thus the sustainability report is complement not
substitute to traditional financial statements. Finally, I find that the risk premium
charged by auditors will reduce when the quality of sustainability disclosure is high.
My paper contributes to accounting literature by providing new evidence for
the long-time argument regarding to the relation between voluntary disclosure and
earnings quality. Different from most prior papers, I respectively examine the relation
between innate earnings quality and voluntary disclosure and the relation between
discretionary earnings quality and voluntary disclosure, and find that the voluntary
disclosure can be both complement and substitute to earnings quality. Moreover, my
research suggests that disclosure quality, which is usually neglected by prior papers
due to database limitation, plays an essential role in explaining the effect of voluntary
disclosure on earnings quality and auditors’ risk assessment. However, currently we
are still lack of comprehensive guidance and standards to regulate firms’ voluntary
disclosures. My paper suggests that the low quality of voluntary disclosure will
encourage managerial opportunism and increase audit fees. Therefore, my paper has
policy implication for standard setters and other organizations (such GRI) to continue
improving the framework and guidance to help firms prepare high-quality disclosures.
I suggest firms should pay more attention to the disclosure quality when they are
trying to increase the disclosure quantity to provide more useful information to
outside decision makers. Finally, different from most prior papers which examine the
financial disclosures (such as management earnings forecast), my papers examine the
voluntary disclosure in a different setting through investigating the effectiveness of
sustainability report which has obtained more and more attention from regulators,
especially in Europe. Through investigating the nonfinancial sustainability disclosure,
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my research fills the research gap and provides new evidence for building the
framework of voluntary disclosure research.
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CHAPTER 3
COST STICKINESS AND MANAGEMENT EARNING FORECASTS

1. Introduction
Cost management and financial reporting are two important responsibilities of
the management. Cost plays an important role in firm’s operation to generate profits
and thus is always an interesting topic for practitioners and researchers. To maintain
the firm effectively and efficiently, managers should make wise decisions in assigning
resource appropriately to produce products or provide services. Moreover, it’s also
important to measure the resource allocation precisely and calculate the unit cost
correctly to provide feedback for future decisions of resource assignment. However,
one significant challenge faced by managers is how to clearly measure some resource
usage which is not proportional to the firm’s production volume, such as
organizational expenses. The organizational expenses cannot be directly linked to
each unit product/service, but their tremendous amount obviously has economics
meanings and should not be ignored in making managerial decision. Accounting
research has a long history in investigating the probable improvement in the
measurement of cost. For example, Cooper and Kaplan (1992) develop the activitybased cost (ABC) method which can better measure the cost of resource usage
through directly linking the resource usage of performing organizational activities to
the products and services for which these activities are performed. Different from
traditional costing method, ABC method can better allocate the organizational
expenses to each unit product/service based on the activities performed. However, the
ABC method cannot completely reduce the errors in measuring the cost. Prior
research suggests that costing allocation systems, including ABC, will overstate the
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overhead costs, because these costing systems assume that costs are proportional to
activity but in fact it’s not true (Norton and Soderstrom, 1994; Norton and
Soderstrom, 1997 ).
To solve this problem, Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003), hereafter
ABJ, try to develop new model to explain the cost behaviors in the real business
world. They build their theory based on two assumptions, resource adjustment cost
and managerial deliberate choice. First, the cost management is a strategy deliberately
chosen by the management. Second, when managers choose their cost strategies, it’s
not costless. According to the traditional view that cost is determined by sales, thus
managers will reduce the resource level devoted into the production when the
concurrent sales reduce. However, based on the assumptions of ABJ, managers have
the discretion in determining the resource usage and when they adjust the resource
usage they should burden the corresponding adjustment cost. Therefore, when the
sales decrease, the managers will trade off between the cost of removing excess
resource and the cost of maintaining current resource level with unused capacity. If
managers decide not to remove unutilized resource when sales decrease, asymmetric
cost behavior will happen because managers will always increase the resource level
when sales increase, according to ABJ. Therefore, cost stickiness (anti-stickiness) that
costs decrease by a smaller (larger) amount when sales decrease compared to the
increase amount of costs when sales increase is the outcome of managerial deliberate
choice of resource adjustment. And when determining the cost management strategy,
managers will consider not only the adjustment cost itself but also the firm’s cost
structure, the expectation of future sales change, asset intensity, macro-economy and
so on (such as Subramanian and Weidenmier, 2003; Anderson et al., 2003;
Balakrishnan et al., 2004; Chen et al. 2012; Cannon, 2014). Moreover, because the
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cost management is a managerial deliberate choice, the management itself plays an
important role in explaining the firm’s cost behavior. Therefore, the managerial
incentive behind the cost management choice is worthwhile to discuss, because
managers’ interest may be not always aligned with the shareholders’ interest
according to the agency theory.
In fact, managers tend to choose the cost strategy with respect to their other
operating, financing and investing strategies. To achieve the same goal of the firm as
the whole, the cost strategy will be implemented to align with other operating,
financing and investing strategies determined by managers. Therefore, the
examination of the interaction between different strategies chosen by managers can
help us better understating the complicated system of corporate management. In this
paper, I examine how managers’ cost strategy is associated with their voluntary
disclosure strategy. I believe it’s important to investigate how managers coordinate
their internal operating system and external reporting system. Cost management is a
typical internal accounting activity which provides useful information, such as
performance feedback, for internal managers to make decisions. In contrast, voluntary
disclosure is a typical financial reporting activity which provides useful information
for external information users, such as investors, suppliers, customers and
governments, to make decisions. Therefore, through examining the link between cost
management strategy and voluntary disclosure strategy, we can better understand the
whole system of accounting information including the interaction between the internal
and the external information system.
Due to the separation of control and ownership, managers’ choices, including
cost stickiness, are not directly observed by outsiders. The information asymmetry
exists between inside managers and outside managers may lead to “lemon problem”
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with less market efficiency (Akerlof, 1970). Therefore, firms have the incentive to
increase voluntary disclosure level to reduce the information asymmetry (Shroff et al.
2013). Moreover, according to ABJ, the managers are optimistic with their future
sales when they decide to maintain unused capacity when sales decrease. Based on the
signaling theory of voluntary disclosure, managers tend to voluntarily disclose the
good news to distinguish themselves from other “worse” competitors. In conclusion,
based on signaling theory and agency theory, I conjecture that the asymmetric cost
behavior is positively correlated with the management’s propensity to issue
management earnings forecasts (MEF).
Moreover, the type of information disclosed by managers is also an important
part of firm’s financial reporting system. Prior research suggests managerial incentive
can influence their strategies on the timing and choice of good news/bad news
(Matsumoto, 2002; Cotter et al. 2006). Therefore, managerial discretion plays a
significant role in both cost management strategy and the type of management
earnings forecast. Optimistic (pessimistic) expectation of future earnings will
persuade managers to maintain (remove) unused resource when sales decrease and
also encourage managers to release related good (bad) news to the public. Moreover,
Chen et al. (2013) suggest that managerial overconfidence is associated with cost
stickiness. I believe that those overconfident managers will also be more likely to
overestimate the firm’s future earnings. Hence, I conjecture that the degree of cost
stickiness is associated with the more (less) favorable earnings forecast released by
managers.
To investigate the link between cost strategy and voluntary disclosure strategy,
I collect my sample by merging fundamental data with management guidance data
from I/B/E/S. To control the effect of information reporting environment, I collect
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market data from CRSP database. The measurement of cost stickiness is based on the
models developed by ABJ (2003) and Weiss (2010). After discussing the advantages
and disadvantages of the two models, I alternatively use both the firm-level and
industry-level measurements to capture the asymmetry cost behavior. I also
alternatively use two measurements, the management’s propensity to issue MEF and
the frequency of MEF issued during the period, to measure the management’s
voluntary disclosure strategy. Through empirical tests with a sample between year
2005 and 2011, I find that the firm’s level of sticky cost is positively associated with
the firm’s propensity to issue MEF and the frequency of MEF. Moreover, I find that
the firm’s level of sticky cost is associated with more favorite earnings news
forecasted by managers. Finally, I find that the relation between cost stickiness and
MEF behaviors is more pronounced when the MEF is long-horizon oriented and when
the firm efficiency is high. I believe my results are robust by using alternative
measurements of cost stickiness and MEF.
In conclusion, this paper discusses the association between firm internal
accounting management and firm external accounting reporting through investigating
the link between asymmetric cost behavior and management earnings forecast. First,
my paper contributes to the accounting research through building a bridge between
managerial accounting and financial accounting. Most prior papers disentangle the
complicated accounting information system by focusing on either internal information
system or external information system. The interdependencies among managerial
decisions that shape the corporate accounting information system are lack of attention
from prior research. However, in the real business world, managers should consider
the two systems at the same time when making decisions. Beyer et al. (2010) suggest
future research to develop the complete corporate information environment. Beyer
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and Guttman (2012) examine the interdependencies between management’s
disclosure strategy and investing decisions. This paper provides the insight into the
whole system of corporate information environment through discussing the
interrelation between management’s cost strategy and management’s disclosure
strategy, an interaction between internal managerial information system and external
financial information system. Therefore, I provide better understating of the
managerial incentive and the managerial strategies under a setting which can mimic
the complicated interactions of different elements in the real business world. Second,
most prior papers which examine the cost stickiness focus on the determinants of
asymmetric cost behavior. In contrast, my paper provides some evidence for the
consequences of cost stickiness strategy chosen by managers and thus enriches the
related research framework. Finally, my findings are also relevant to current debates
among policymakers, academia and practitioners regarding the regulation of
mandatory and voluntary disclosures through discussing the managerial incentive
behind the managerial disclosure strategies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II presents a review of
literature on cost stickiness and MEF. The theoretical framework, research questions,
and hypothesis development are discussed in Section III. Section IV explains the
methodology, including research models and sample collection. Results are presented
in Section V, and Section VI concludes the paper.
2. Literature Review
2.1 Stickiness of Cost
Cost structure is an important managerial strategy in management accounting
and has obtained the attention from accounting research for a long-term history.
Because cost plays an important role as sales in determining the firm’s earnings, the
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management should clearly understand and precisely calculate the costs of resource
used by each product or service. Traditionally, firms use the volume-driven method to
allocate the indirect cost, and thus the cost is directly linked to sales. However, certain
non-production cost, such as SG&A expense, is difficult to be allocated to each
product/service, because this kind of resource cost is not proportional to the volume of
product/service units produced or sold (Miller and Vollman, 1985; Copper and
Kaplan, 1988). Therefore, Cooper and Kaplan (1992) suggest that the use of activitybased cost (ABC) method can better measure the cost of resource usage through
directly linking the resource usage of performing organizational activities to the
products and services for which these activities are performed. Both the traditional
cost system and ABC method believe that cost will proportionally change with respect
to the change of units sold or activities performed. However, Norton and Soderstrom
(1997) find the costing allocation systems, including ABC, will overstate the overhead
costs for hospital service departments. The authors believe the reason is that
traditional cost system, including ABC, assumes that costs are proportional to activity
but in fact it’s not true (Norton and Soderstrom, 1994).
Because the traditional view which believes cost is determined by the sales
cannot empirically explain the cost behaviors in the real world, Anderson, Banker and
Janakiraman (2003), hereafter ABJ, explain the cost behavior through two new
hypotheses, including resource commitment hypothesis and deliberate management
choice. ABJ suggests that cost is sticky because they empirically find that SG&A
expenses decrease by a smaller amount when the corresponding sales decrease but
increase by a larger amount when the sales increase. In the ABJ model, cost is
determined by resource adjust cost and deliberate management choice, instead of
sales. Resource adjust cost incurs, when managers determine to remove the
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committed resource (when sales decrease) or restore the committed resource (when
sales restore). Therefore, when sales decrease, managers will trade-off between the
cost of adjusting committed resource with respect to sales reduction and the cost of
maintaining current resource level with unused capacity. If managers predict the
future sales can be restored in the short-term period, managers will believe that the
resource adjust cost is larger than the cost of operating with unused capacity and thus
they tend to deliberately maintain current resource level and cause the cost to be
sticky. In conclusion, according to ABJ, the asymmetry in the cost behavior exists
because the cost is not proportional to sales but is committed by resource adjust cost
and managers’ decisions.
Following ABJ, a lot of papers begin to discuss the cost stickiness
phenomenon. Malik (2012) summarize three groups of research, including the
evidence, determinants and consequences of asymmetric cost behavior. First, the
evidence of stickiness cost is examined under different settings and tested through
both time-series and cross-sectional method. For example, Balakrishnan and Gurca
(2008), Calleja et al. (2006) and Subramanian and Weidenmier (2003) respectively
find the evidence of cost stickiness through department level comparison, industry
level comparison and country level comparison. Banker et al. (2011) conclude the
cost stickiness is the prevalent global evidence through using large panel data from
1988-2008 for all countries in the Global Compustat database.
Although many prior papers empirically find the evidence of cost stickiness,
there are incomplete answers to the determinants of cost stickiness. ABJ and some
other papers believe that the asymmetric cost behavior is caused by resource adjust
cost and management deliberate choice (such as Subramanian and Weidenmier, 2003;
Banker et al., 2013). Prior research believes some other factors may also influence the
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cost stickiness phenomenon, such as asset intensity (Subramanian and Weidenmier,
2003; Anderson et al., 2003), capacity utilization (Balakrishnan et al., 2004; Cannon,
2014), organizational core competency (Balakrishnan and Gurca, 2008), agency
problem (Chen et al. 2012), managerial incentive (Kama and Weiss, 2010; Dierynck
et al., 2012), loan financing (Banker and Fang, 2013), economic crisis (Banker et al.,
2013), management overconfidence (Chen et al., 2013), fixed costs and scale of
diseconomies (Balakrishnan et al., 2014), the change of regulation (Holzhacker et al.,
2014), demand uncertainty(Banker et al., 2014a), prior sales change (Banker et al.,
2014b) and labor unemployment risk (Kim and Wang, 2014). In conclusion, a lot of
factors, including manager individual characteristics, firm specific characteristics and
macroeconomics, may influence the asymmetric cost behaviors. Therefore,
researchers are continuously improving the current model of cost stickiness to more
precisely capture this cost behavior.
There are also several papers which address the effect of cost stickiness on
earnings. For example, Banker and Chen (2006) suggest that the firm’s cost stickiness
plays an important role in predicting the future earnings. Anderson et al. (2007)
further investigate the effect of sticky cost on future earnings and find that cost
stickiness can lead to abnormal positive return. Because the cost stickiness will
influence the earnings forecast, it may also influence the behaviors of financial
analysts’ earnings forecasts. For example, Weiss (2010) finds that stickier cost
structure behavior will reduce the precision of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Ciftci et al.
(2013) further suggest that the enhancing analysts’ awareness of cost stickiness will
improve the quality of financial analysts’ forecast. Prior research also finds that
asymmetric cost behavior will not only influence the earnings forecast but also
influence the stock market and macro-economy. For example, Banker et al. (2014c)
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suggest the asymmetric cost behavior tend to increase the long-horizon return.
Moreover, Rouxelin et al. (2014) suggest that the level cost stickiness derived from
recent corporate filings is positively associated with the overstatement of future
macro-level unemployment rates. Although some papers are trying to discuss the
effect of asymmetric cost behavior, since the cost behavior is comprehensively linked
to the firm operation, we still have a lot answered question regarding the effect of cost
stickiness on managerial strategy and stock market. This also provides the research
opportunity for this paper which focuses on the effect of cost behavior on managers’
voluntary disclosure behaviors.
Although sticky cost phenomenon has been documented in many prior papers,
several research doubts the real existence of asymmetric cost behavior. First,
Anderson and Lanen (2009) question the validity of cost stickiness because they find
that the sticky cost evidence is insignificant after removing the “unusual”
observations in which costs and sales move in different directions and that the number
of employee doesn’t exhibits significant cost stickiness. Second, Via and Perego
(2014) criticize the empirical analysis approach and interpretation of sticky cost
behavior because they empirically find that asymmetric cost behavior exits only for
the cost of labor and not for SG&A costs, cost of goods sold and operating costs.
Although there is room for improvement regarding the theory and methodology of
sticky cost research, I believe sticky cost behavior is an interesting strategic
phenomenon and is linked to other managerial strategies, including financial
reporting.
2.2 Management earnings forecast
ABJ and following papers develop the framework of sticky cost and suggest
that sticky cost is the consequence of management choice, although a lot of other
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factors may influence the magnitude of cost stickiness. The deliberate cost
management also will not only influence firm’s earnings but also may affect other
managerial strategies, such as management earnings forecast (MEF). As a typical
financial voluntary disclosure, MEF has obtained attention from accounting research
for long time. Hrist et al. (2008) summarize the works of MEF research through three
components, including antecedents, characteristics and consequences. In this paper, I
focus on the antecedents and characteristics of MEF.
First, the management’s incentive to issue MEF and the management’s choice
are significantly influenced by the legal and regulatory environment (Baginski et al.,
2002; Wang, 2007), information asymmetry (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991;
Verrecchia, 2001), pre-commitment to continue disclosure (Botosan and Harris,
2000), firm specific litigation risk (Brown et al., 2005), managerial incentives (Nagar
et al., 2003), prior forecasting behavior (Skinner, 1994) and proprietary costs (Zhang,
2001). Specifically, prior research, such as Coller and Yohn (1997) and Baginski et al.
(2002), suggests that firms with more prior information asymmetry tend to have more
incentive to release MEF. Moreover, the managerial incentives also play a significant
role in the determination of MEF, because MEF is a voluntary disclosure decided by
the management based on the firm strategies. Specifically, the MEF behaviors are
influenced by individual managers’ characteristics (Bamber et al., 2010), insider
trading activities (Cheng et al., 2013) and executive compensations (Nagar et al.,
2003; Cheng et al., 2014). Moreover, some papers argue that managers have the
incentive to release MEF, because they tend to achieve earnings targets through using
the MEF to reduce the financial analysts’ expectation of future earnings (Matsumoto,
2002; Cotter et al. 2006). In conclusion, forecast environment and managerial
incentive significantly influence the management’s propensity to issue MEF.
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Second, prior research suggests managers issue MEFs with different
characteristics to achieve different strategic goals. For example, prior papers suggest
that managers will chose the disclosure of good news or bad news based on their
expectations of market reactions and litigation risk (Kothari et al., 2009; Hurwitz,
2012). The quality of MEF also plays a key role in the voluntary disclosure activities.
Prior research suggests that the precision of MEF is influenced by management’s
ability and managerial incentive. For example, Baik et al. (2011) suggest that CEO’s
ability is positively correlated with accuracy of management earnings forecast. And
the accuracy of MEF will also be improved through the rational for management’s
incentive, such as the reduction of management’s discretionary accounting choice
(Jaggi and Sannella, 1995), better corporate governance (Ajinkya et al. 2005;
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), and financial analysts following (Baginski and Hassell
1997). Therefore, I believe it’s important to address the managerial incentive when
discussing the type and quality of MEF.
In conclusion, as a type of corporate financial voluntary disclosure,
management earnings forecast is significantly determined by managerial incentive
which is also an important factor of sticky cost behavior. This also provides a
theoretical framework for this research of the link between cost stickiness and
management earnings forecast.
3. Hypotheses Development
3.1 Cost stickiness and management’s incentive to issue MEF
As mentioned above, managerial deliberate choice of resource adjust activities
plays an important role in explaining the sticky cost behavior, although several other
factors will also influence the cost stickiness. According to ABJ, costs do not
proportionally change with respect to the change of sales. Instead costs are committed
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to the availability of resource. Therefore, based on their expectations of earnings,
managers tend to manage their costs through deliberating adjusting the resource level.
Specifically, when sales decrease, managers will consider whether adjust the resource
level through the trade-off between the cost of adjusting resource and the cost of
maintaining current resource level with unused capacity. If managers believe the
downwards change of sales is temporary and the sales will recover in a short period,
then they tend to maintain the current level of resource instead of incurring resource
adjust cost, because there is a tremendous burden of cost to remove unused resource
and to add back the resource in a short-run. Therefore, due to the management choice
of resource adjust cost according to their earnings expectation, the asymmetric cost
behavior is prevalent across different firms, industries and countries.
Similarly as cost stickiness, management earnings forecast is also a type of
management deliberate choice. Moreover, managers tend to choose the voluntary
disclosure strategy which is aligned with their cost management strategy. As
mentioned above, the asymmetric cost behavior is the outcome of the management
deliberate choice, because they believe their sales will restore in a short period.
Hence, the management of the firm with stickier costs usually is more optimistic
regarding the firm’s future sales and thus has decided to maintain the unused capacity
when the sales decrease. According to the signaling theory of voluntary disclosure,
managers tend to voluntarily disclose more information to the public, because they
want to distinguish themselves from other “worse” competitors. Because the
managers are optimistic with their future sales when they make stickier cost choice,
they will also have the incentive to signal the good news to the public. Therefore, I
conjecture that firms with stickier costs will be more likely to release quarterly
management earnings forecast.
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Second, agency theory also plays a significant role in explaining the link
between cost stickiness and MEF. Due to the separation of ownership and control,
managers have the information advantage compared to outside investors. The
information asymmetry will lead to the lemon problem and reduce the market
efficiency. Prior research suggests that managers have the incentive to voluntarily
disclose information to reduce the information asymmetry and increase the market
liquidity (such as Healy and Palepu, 2001; Shroff et al. 2013). Cost stickiness will
also lead to information asymmetry, because it is derived from the internal managerial
strategy which is not viewed by the outsiders. Thus managers have information
advantage regarding the firm’s costs-sales relation than outside investors and financial
analysts do. Banker and Chen (2006) suggest that cost stickiness is a significant factor
in predicting future earnings. Moreover, the lack of knowledge of firm’s asymmetric
cost behavior will lead to less accuracy of financial analysts’ earnings forecast (Weiss,
2010). Hence, to reduce this information asymmetry caused by asymmetric cost
behavior, managers have the motivation to increase the voluntary disclosure level. In
conclusion, I develop the first hypothesis based on the signaling theory and agency
theory:
H5: The degree of cost stickiness is positively associated with the management’s
propensity to issue quarterly management earnings forecast.
3.2 Cost stickiness and management earnings expectation
In this section, I tend to examine the link between cost stickiness and
management earnings expectation. Because both cost stickiness and management
earnings forecast are the results of management deliberate choice, the managerial
discretion plays a significant role in explaining their association. If managers feel
optimism (pessimism) about the future earnings, they tend to release the good (bad)
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news, an earnings forecast which is more (less) favorable than the public expectation.
Therefore, the type of MEF released by managers is influenced by managers’
expectation regarding their future earnings. As mentioned above, when managers
determine their cost management choice, they will also consider the firms future
sales/earnings. If managers believe their sales will increase in the future, they will
choose a stickier cost strategy through maintaining unused capacity during sales
downturn. Hence, I conjecture that firms with stickier costs tend to be more likely to
issue good news to the public.
Moreover, Chen et al. (2013) suggest that overconfident managers are more
likely to overestimate future demand and thus will be less likely to remove unused
resource when sales decline. Therefore, managerial overconfidence can also explain
the asymmetric cost behavior. According to Chen et al. (2013), the managers in the
firms with stickier cost are more overconfident regarding the firm’s future sales. I
believe that those overconfident managers also tend to overestimate the firm’s future
earnings. Therefore, those managers who determine the cost stickiness strategy have
the incentive to release more favorable information to the public through quarterly
management earnings forecast. In conclusion, based on the managerial discretion
theory, I develop the following hypotheses:
H6a: The degree of cost stickiness is positively associated with earnings forecast of
good news.
H6b: The degree of cost stickiness is negatively associated with earnings forecast of
bad news.
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4. Research Design
4.1 Management earnings forecast
The data of quarterly management earnings forecast are obtained from the
Thomson First Call’s Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database. However, Chuk et
al. (2013) suggest that the CIG database is subject to coverage bias compared to handcollected data from press release. Therefore, I need to carefully build the sample
selection criteria. I limit the sample year after certain year, because Chuk et al. (2013)
find that press releases issued after 1997 have higher probabilities of being
represented on CIG compared to press releases issued in 1997. Moreover, prior
research suggests that firms are more likely to issue voluntary disclosure after the FD
regulation and thus I determine the sample year since 2005 to increase the
representativeness of my sample. I also remove the forecast observations with
announcement dates more than thirty days after the associated firm-quarter’s fiscal
period end date. And I exclude observations for which the MEF occurs within three
days of either the analyst survey date, or the announcement date of realized earnings
for that quarter. Following Kothari et al. (2009), I also exclude the extreme one
percent of management earnings forecasts relative to analyst expectations and the
extreme one percent of MEF forecast errors relative to realized EPS to mitigate the
potential effects of miscoded data. Finally, I exclude “bundled” MEF issued
concurrently with the earnings announcement, because Rogers and Buskirk (2013)
suggest that the traditional calculation of bundled forecast news without any
adjustment is subject to material measurement errors.
To measure the management earnings forecast behaviors, I respectively
construct two measurements. First, the dummy variable (ISSUE) which is equal to 1 if
the sample firm issues at least one quarterly MEF during the sample year, and zero
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otherwise. Second, I capture the frequency of MEF (Freq) by summing the number of
quarterly earnings forecasts released by the sample firm in the sample year.
In the test of hypothesis two, I consider the median value of most recent
analyst survey of quarterly earnings expectation as the market consensus forecast of
quarterly earnings. Then the news in the MEF is defined as the difference between the
MEF and the financial analyst’ forecast median, scaled by the absolute value of
financial analyst’ forecast median.5 NEWS = (MEF ̶ Analyst_Median)/
Analyst_Median. For both MEF and financial analysts’ forecast, I consider the
stock dividends and stock split and adjust the EPS numbers by using the Factor to
Adjust Shares published in the CRSP database. I include only those analyst forecasts
which are released before management released earnings forecasts because financial
analysts usually revise their forecasts based on the management earnings forecasts.
Following Kothari et al. (2009), I only include MEF where the absolute value of
News is greater than 1%, and the absolute value of Analyst_Median is greater than
five cents per share. Finally, I winsorize the top and bottom one percentile of NEWS
observations. Therefore, it’s defined as good news (bad news) if the variable NEWS
is more positive (negative).
4.2 Cost Stickiness
ABJ and following papers continuously are improving the methodology of
calculating the degree of cost stickiness. The original ABJ model is based on the
piecewise-linear relation between log-change in costs and concurrent log-change in
sales:

1

We calculate only the most recent management earnings forecast when managers
issue multiple quarterly earnings forecasts during the same fiscal quarter for the same forecast
period.

70

∆ln 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 × ∆ln 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 × ∆ln 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡

(7)

where ∆ln 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the log format of changes in costs from the previous period.

∆ln 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the log format of changes in sales from the previous period. DEC is
the dummy variable, equal to 1 if the ∆ln 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 < 0 and zero otherwise. All

variables in the equation 1 are adjusted for inflation effect. According to ABJ, the
degree of cost stickiness is the change of cost in response to the sales decrease versus
increase. Therefore, the firm chooses the cost stickiness (anti-stickiness) strategy, if
the 𝛽𝛽2 is negative (positive). The larger 𝛽𝛽2 implies the lower degree of cost stickiness.

I run regression of Equation (1) for each industry and each yea and thus I can get the
industry-level cost stickiness (ABJ_Sticky) based on ABJ 2003 model.

Then Weiss (2010) develop a model which is especially useful in investigating
the consequences of stickiness model through constructing the firm-level cost
stickiness:
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𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = log �

∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

�

− log �

∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏+

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = log �

∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆&𝐴𝐴

�

− log �

∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏+

∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−

∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−

∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏−

∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

�

(8)

∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

�

(9)

∆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆&𝐴𝐴

�

(10)

where the 𝜏𝜏 −(𝜏𝜏 +) is the most recent period with a sales decrease (increase) over the

last four periods. The cost is respectively measured by three variables following Weiss
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(2010), including the cost which is the difference between sales revenues and income
before extraordinary items, the cost of goods sold, and the selling, general and
administrative expenses (SG&A). Using the Weiss (2010) model I can more directly
examine the effect of cost stickiness on the management earnings forecast and thus
get the firm-level cost stickiness (Cost_Sticky, COGS_Sticky, and SGA_Sticky).
I will implement both original ABJ and Weiss (2010) to capture the cost
stickiness (equation 7 - 10), because both the two models have advantages and
disadvantages. First, original ABJ is most easily to observe the degree of cost
stickiness, but it doesn’t consider the effect of other factors which will also influence
the cost stickiness. Second, Banker and Byzalov (2014) suggest that the ABJ and the
extended model are more useful in investigating the determinants of cost stickiness
and instead the Weiss (2010) model is more useful in investigating the consequences
of stickiness model. Therefore, the Weiss (2010) model is more appropriate for the
objective of this paper. Second, Weiss (2010) model can provide firm-level
measurement of cost stickiness, and instead the ABJ (2003) model can provide only
industry-level measurement of cost stickiness. However, the Weiss model requires
that sample firms should have both sales increase and sales decrease during past four
periods. This requirement will significantly reduce the sample size. In conclusion,
because the two models have both advantages and disadvantages, I use both of them
to calculate the cost stickiness variable.
4.3 Control Variables
Prior research suggests that MEF is influenced by forecasting environment,
information asymmetry, litigation risk and proprietary cost (Hirst et al., 2008). First, I
control the firm’s institutional ownership (Inst_Owner) which is percentage of firm’s
shares owned by the institutional investors at the period end. Then, I control the effect
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of financial analysts through calculating the number of financial analysts following
during the previous period (No_Analyst). To control the firm’s information
asymmetry level, I develop the return volatility (Ret_Vol) which is measured as the
standard deviation of monthly raw return over the 36 months prior to the period t.
Higher return volatility imply the higher level of information asymmetry. Moreover, I
develop the MEF_Cost, which is the industry level weighted average entry costs to
proxy firms’ competency to face the threat of new entrants, following Gong et al.
(2013). I multiply the MEF_Cost by -1, and thus the higher value indicates lower
entry costs and higher proprietary costs. Prior papers suggest that the earnings
predictability, earnings response coefficients and earnings non-synchronicity will
significantly increase the management’s incentive to release earnings forecasts (such
as Gong et al. 2013). I define the earnings predictability (Earn_Predict) as the
logarithm transformation of R-square from regressing return-on-assets for the period t
on return-on-assets for period t-4 over a rolling window of 16 quarters prior to period
t. The earnings coefficient response (ERC) is calculated by regressing three-day
cumulative market adjusted stock returns on unexpected earnings over 36 months
prior to the period t. And the earnings non-synchronicity (Nonsynch) which captures
the firm-specific factors in explaining the earnings predictability is carefully
introduced in Gong et al. (2013). In this paper, I use the mean of the top four highest
r-square to calculate earnings non-synchronicity. Moreover, managerial
management’s financing strategies also will influence their MEF decisions (Beyer et
al. 2010). I measure the financing strategies by constructing the dummy variable
(SEO) which is equal to 1 if the firm issues new equity in the period t+1 and zero
otherwise.
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According to Matsumoto (2002) and Kothari et al. (2009), the management
earnings expectations are influenced by institutional ownership (Inst_Owner), the
number of financial analysts following (NO_Analyst), earnings coefficient response
(ERC), financing strategies (SEO), growth prospects (Growth), reliance on implicit
claim, litigation risk (Litigation). First, I use the difference between present total
assets and previous year total assets scaled by previous year total assets to capture the
growth prospects (Growth). Second, I define the litigation risk as the dummy variable
which is equal to 1 if the firm is in the high-risk industry and zero otherwise 6. Thirdly,
I use two variables to measure the reliance on implicit claims. One variable is the
dummy variable (Durable) which is equal to 1 of the firm is in the durable goods
industry (SICs 150-179, 245, 250-259, 283,301, 324-399) and zero otherwise. The
other one to capture the reliance on implicit claims is the labor intensity
(Labor_Intense), defined as the 1 minus the ratio of PPE to gross assets.
Finally, I control firm characteristics in the tests of two hypotheses, including
firm size (SIZE), which is the logarithm format of total assets at each quarter end,
firm current profitability (ROA) measured as the return on assets, the dummy variable
(LOSS) which is equal to 1 if the firm experiences loss in the period t and zero
otherwise, the changes in earnings (∆EPS), and the firm risk level (BTM) measured as
the book-to-market ratio. Hence, I develop following equation to test the relation
between cost stickiness and the management’s propensity to issue MEF (H5):

2

The high risk industry is defined as firm with SIC of 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 73707374, 3600-3674 and 5200-5961, according to Matsumoto (2002).
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𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ +

𝛽𝛽5 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽9 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 +

𝛽𝛽10 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽11 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽12 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝛽13 ∆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽14 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽15 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + ε1

(11)

where MEF refers alternatively to the issuance of MEF (Issue) or the frequency of
MEF (Freq). Where Stick represents alternatively to the three firm-level
measurements of cost stickiness using Weiss (2010) model and the industry-level
measurement of cost stickiness using ABJ (2003) model. I also develop the following
equation to test the relation between management earnings expectation and cost
stickiness (H6):

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 +

𝛽𝛽6 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺ℎ + 𝛽𝛽7 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽9 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿+𝛽𝛽10 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 +
𝛽𝛽11 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽12 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽13 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝛽14 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽15 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + ε1

(12)

where the NEWS represents the management earnings expectation relative to the
market expectation (Good_News and Bad_News). All the variables in the Equation 11
and Equation 12, except dummy variables and NO_Analyst, are winsorized at top and
button 1 percent level. I control fixed time effect and fixed industry effect as well.
4.4 Sample
I collect the management earnings forecasts from the Thomson First Call’s
Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database, the firm-level fundamental variables from
the COMPUSTAT database, and the market variables from the CRSP database. The
variable of institutional ownership and the variables related to financial analysts are
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respectively obtained from Thomson Reuters database and I/B/E/S database. As
mentioned above, I limit my sample after year 2004 to increase the representativeness
of voluntary disclosure sample. Finally, my sample year is between 2005 and 2011.
The sample sizes varies when I use different measurements to capture cost stickiness
and when I respectively test H5 and H6. And all the standard errors presents in the
OLS regressions are adjusted for the firm-level and year-level clustering.
5. Empirical Results
5.1 Cost stickiness and MEF
First, I investigate the Hypothesis 5 whether cost stickiness is positively
associated with management earnings forecasts. The table 8 displays the descriptive
statistics of H5 sample. I find values of four measurements of cost stickiness are close
to negative, which indicates that cost stickiness is a widespread phenomenon in the
real business world.

Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of the relation between cost stickiness and MEF Issuance
Variable
Mean
Std Dev
25th Pctl
Median
75th Pctl
Cost_Sticky
0.01577
1.14046
-0.4431
0.00355
0.46321
COGS_Sticky
0.11108
1.2265
-0.406
0.05457
0.57317
SGA_Sticky
-0.1567
1.55182
-1.0385
-0.1671
0.70148
ABJ_Sticky
-0.0714
0.49406
-0.3005
-0.0663
0.14329
Earn_Predict
-2.6361
2.01051
-3.9598
-2.6432
-1.2748
Nonsynch
-0.6677
1.0265
-1.1914
-0.5858
-0.0787
ERC
13.0651
27.5856
-0.1517
5.91144
19.5965
Ret_Vol
0.12129
0.064
0.07479
0.10766
0.14994
Inst_Owner
0.68863
0.28368
0.50031
0.74449
0.89409
NO_Analyst
10.9373
8.55435
4
9
15
MEF_Cost
8.19976
2.08924
7.00091
8.59727
9.58503
SIZE
7.34725
1.82672
6.06934
7.34459
8.52011
ROA
0.00685
0.15085
0.00244
0.02998
0.07087
BTM
0.62894
0.55103
0.30854
0.51147
0.79832
∆EPS
-0.0305
2.07397
-0.43
0.08
0.53
This table illustrates the descriptive statistics of the sample to test the relation between cost
stickiness and the managerial incentive to issue management earnings forecasts.
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Table 9 below displays the Pearson correlation among the variables in the H5
sample. Consistent with my conjecture, I find that that the four measurements of cost
stickiness are positively and significantly associated with the issuance and frequency
of management earnings forecast. Moreover, the four measurements of cost stickiness
are highly positively correlated with each other. This suggests my sample is initially
valid. Then I will test the association using the multivariate regression.
The Table 10 below investigates the association between cost stickiness and
firm’s management earnings forecast behaviors. I respectively use whether issue at
least one quarterly MEF during the sample year (Issue) and the frequency of quarterly
MEF released during the sample year (Freq) to measure the firm’s MEF behaviors. In
the Panel A, I respectively use Cost_Sticky, COGS_Sticky and SGA_Sticky to
measure the firm-level cost stickiness based on Weiss (2010) model. I find that all
three firm-level measurements of cost stickiness are positively associated with the
firm’s management earnings forecast behaviors. Specifically, the Cost_Sticky is
positively and significantly correlated with whether firm issues the quarterly MEF
(coefficient=0.0148 and P-value=0.0042) and the frequency of MEF release
(coefficient=0.0765, P-value=0.0164). The COGS_Sticky is also positively and
significantly associated with the frequency of MEF release (coefficient=0.0773, Pvalue=0.0147), and it’s positively correlated with whether firm issues the quarterly
MEF (coefficient=0.0085 and P-value=0.059) and the relation is significant at 10
percent level. Consistently, the SGA_Sticky is positively associated with whether firm
issues the quarterly MEF (coefficient=0.0030 and P-value=0.0566) the frequency of
MEF release (coefficient=0.0147, P-value=0.0671), and the relations are significant at
10 percent level.
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Table 9: Pearson Correlation to Test the Relation between Cost Stickiness and MEF Issuance
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(1)Freq

1

(2)Issue

0.6824

(3)Cost_Sticky

0.0105 0.0296

(4)COGS_Sticky

0.0258 0.0235 0.5387

(5)SGA_Sticky

0.0164 0.0094 0.3769 0.1719

(6)ABJ_Sticky

0.0091 0.0101 0.0328 0.0446 0.0126

(7)Earn_Predict

0.1049 0.0992 -0.0466 -0.0262 -0.0487 0.0036

(8)Nonsynch

0.0703

(9)ERC

0.1369 0.1634 -0.0293 -0.0158 -0.0162 -0.0095 0.0603 0.0665

(10)Ret_Vol

(11)

(10)

(12)

(13)

1
1
1
1
1
1

0.076 -0.0486 -0.0073 0.0256 -0.0115 0.0562

-0.1672 -0.1701 0.0067 -0.0546 0.0186 0.0468

1
1

-0.152 -0.1046 -0.1167

1

(11)Inst_Owner

0.2074 0.2638 0.0015 -0.0041

-0.037 0.0092 0.0076 0.0859 0.1616 -0.1205

(12)NO_Analyst

0.1544 0.1529 -0.0132 0.0242 -0.0407 0.0209 0.0175 -0.0336 0.1658 -0.1787 0.3276
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1
1

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

Table 9: Pearson Correlation to Test the Relation between Cost Stickiness and MEF Issuance – Continued

(13)MEF_Cost

0.0568 0.0512 -0.0009 -0.0384 0.0584 0.0555

(14)SEO

0.0861 0.0129

(15)SIZE

0.1031 0.0592

(16)ROA

0.1353 0.1659 0.1855 0.1065 0.0869 0.0066 0.0807 0.0755 0.1357

(17)BTM

-0.1235

-0.011 -0.0153 -0.0192

0.1066 0.1018 0.2063

1

-0.01 0.0051 -0.0183 0.0039 -0.0275

-0.044

1

0.01 0.0557 -0.0746 0.0056 0.0157 -0.0301 0.0181 -0.3905 0.1818 0.5626

-0.01

-0.034

0.006 -0.0024 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0153

-0.156 -0.1195 -0.1169 -0.0912 -0.0126

-0.03 -0.0809 -0.1146

-0.378 0.2237

0.195

0.1199 -0.1648 -0.2001

1

-0.046 0.0251 0.3192

1

-0.177 0.0315 0.0318 -0.0936

1

0.0271 0.0336 0.2835 0.1321 0.0756 0.0318 -0.039 -0.0538 -0.0167 0.0537 0.0332 0.0244 0.0308 0.0095 0.0005 0.2433 -0.1711
(18)∆EPS
This table displays the Pearson correlations among variables in the sample of hypothesis 5 to test the relation between the cost stickiness and the managerial incentive to
issue managmeent earnings forecasts. The bold figure indicates the correlation is significant at 5 percent level.
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Table 10: the Relation between Cost Stickiness and Management Earnings Forecast
Panel A: Firm-level cost stickiness

Intercept
Cost_Sticky
COGS_Sticky
SGA_Sticky
Earn_Predict
Nonsynch
ERC
Ret_Vol
Inst_Owner
NO_Analyst
MEF_Cost
SEO
SIZE
ROA
BTM
∆EPS
Industry Fixed Effect
Year Fixed Effect
Observations
# of forecasts
# of non-forecasts
R-Square

Coefficient P-value
-0.06816 0.6502
0.014795 0.0042

Dependent Variable = Issue
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
0.118642 0.5734
0.0708349 0.661
0.0084528

0.00322
0.013891
0.000836
-0.45231
0.226819
0.001003
-0.01203
0.132584
0.005263
0.143477
-0.05672
0.002341

0.0234
0.0222
0.0026
<.0001
<.0001
0.3359
0.0012
0.32
0.0326
0.0066
<.0001
0.4196

Yes
Yes
5327
1486
3841
0.1683

0.004288
0.0118831
0.0007945
-0.453238
0.2215621
0.0020906
-0.008196
0.0219432
0.0051786
0.152256
-0.060771
0.0039684

Coefficient P-value
-0.694867 0.5259
0.0764986 0.0164

0.059
0.1662
0.0585
0.0046
<.0001
<.0001
0.0543
0.0327
0.8734
0.0341
0.0012
<.0001
0.1574

Yes
Yes
5273
1498
3775
0.1665

0.002993
0.007417
0.016122
0.000423
-0.27914
0.18704
0.003883
-0.0214
0.119303
0.003164
0.107976
-0.06729
0.011322

0.0566
0.0744
0.0355
0.0161
0.0574
<.0001
0.0076
<.0001
0.3777
0.0658
0.0868
<.0001
0.0011

Yes
Yes
3081
945
2136
0.165
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0.0216555
0.1803978
0.0066207
-4.341946
1.1521074
0.0043337
-0.06697
0.3511047
0.2023008
0.5392898
-0.257971
0.0116217

0.3523
0.0003
0.0018
<.0001
<.0001
0.5833
0.0082
0.7123
<.0001
0.0881
<.0001
0.5492

Dependent Variable = Freq
Coefficient P-value
-0.284229 0.7799
0.077316

0.0147

0.023136
0.165651
0.005798
-4.23936
1.064063
0.013471
-0.041824
0.046233
0.196412
0.795669
-0.284744
0.025083

0.3241
0.0012
0.005
<.0001
<.0001
0.1074
0.1304
0.9542
<.0001
0.0036
<.0001
0.174

Coefficient P-value
0.252674 0.8401

0.014703
0.025748
0.130867
0.006897
-4.114298
0.879442
0.021425
-0.087725
0.889475
0.114358
0.775114
-0.398513
0.072219

0.0671
0.3663
0.0049
0.0127
<.0001
<.0001
0.0232
0.0083
0.067
0.0209
0.03
<.0001
0.0023

Yes
Yes
5327

Yes
Yes
5273

Yes
Yes
3081

0.1217

0.1241

0.1217

Table 10: the Relation between Cost Stickiness and Management Earnings Forecast - Continued

Panel B: Industry-level cost stickiness

Intercept
ABJ_Sticky
Earn_Predict
Nonsynch
ERC
Ret_Vol
Inst_Owner
NO_Analyst
MEF_Cost
SEO
SIZE
ROA
BTM
∆EPS

Dependent Variable = Issue
Coefficient P-value
0.0254956 0.7579
0.0044237 0.0398
0.0091756 <.0001
0.0078995 0.0723
0.0009729 <.0001
-0.79935 <.0001
0.2510286 <.0001
-0.00537 0.9382
-0.011654 <.0001
0.0806369 0.196
0.015531 <.0001
0.1823899 <.0001
-0.050067 <.0001
0.0031462 0.0814

Dependent Variable = Freq
Coefficient P-value
-0.50423 0.3328
0.0884924 0.0183
0.0835501 <.0001
0.1427922 0.0002
0.0078737 <.0001
-5.806834 <.0001
1.4853032 <.0001
0.0056928 0.321
-0.080677 <.0001
0.3341899 0.3852
0.2119222 <.0001
0.8300769 <.0001
-0.267858 <.0001
0.0364283 0.0035

Industry Fixed Effect
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effect
Yes
Yes
Observations
11920
11920
3759
# of forecasts
8161
# of non-forecasts
0.206
0.149
R-Square
This table illustrates the association between cost stickiness and the managers' propensity to issue management earnings forecast (MEF). In the Panel A, the cost stickiness is
measured by the three firm-level variables obtained from the Weiss (2010) model. In the first three columns, the dependent variable is the dummy variable whether the firm issues
at lease one quarterly earnings forecast during the sample year. In the last three columns, the dependent variable is the frequency of quarterly MEF issued during the sample year.
In the Panel B, the cost stickiness is measured by the industry-level variable obtained from the ABJ 2003 model. In the first column, the dependent variable is the dummy variable
whether the firm issues at lease one quarterly MEF during the year. In the second column, the yeardependent variable is the frequency of quarterly MEF issued during the year.
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In the Panel B, I use the ABJ (2003) model to measure the industry-level cost
stickiness and investigate its association with firm’s management earnings forecast
behaviors. Consistently, I find that the industry-level cost stickiness (ABJ_Sticky) is
positively and significantly associated with whether issue at least one MEF
(coefficient=0.0044, P-valu0.0398) and the frequency of MEF release
(coefficient=0.0885, P-value= 0.0183). In conclusion, through multivariate
regressions I find that cost stickiness is positively associated with firm’s MEF
behaviors. This suggests that firms with the higher level of sticky cost tend to be more
likely to issue management earnings forecasts.
5.2 Cost stickiness and management earnings expectation
In this section, I test the association between the firm’s level of sticky cost and
the managers’ expectations regarding the future earnings. Table 11 displays the
descriptive statistics of H6 sample. And Table 12 shows the Pearson correlations
among variables of H6 sample. I find that the four measurements of cost stickiness are
positively and significantly correlated with good news as expected, but I don’t find a
significant negative correlation between the four measurements of cost stickiness and
bad news. More evidence should be provided using the multivariate regressions.
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics to test the relation between cost stickiness and MEF expectation
Mean
Std Dev
75th Pectl
25th Pctl
Median
Good_News
0.20737
0.54635
0
0
0.0479
Bad_News
-0.1454
0.31265
-0.1469
-0.007
0
Cost_Sticky
0.05216
1.02512
-0.3506
0.01342
0.41627
COGS_Sticky
0.1305
1.06527
-0.303
0.08842
0.53565
SGA_Sticky
-0.1643
1.48522
-1.0197
-0.1957
0.70197
ABJ_Sticky
-0.0684
0.48856
-0.2682
-0.0873
0.1418
ERC
19.5497
32.1321
1.42324
11.8424
30.829
Ret_Vol
0.10531
0.04939
0.06901
0.09617
0.1306
Inst_Owner
0.80566
0.21392
0.68781
0.83547
0.94218
NO_Analyst
13.3319
8.35311
7
12
18
Growth
0.09746
0.22553
-0.0091
0.06155
0.15167
Labor_Intense 0.54637
0.34546
0.33157
0.65565
0.81713
SIZE
7.59063
1.67962
6.41839
7.52485
8.701
ROA
0.04229
0.10374
0.02082
0.05061
0.0865
BM
0.53219
0.40912
0.28861
0.45089
0.67125
This table illustrates the descriptive statistics of the sample to test the relation between cost
stickiness and management earnings forecast expecation (good news and bad news).
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(1)
(1)Good_News

Table 12: Pearson Correlation to test the relation between cost stickiness and MEF expectation
(3)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)

(2)
1

(2)Bad_News

0.1765

(3)Cost_Sticky

0.0829 0.0305

(4)COGS_Sticky

0.0799 0.0329 0.4449

(5)SGA_Sticky

0.0296

(6)ABJ_Sticky

0.0383 0.0126 0.0193 0.0523 0.0301

(7)ERC

0.0185 0.0366 -0.047

(8)Ret_Vol

-0.033 -0.182 -0.003 -0.095 0.0101 0.0283 -0.078

(9)Inst_Owner

1
1
1

-0.03 0.3897 0.1515

1
1

-0.01 -0.031 -0.016

1
1

0.01 0.0578 -0.019 -0.035 -0.027 0.0253 0.1421 -0.022

1

(10)NO_Analyst

-0.007 0.1074 -0.007 0.0443 -0.081

0.024 0.1261 -0.132 0.1376

1

(11)Growth

0.0408 0.0963 0.1323 0.1156 0.0844 0.0006 0.0631 -0.018 0.1076 0.0841

(12)Labor_Intense

-0.045 -0.053 -0.014 -0.029 -0.022

1

-0.08 0.0812 0.1123 0.0986 0.1109 0.1536
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1

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

Table 12: Pearson Correlation to test the relation between cost stickiness and MEF expectation – Continued

1

(13)Litigation

0.0085 -0.044 0.0296 -0.048 0.0103 -0.053 0.0408 0.1666 -0.011 0.2072 0.0166 0.1646

(14)Durable

-0.029 -0.023 -0.015 -0.047 -0.055 0.0527 0.0181 0.1394 0.0776 0.0566 0.0171 0.2052 0.1117

(15)SEO

0.0042 0.0014 0.0131 0.0088 -0.046 0.0115 0.0159 -0.008 0.0295 -0.028 0.0265

(16)SIZE

-0.041 0.1796 0.0068 0.0952 -0.084 0.0383

(17)Loss

-0.014 -0.267 -0.196 -0.154 -0.051 -0.034 -0.079 0.3078 -0.081 -0.113 -0.211 0.0505 0.1036 0.0661 -0.011 -0.209

(18)ROA

0.0413 0.1951 0.2462

(19)BTM

-0.084

1

-0.01 0.0182 0.0297

1

-0.03 -0.436 0.0106 0.5457 0.0098 -0.101 -0.168 -0.114 -0.022

0.148 0.0852 0.0366 0.1214 -0.243 0.1255

1

0.157 0.2741 -0.012 -0.053 -0.022 0.0159 0.1312

-0.22 -0.146 -0.188 -0.095 -0.032 -0.133 0.2092 -0.077 -0.209 -0.174 -0.031 -0.089 -0.044 0.0149 -0.018

1
-0.64

1

0.293 -0.363

This table displays the Pearson correlations among variables in the sample of hypothesis 6 to test the relation between cost stickiness and management earnings forecast expectation. The bold figure

indicates the correlation is significant at 5 percent level.
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1

Table 13 represents the results of the relation between cost stickiness and
management earnings expectation. In the Panel A, I use the firm-level measurements
of cost stickiness based on Weiss (2010) model, and I find that Cost_Sticky
(Coefficient = 0.0239, P-value=0.0229), COGS_Sticky (Coefficient = 0.0139, Pvalue=0.0156) and SGA_Sticky (Coefficient = 0.0176, P-value=0.0321) are positively
and significantly correlated with good news as expected. Unfortunately, I don’t find a
significant negative correlation between my three measurements of cost stickiness and
bad news as expected. In the Panel B, I run the multivariate regression by using the
industry-level cost stickiness measurement. Consistently, I find that the industry-level
measurement, ABJ_Sticky, is positively and significantly correlated with good news
(Coefficient=0.0274, P-value=0.0165), and I don’t find a significant correlation
between ABJ_Sticky and bad news.
In conclusion, I find a consistent evidence for the positive relation between
cost stickiness and good news. This suggests that firms with the higher level of sticky
cost are optimistic about their future earnings and thus tend to issue good news.
However, I don’t find a significant correlation between cost stickiness and bad news.
This may suggest that the release of bad news is influenced greatly by macro factors
instead of firm specific strategies.
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Table 13: the Relation between Cost Stickiness and Management Earnings Expectation
Panel A: Firm-level cost stickiness

Intercept
Cost_Sticky
COGS_Sticky
SGA_Sticky
ERC
Ret_Vol
Inst_Owner
NO_Analyst
Growth
Labor_Intense
Litigation
Durable
SEO
Size
Loss
ROA
BM
Industry Fixed Effect
Year Fixed Effect
Observations
R-square

Dependent Variable = Good_News
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient
1.5379526 0.0319
1.501956 0.0089
2.0086124
0.0239365 0.0229
0.013869 0.0156
0.0176354
0.0001688 0.7371
-0.00028 0.5766
0.0009729
-0.94136 0.0013
-0.8542 0.0019
-0.81716
-0.091099 0.2034
-0.06563 0.3222
-0.024894
-0.005952 0.0118
-0.00395 0.0597
-0.005191
-0.022252 0.6861
0.005617 0.9075
0.0123761
-0.113571 0.0119
-0.11702 0.0111
-0.164874
0.0911597 0.0678
0.079596 0.0841
0.0698024
-0.22491 0.0176
-0.21412 0.0217
-0.302332
-0.16024 0.6044
-0.27436 0.1223
-0.203309
0.012932 0.2995
0.003786 0.7505
0.0070929
-0.121804 0.0187
-0.06523 0.152
-0.091814
0.1094348 0.5486
-0.11514 0.5221
-0.032055
-0.101577 0.042
-0.13077 0.0008
-0.083344
Yes
Yes
1694
0.1352

Yes
Yes
1739
0.1394

P-value
0.0115

0.0321
0.134
0.0248
0.754
0.0493
0.8367
0.0098
0.2797
0.0075
0.1086
0.6391
0.0882
0.867
0.0952

Yes
Yes
1113
0.1853
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Coefficient P-value
-0.164101 0.1134
0.00298 0.7631

-0.000193
-0.163784
0.005937
-0.002096
0.06828
-0.028699
0.007618
-0.045172
0.052667
0.039678
-0.123685
0.023188
-0.093964

0.4895
0.4052
0.906
0.1052
0.0799
0.3592
0.8217
0.3508
0.3743
<.0001
0.0037
0.8949
0.0049

Yes
Yes
1694
0.145

Dependent Variable = Bad_News
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
-0.095642 0.4578
0.226617 0.0545
0.000334

0.9644

-0.000179
0.050171
0.030444
-0.003206
0.039707
-0.017326
0.034775
-0.03853
-0.111033
0.041967
-0.138431
0.039472
-0.101848

0.5198
0.7763
0.5277
0.0129
0.2592
0.5953
0.3153
0.4032
0.2414
<.0001
0.0008
0.7858
0.002

Yes
Yes
1739
0.1556

-0.002639
0.00036
0.158116
-0.011298
-0.003477
0.050649
-0.000985
0.016643
-0.072882
-0.411471
0.055778
-0.1073
-0.01968
-0.113669

0.6943
0.253
0.433
0.8677
0.0256
0.2126
0.9818
0.6788
0.263
<.0001
<.0001
0.0255
0.9143
0.0087

Yes
Yes
1113
0.1563

Table 13: the Relation between Cost Stickiness and Management Earnings Expectation - Continued
Panel B: Industry-level cost stickiness

Intercept
ABJ_Sticky
ERC
Ret_Volatility
Inst_Owner
NO_Analyst
Growth
Labor_Intense
Litigation
Durable
SEO
Size
Loss
ROA
BM

Dependent Variable = Good_News
Coefficient P-value
0.817652 0.018
0.027358 0.0165
0.000296 0.3463
-0.8482 <.0001
-0.04259 0.3581
0.000851 0.6238
0.131894 0.0015
-0.15663 <.0001
0.04205 0.1821
-0.01463 0.8324
-0.0274 0.7944
-0.01883 0.0201
0.05797 0.0456
-0.06279 0.5515
-0.12407 <.0001

Dependent Variable = Bad_News
Coefficient P-value
-0.321171 0.0029
0.007228 0.4602
0.000125 0.3344
-0.062935 0.6184
0.046637 0.0666
-0.001672 0.0195
0.046438 0.0123
0.008089 0.6931
-0.011812 0.5905
-0.025656 0.331
0.041206 0.5577
0.031113 <.0001
-0.139668 <.0001
-0.007305 0.9405
-0.113017 <.0001

Industry Fixed Effect
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effect
Yes
Yes
Observations
4086
4086
R-square
0.1732
0.1416
This table illustrates the OLS regression results to test the relation between cost stickiness and management earnings forecast expectations. The dependent variables are good news
and bad news respectively for the first several and last several columns. In the Panel A, the cost stickiness is measured by the three firm-level variables obtained from the Weiss
(2010) model. And in the Panel B, the cost stickiness is measured by the industry-level variable obtained from the ABJ 2003 model.
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6. Additional Tests
6.1 Short-Horizon and Long-Horizon MEF
In this section, I conduct additional tests to investigate how cost stickiness is
associated with short-horizon and long-horizon management earnings forecast. I
define the short-horizon MEF as the management earnings forecast issued within 90
days prior to the forecast period. In contrast, the long-horizon MEF is defined as the
management earnings forecast issued more than 90 days prior to the forecast period.
The Table 14 suggests how the cost stickiness is associated with short-horizon or
long-horizon MEF behaviors. 7
In the Panel A, I investigate the relation between firm’s level of sticky cost
and the firm’s propensity to issue short-horizon (Issue_SH) or long-horizon MEF
(Issue_LH). I find that the Cost_Sticky is positively and significantly correlated with
the firm’s propensity to issue short-horizon MEF (Coefficient=0.0134, Pvalue=0.0057). However, I don’t find a significant positive correlation between cost
stickiness and the firm’s propensity to short-horizon MEF when I use other
measurements of cost stickiness, such as COGS_Sticky and ABJ_Sticky. In contrast, I
find that all three measurements of cost stickiness are positively and significantly
correlated with the firm’s propensity to issue long-horizon MEF (Cost_Sticky:
coefficient= 0.0120, P-value=0.0079; COGS_Sticky: coefficient=0.0093, Pvalue=0.0197; ABJ_Sticky: coefficient=0.0091, P-value=0.0232).

3

Because the measurement, SGA_Sticky, is usually significant at 10 percent level in
the main tests, here I didn’t use this measurement in the short-horizon/long-horizon MEF
tests.
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Table 14: the effect of cost stickiness on long-horizon and short-horizon management earnings forecast
Panel A: Whether firms issue MEF

Intercept
Cost_Sticky
COGS_Sticky
ABJ_Sticky
Earn_Predict
Nonsynch
ERC
Ret_Vol
Inst_Owner
NO_Analyst
MEF_Cost
SEO
SIZE
ROA
BTM
∆EPS
Industry Fixed Effec
Year Fixed Effect
Observations
# of forecasts
# of non-forecasts
R-Square

Coefficient P-value
0.052131 0.7291
0.013435 0.0057

0.003615
0.011052
0.000591
-0.570193
0.202227
0.001264
-0.013192
0.071225
0.000972
0.102875
-0.055115
0.002078

0.2117
0.0515
0.026
<.0001
<.0001
0.2056
0.0002
0.5971
0.849
0.0437
<.0001
0.4505

Yes
Yes
5327
1269
4058
0.1665

Dependent Variable = Issue_SH
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
0.197862 0.2168
0.077676 0.323
0.005403

0.2037

0.00514
0.009214
0.00065
-0.577004
0.202509
0.002415
-0.009532
-0.040542
-0.00036
0.113109
-0.061124
0.003282

0.1171
0.0159
<.0001
<.0001
0.0204
0.0075
0.7674
0.9445
0.0126
<.0001
0.2171
0.1574

Yes
Yes
5273
1286
3987
0.1677

0.001668
0.009839
0.005361
0.000907
-0.835829
0.232607
0.000345
-0.011156
0.029502
0.010378
0.144673
-0.048351
0.002249

0.8299
<.0001
0.2019
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.6081
<.0001
0.632
0.0015
<.0001
<.0001
0.1921

Yes
Yes
11920
3301
8619
0.2007

Coefficient P-value
-0.085738 0.5186
0.011996 0.0079

0.005908
0.024285
0.000722
-0.512823
0.159239
-0.002673
-0.004494
0.035162
0.028649
0.164969
-0.0373
0.00177

0.0359
<.0001
0.0056
<.0001
<.0001
0.0035
0.1575
0.7592
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.4796

Yes
Yes
5327
1061
4266
0.1631
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Dependent Variable = Issue_LH
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
-0.059136 0.6372
-0.086003 0.1791
0.009253

0.0197

0.005785
0.020795
0.000553
-0.533122
0.132454
-0.001629
-0.002316
0.022676
0.028559
0.16527
-0.038076
0.004197

0.0411
<.0001
0.0363
<.0001
<.0001
0.093
0.4923
0.8196
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0821

Yes
Yes
5273
1048
4225
0.1622

0.009074
0.009837
0.018265
0.000839
-0.804031
0.188729
-0.00251
-0.008628
0.091367
0.031749
0.176254
-0.044752
0.004258

0.0232
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0001
0.0296
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0071

Yes
Yes
11920
2810
9110
0.2039

Table 14: the effect of cost stickiness on long-horizon and short-horizon management earnings forecast - Continued
Panel B: The frequency of MEF

Intercept
Cost_Sticky
COGS_Sticky
ABJ_Sticky
Earn_Predict
Nonsynch
ERC
Ret_VoL
Inst_Owner
NO_Analyst
MEF_Cost
SEO
SIZE
ROA
BTM
∆EPS

Coefficient P-value
0.561854 0.3917
0.036588 0.0427

Dependent Variable = Freq_SH
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
0.965711 0.1221
0.525386 0.1049
0.023619

0.012051
0.034664
0.002891
-2.653303
0.643119
0.014085
-0.039166
0.022163
-0.022988
0.039572
-0.134928
0.009747

0.2944
0.1201
0.0162
<.0001
<.0001
0.0008
0.0042
0.9703
0.2826
0.834
<.0001
0.34

0.009039
0.028064
0.002774
-2.583229
0.639704
0.017324
-0.023957
-0.292143
-0.025283
0.317297
-0.161931
0.012655

Coefficient P-value
-1.256721 0.0143
0.039911
0.04

0.1517
0.4294
0.2197
0.022
<.0001
<.0001
0.0001
0.0939
0.5762
0.2556
0.0561
<.0001
0.2012

0.004728
0.041972
0.02788
0.00424
-3.061437
0.778124
0.011947
-0.032726
-0.104031
0.001819
0.356799
-0.113718
0.013494

0.8809
<.0001
0.1122
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0008
0.6904
0.8976
0.0003
<.0001
0.0452

0.009604
0.145734
0.00373
-1.688642
0.508989
-0.009752
-0.027804
0.328942
0.225288
0.499717
-0.123042
0.001875

0.5227
<.0001
0.0022
<.0001
<.0001
0.0619
0.0699
0.4104
<.0001
0.0102
0.0023
0.8821

Dependent Variable = Freq_LH
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
-1.249941 0.0103
-1.029616 <.0001
0.053696

0.007

0.014098
0.137587
0.003024
-1.656131
0.424359
-0.003853
-0.017868
0.338376
0.221695
0.478372
-0.122813
0.012428

0.3551
0.0003
0.0095
<.0001
<.0001
0.48
0.3023
0.3057
<.0001
0.0038
0.0023
0.2995

0.083765
0.041578
0.114912
0.003634
-2.745397
0.707179
-0.006255
-0.047951
0.438221
0.210103
0.473278
-0.15414
0.022934

0.0186
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.081
<.0001
0.0065
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0035

Industry Fixed Effec
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effect
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
5327
5273
11920
5327
5273
11920
R-Square
0.1115
0.1162
0.1488
0.1279
0.1293
0.1516
This table illustrates the relation between cost stickiness and short-term MEF and the relation between cost stickiness and long-term MEF. The cost stickiness is measured by
several industry-level and firm-level variables obtained from the ABJ 2003 model and the Weiss (2010) model. In the Panel A, the dependent variables are repsectively the
issuance of short-horizon MEF and the issuance of long-horizon MEF in the first three and the last three columns. In the Panel B, the dependent variables are respectively the
frequency of short-horizon MEF and the frequency of long-horizon MEF in the first three and last three columns.
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In the Panel B, I investigate the relation between firm’s level of sticky cost
and the frequency of short-horizon (Freq_SH) or long-horizon MEF (Freq_LH)
releases. ). I find that the Cost_Sticky is positively and significantly correlated with
the frequency of short-horizon MEF (Coefficient=0.0366, P-value=0.0427). However,
I don’t find a significant positive correlation between cost stickiness and frequency of
short-horizon MEF when I use other measurements of cost stickiness, such as
COGS_Sticky and ABJ_Sticky. In contrast, I find that all three measurements of cost
stickiness are positively and significantly correlated with the frequency of longhorizon MEF (Cost_Sticky: coefficient= 0.0399, P-value=0.04; COGS_Sticky:
coefficient=0.0537, P-value=0.007; ABJ_Sticky: coefficient=0.0838, Pvalue=0.0186). In conclusion, I find that the positive correlation between cost
stickiness and MEF is more pronounced when the management earnings forecast is
the long-horizon oriented. This result is consistent with my conjecture that managers
will align their interests when they determine different strategies. When managers
adjust the firm’s resource level they will simultaneously consider and forecast the
firm’s future earnings. Therefore, managers will burden the lower level of resource
adjust cost when they have forecasted the future earnings in an earlier period, and thus
tend to choose the more sticky cost strategy.
6.2 The Effect of Firm Efficiency
As mentioned above, the cost stickiness is associated with managers’
deliberate choice of resource adjustment. The management earnings forecast is also a
type of managerial strategy based on managerial incentives and operation goals.
Therefore, the firm’s operating, investing and financing efficiency will significantly
influence managers’ choices, including cost stickiness management and management
earnings forecast. In this section, I investigate how the relation between cost
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stickiness and management earnings forecast is influenced by firm efficiency
situation.8 Table 15 displays the results of multivariate regressions. The measurement
of firm efficiency is based on Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012). In the Panel A, I
test the effect of firm efficiency on the relation between cost stickiness and the firm’s
propensity to issue long-horizon MEF. First, I find that the measurements of cost
stickiness are all positively correlated with the firm’s propensity to issue long-horizon
MEF when the firm efficiency is high (Cost_Sticky: coefficient=0.0603, Pvalue=0.0097; COGS_Sticky: coefficient=0.0780, P-value=0.0004; ABJ_Sticky:
coefficient=0.0479, P-value=0.0414). In contrast, I don’t find a significantly positive
relation between cost stickiness and the firm’s propensity to issue long-horizon MEF
when the firm efficiency is low.
In the Panel B, I test the effect of firm efficiency on the relation between cost
stickiness and the frequency of long-horizon MEF. First, I find that the measurements
of cost stickiness are all positively correlated with the frequency of long-horizon MEF
when the firm efficiency is high (Cost_Sticky: coefficient=0.2737, P-value=0.0143;
COGS_Sticky: coefficient=0.3034, P-value=0.0229; ABJ_Sticky: coefficient=0.2452,
P-value=0.0224). In contrast, I don’t find a positive relation between cost stickiness
and the firm’s propensity to issue long-horizon MEF which is significant at 5 percent
level when the firm efficiency is low. In conclusion, this suggests that the positive
relation between cost stickiness and management earnings forecast is more (less)
pronounced when the firm efficiency is high (low). This is consistent with my
conjecture that the different choices determined by managers are interrelated among

4

In the section 6.1, I suggest that the cost stickiness is more associated with longhorizon MEF instead of short-horizon MEF. In this section, I specifically test the effect of
firm efficiency on the relation between cost stickiness and long-horizon MEF.
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each other and these strategy interdependencies are influenced by the firm efficiency.
Specifically when the firm efficiency is high, the different strategies are more
interdependent and work together to align managers’ interests.
7. Conclusions
This paper investigate how firm’s cost stickiness strategy is associated with
firm’s voluntary disclosure strategy. Prior papers suggest that cost stickiness is a
prevalent phenomenon in the business world and is a type of deliberate management
choice. As we know, the management earnings forecast is also a type of voluntary
disclosure determined by managers’ choices. Therefore, I conjecture that these two
managerial strategies are interdependent to each other to align managers’ interests.
Specifically, when managers determine the cost strategy they will also choose the
corresponding MEF strategy. Through empirical tests with a sample between 2005
and 2011, I find that both the firm-level and the industry-level of cost stickiness is
positively and significantly correlated with the firm’s propensity to issue MEF and the
frequency of MEF. I also find that the firm’s level of sticky cost is associated with
more good news announced by managers. My results are robust when I use alternative
measurements of cost stickiness. Moreover, in the additional tests, I find the relation
between cost stickiness and MEF is more pronounced when the MEF is the longhorizon and when the firm efficiency is high.
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Table 15: the effect of firm efficiency on the relation between cost stickiness and MEF
Panel A: Whether firms issue MEF

Intercept
Cost_Sticky
COGS_Sticky
ABJ_Sticky
Efficiency
Earn_Predict
Nonsynch
ERC
Ret_Vol
Inst_Owner
NO_Analyst
MEF_Cost
SIZE
ROA
BTM
∆EPS
Industry Fixed Effect
Year Fixed Effect
Observations
# of forecasts
# of non-forecasts
R-Square

Coefficient P-value
0.991008 0.0639
0.0603
0.0097

-0.407788
-0.010399
0.002147
0.000698
-1.008787
0.107724
0.00445
-0.046427
0.023397
0.583372
-0.048321
0.000831

0.1947
0.3567
0.9461
0.531
0.0136
0.2266
0.3425
0.0108
0.2635
0.0602
0.3217
0.9325

Yes
Yes
524
187
337
0.2735

Dependent Variable = ISSUE_LH
when firm efficiency is high
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient
0.037797 0.9142
0.705389
0.001
-0.3918
0.018545
0.077968 0.0004
0.047916 0.0414
-0.363173 0.227
-0.59724 0.0021
0.177633
-0.013436 0.2052
0.010222
0.141
-0.01154
0.013756 0.6493
0.048392 0.0111
-0.00435
0.001342 0.2095
0.000195
0.695
0.001711
-0.71842 0.0623
-1.4777
<.0001
-0.74559
0.068172 0.4175
0.211386 <.0001
-0.00516
0.007599 0.0689
0.006712 0.0062
-0.00218
-0.03887 0.0309
-0.02965 0.0212
-0.00448
0.022404
0.293
0.016537 0.1715
0.074664
0.181277 0.4725
0.30443
0.0614
0.204439
-0.02442 0.5453
-0.07717 0.0094
-0.0459
0.007353 0.3822
0.012129 0.0694
0.00269
Yes
Yes
5273
169
359
0.258

Yes
Yes
1256
526
730
0.2879
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P-value
0.0346
0.1232

0.2828
0.2243
0.8335
0.0732
0.0029
0.949
0.6367
0.7704
0.0015
0.0374
0.0628
0.7171

Yes
Yes
5327
86
365
0.2435

when firm efficiency is low
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
-0.34946 0.0403
-0.333911 0.0032

0.011026
0.258879
-0.001699
-0.004435
0.001876
-0.881767
0.062039
-0.005209
-0.004058
0.068849
0.101141
-0.049427
0.003771

0.2761
0.0901
0.8476
0.829
0.0179
0.0002
0.3868
0.2489
0.7925
0.0015
0.1667
0.0246
0.5659

Yes
Yes
5273
93
409
0.2517

0.034742
0.38202
-0.005485
0.004657
0.001125
-0.799759
0.045616
-0.00287
-0.005059
0.06228
0.051084
-0.061838
0.000465

0.2571
<.0001
0.3361
0.7361
0.0142
<.0001
0.3097
0.2919
0.7204
<.0001
0.2789
0.001
0.9342

Yes
Yes
3081
298
945
0.2348

Table 15: the effect of firm efficiency on the relation between cost stickiness and MEF – Continued
Panel B: Frequency of MEF

Intercept
Cost_Sticky
COGS_Sticky
ABJ_Sticky
Efficiency
Earn_Predict
Nonsynch
ERC
Ret_Vol
Inst_Owner
NO_Analyst
MEF_Cost
SIZE
ROA
BTM
∆EPS

Coefficient P-value
4.323262 0.0626
0.273656 0.0143

-2.893613
-0.057303
0.182148
0.008486
-4.29667
0.007908
0.017642
-0.147443
0.254283
0.981214
-0.419064
-0.032105

0.0403
0.2895
0.3472
0.0843
0.0135
0.9831
0.4936
0.0662
0.0105
0.6961
0.0447
0.5496

Dependent Variable =Freq_LH
when firm efficiency is high
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient
Coefficient P-value
-2.70448
0.9101
3.416029 0.0013
0.18682
-0.05052
0.303418 0.0229
0.245242 0.0224
-2.704256 0.0711
-3.5951
0.0001
1.628156
-0.05196
-0.065795 0.2145
0.041325 0.2537
0.358098 0.0004
0.049035
0.190114 0.3072
-0.00212 0.4762
0.010493
0.009901 0.0415
-3.540795 0.0416
-6.15392 <.0001
-2.25171
-0.06349
0.560586 0.0271
0.022118 0.9521
-0.03545
0.017967 0.4478
0.049283 0.0015
-0.1028
0.1034
0.004452
-0.10143 0.2222
0.23829
0.02
0.161348 0.0087
0.41995
0.483163 0.5696
0.295077
0.493197 0.6534
-0.47375 0.0018
-0.15486
-0.277279 0.0936
0.02309
0.061728 0.1014
-0.002609 0.9534

P-value
0.0017
0.3007

0.016
0.1798
0.563
0.0284
0.0316
0.8175
0.0707
0.9439
0.0002
0.3894
0.0867
0.4392

when firm efficiency is low
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
-1.846934 0.0001
-2.205921 0.0033
0.024745

0.5606

1.784871
-0.015169
0.086631
0.011134
-2.498097
0.337002
-0.035923
0.005503
0.320385
0.187813
-0.154462
0.029598

0.0075
0.6897
0.3016
0.0062
0.0107
0.1951
0.046
0.93
0.002
0.4642
0.0661
0.199

0.238695
1.555534
-0.017214
0.096078
0.004842
-2.513252
0.125611
-0.009604
0.00034
0.306466
0.155943
-0.201897
0.011756

0.088
0.0005
0.456
0.0902
0.0208
<.0001
0.4704
0.4084
0.9951
<.0001
0.3747
0.0041
0.6406

Industry Fixed Effect
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effect
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
524
528
1256
451
502
1243
R-Square
0.2645
0.2337
0.2488
0.2435
0.2293
0.2169
This table illustrates the relation between cost stickiness and the management earnings forecast when the firm efficiency is either high or low. In the Panel A, the dependent variable
is the issuance of long-horizon MEF. In the Panel B, the dependent variable is the frequency of long-horizon MEF. In the first three columns, the relation is tested when the firm efficiency
is high. And in the last three columns, the relation is tested when the firm efficiency is low.
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My results contribute to accounting research through investigating the
interdependent incentives behind each managerial strategy. First, cost stickiness is a
prevalent phenomenon but have not obtained sufficient attention from accounting
research to investigate its effect on firm operations. Second, this paper builds a link
between financial accounting information (such as MEF) and managerial accounting
information (such as cost stickiness) and thus provides new evidence regarding how
managers operate the external financial and internal managerial accounting information
systems to align their interests and provide information to external users. Finally, through
examining the interdependency between managers’ choices, we can better understand the
whole complicated accounting information system in the real business world. I believe
my paper will provide new insights into the research of managerial incentives behind
their operating, financing and investing strategies.
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CHPATER 4

HOW INDUSTRY PEER FIRMS INFLUENCE THE VOLUNTARY
DISCLOSURE STRATEGY?

1. Introduction
Managerial voluntary disclosure is endogenously derived from the agency
problem and information asymmetry between managers and investors (Beyer et al. 2010).
Management earnings forecast (MEF), as one typical financial voluntary disclosure, has
obtained attention from accounting literature for a long history. Scholars are interested in
investigating why managers tend to voluntarily issue management earnings forecast and
how managers determine their type, timing and specificity of MEF. Prior research
suggests that forecasting environment and forecaster’s characteristics will significantly
influence the managers’ propensity to issue earnings forecast (Hirst et al. 2008).
Specifically, the MEF behaviors are influenced by regulation change (Baginski et al.,
2002), information asymmetry (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991), institutional ownership
and financial analyst following (Barber et al., 2001), CEO ability (Baik et al., 2011),
managers’ personality (Hribar and Yang, 2010; Hilary and Hsu, 2011) and managerial
incentive (Cheng et al., 2013). However, prior paper doesn’t consider one endogenous
factor, the impact of industry peer firms, which also will influence the firm’s MEF
behaviors, although the industry fixed effect is commonly controlled by researchers.
The pressures from industry peer firms significantly shape the managers’ thinking
and their corresponding strategies. Prior research suggests that the peer firms can
influence the CEO performance evaluation (Albuquerque, 2009), executive compensation
(Bizjak et al. 2008), tax avoidance choices (Li et al., 2013), investment decisions
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(Ozoguz and Rebello, 2013), dividend policy (Popadak, 2012; Adhikari, 2013), and
capital structure (Leary and Roberts, 2014). Recently, as the market competition rises, the
impact of peer firms spread over firm’s operating, investing and financing activities. This
generates my interest in investigating how peer firms will influence firm’s voluntary
disclosure strategy.
I conjecture four plausible reasons to explain why industry peer firms may
influence the firm’s management earnings forecast behaviors. First, according to the
signaling theory, firm has the incentive to follow the peer firms’ disclosure strategy
because keeping silence will be identified as a “bad” firm. Second, the free rider
theory/herding theory suggests that firms tend to mimic the MEF behaviors of peer firms,
especially the more successful peers, in order to save expenses and time. Third, the
potential litigation risk also encourages firms to choose the herding strategy and thus
follow others’ behaviors (such as Floyd, 2012). Finally, the concerns about their career
and reputation lead managers to mimic peers’ disclosure strategy, when the disclosure
performance has been identified as a method to evaluate the CEO’s ability according to
Baik et al. (2011). Hence, this paper is trying to discussing whether firms mimic their
peer firms’ management earnings forecast behaviors and which firms mimic and which
firms are mimicked.
To investigate the impact of peer firms on voluntary disclosure, I first try to
specifically identify how to measure the peer firms’ behaviors. Leary and Roberts (2014)
suggest that this type of research is facing the empirical problem when directly using the
industry average values to proxy peer firms’ behaviors, because it’s difficult to conclude
whether the firm’s behaviors are really driven by peer firms’ behaviors or they are driven
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by the same institutional environment within the industry. To solve the endogeneity
problem of industry average values, I construct the instrument variables, the earnings
non-synchronicity of peer firms (excluding the specific firm i) and the ERC of peer firms
(excluding the specific firm i), which can satisfy both the relevance requirement and the
excludability requirement. According to Gong et al. (2013), the earnings nonsynchronicity of peer firms is positively correlated with peer firms’ MEF behaviors and is
not associated with the specific firm’s MEF behaviors, because the variable suggests how
firm specific factors explain the specific firm’s variations in earnings. Moreover, prior
research suggests that ERC is significantly correlated with the good news and bad news
disclosed by managers (Relevance) and the peer firms’ ERC is not associated with the
specific firms’ management earnings forecast (Excludability). Then I construct several
measurements to proxy the frequency, timeliness (long horizon versus short horizon) and
type (good news versus bad news) of management earnings forecast behaviors. When I
test the peer effects on disclosure frequency and disclosure horizon, I use the peer firms’
earnings non-synchronicity as the instrument. When I test the peer effects on
management earnings expectations, I use the peer firms’ ERC as the instrument. Because
I empirically test the models through using the two stage least square (2SLS) method,
thus I can conclude the causal effect in this paper. I also alternatively use the 3-digit SIC
code method and the text-based network industry classification method developed by
Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2015) to define the industry peer firms and thus ensure the
robustness of my results.
I measure the voluntary disclosure based on the management earnings forecasts
obtained from the Thomson First Call’s Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database. Other
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fundamental, market-based and financial analyst variables are respectively obtained from
the COMPUSTAT database, the CRSP database, and Thomson Reuters database. I limit
my sample after year 2004 to increase the representativeness of management earnings
forecast sample. Finally, my sample year is between 2005 and 2011 and the sample sizes
vary based on different measurements of voluntary disclosure and different methods to
define industry peer firms.
The empirical results suggest that industry peer firms’ disclosure strategy can
significantly influence the specific firm’s disclosure strategy. Specifically, the increase in
the industry peer firms’ disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and disclosure of bad
news will encourage the specific firm to increase its disclosure frequency, disclosure
horizon and disclosure of bad news. Moreover, certain firms with S&P credit rating,
higher profit, larger size and higher Market-to-Book ratio tend to be more sensitive to
their peers’ disclosure frequency and certain firms with higher profit and higher Marketto-Book ratio tend to be less sensitive to their peers’ disclosure of bad news. Finally, I
investigate whether there is the leader-follower relation in the peer effects of disclosure
strategy. Through empirical test, I don’t find that certain firms (leaders) are always
mimicked and certain firms (followers) always mimic. In contrast, I find each firm
respond actively to its peers’ disclosure strategy no matter its position within the industry.
This suggests the herding theory and free rider theory are not major reason in explaining
the peer effects, because the leader-follower relation doesn’t exist and the mimicking of
voluntary disclosure is very pricy. I suggest that the signaling theory, litigation risk and
CEO reputation are major reasons in explaining why firms mimic their peers’ disclosure
strategy.
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In conclusion, this paper discusses how firms mimic their peers’ voluntary
disclosure strategy. This paper contributes to the accounting literature by examining the
endogenous factor, the impact of industry peer firm, which is usually ignored by prior
papers. My results provide new evidence to explain the managerial incentives behind the
management earnings forecast behaviors. And I provide three plausible reasons (signaling
theory, litigation risk and CEO reputation) to explain the impact of peer firms and
exclude other two plausible reasons (herding theory and free rider theory), and thus this
paper greatly enriches the academic views regarding the complicated financial reporting
system. Moreover, different from most prior papers which suffer the serious endogeneity
problem by directly use industry average values to measure the peer firms’ behaviors, I
implement the 2SLS method through the instrument and thus can conclude a causal effect
of peer firm on the voluntary disclosure strategy. Therefore, my paper provides the
guidance in discussing the possible solutions to solve the endogeneity problem which is
always existed in the voluntary disclosure research. Finally, this paper also suggests the
importance of regulating the voluntary disclosure by standard setters because of the
herding effect. Hence, I hope this paper can provide the insight into better understanding
the managerial incentives behind the voluntary disclosure strategy and thus help us build
a healthier accounting information environment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews literature related
to management earnings forecast and peer firms’ effect. The theoretical framework,
research questions, and hypothesis development are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 and
Section 5 respectively explain my research methodology and sample selection, especially
the way to construct the instruments and the way to define the industry peer firms. Main
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results are presented in Section 6 and the additional sensitive tests are described in
Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. Literature Review
2.1 Management earnings forecast
Accounting information plays an important role in improving the market liquidity
and mitigating the “lemon problem” described by Akerlof (1970). Voluntary managerial
disclosure of future earnings forecast, one important type of accounting information, has
been shown to explain 28.37% of the quarterly stock return variance, according to Beyer
et al. (2010). Therefore, the antecedents, characteristics and consequences of
management earnings forecast have obtained tremendous attention from accounting
research. In this paper, I focus on the antecedent determinants and the characteristics of
management earnings forecast to explain how industry peer firms will influence the
specific firm’s voluntary disclosure strategies.
Prior research suggests that the management’s incentive to issue earnings
guidance is significantly influenced by the forecast environment and forecasters’ specific
characteristics (Hirst et al. 2008). For example, Baginski et al. (2002) suggest that the
legal environment can significantly influence the management’s incentive to issue
earnings forecasts. Barber et al. (2001, 2003) suggest that the increase in institutional
ownership and financial analysts will also encourage managers to release MEF.
Moreover, the managers’ propensity to issue MEF is significantly determined by the
information asymmetry faced by the firm, and specifically higher information asymmetry
will force managers to increase disclosure level in order to hype the market (Diamond
and Verrecchia, 1991; Verrecchia, 2001). Recent accounting literature also suggest that
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managers’ specific characteristics, including their ability (Baik et al., 2011), personality
(Hribar and Yang, 2010; Hilary and Hsu, 2011) and self-incentive (Cheng et al., 2013),
will affect the quantity and quality of MEF disclosed by the firms. Finally, management
earnings forecast is not costless. The disclosure related costs, such as preparation costs
and proprietary costs, will deter managers from unlimitedly disclosing private
information to the public which will make the firms become too transparent (Verrecchia,
1983; Zhang, 2001). Therefore, the managerial incentive will lead the amount of
voluntary disclosures to arrive a firm specific optimal level after considering the related
benefits and costs.
In spite of the managerial incentive to issue MEF, the type (good news versus bad
news) and the form (qualitative versus quantitative) of information contained in the MEF
is also influenced by forecasting environment and forecaster’s characteristics. For
example, Bonsall et al. (2013) suggest that macroeconomy is the most important factor
which explains the type of news contained in the MEF. Similarly, Kim et al. (2014) also
suggest that managers are reluctant to release either good or bad news when
macroeconomic uncertainty is high. Moreover, prior research finds that managerial
incentive explains a great amount in the information contained in the earnings news
released by managers. Managers will strategically determine the form, type, horizon and
timing of disclosure to achieve their goal or align with their interests (such as Cheng and
Lo, 2006; Cotter et al. 2006; Hutton et al. 2003; Waymire, 1985). Specifically, Fuller and
Jensen (2010) express their concerns over managers’ strategic forecast behaviors to
mislead the market and manage market expectations.
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In conclusion, management earnings forecast is a management strategic disclosure
behavior and is influenced by both macro environment and micro firm itself. Currently,
accounting literature has not yet completely explained the incentives behind the
management earnings forecast, a “numbers game” 9 or a report to reduce information
asymmetry or both. This also provides the research opportunity with my paper which
tends to investigate the effect of industry peer firm pressure on the management earnings
forecast.
2.2 Industry Peer Firm Pressure
Prior research suggests industry peer firms play an important role in shaping
managerial strategies and corporate policies. For example, the empirical evidence shows
that peer firms have an important impact on CEO relative performance evaluation
(Albuquerque, 2009) and thus influence executive compensation (Bizjak et al. 2008). And
Li et al. (2013) suggest that the pressure from peer firms will also influence firm’s tax
avoidance behavior. There are several recent papers discussing the impact of industry
peer firms on firm’s investment. For example, Ozoguz and Rebello (2013) find that
managers’ investment decisions are very sensitive to peer firms’ stock prices. Similarly,
Foucault and Fresard (2013) use a large sample of firms and conclude that corporate
investments are positively associated with the market valuation of industry peer firms
which produce and sell related products. And Beatty et al. (2011) suggest that there is the

1

Some researchers, practitioners and regulators have concerned that management
earnings guidance has become the earnings game, because managers are bind by providing the
earnings guidance to meet the market expectations and thus encourage managerial myopia, such
as Fuller and Jensen (2010), “Coke, Quarterly Estimation and ‘The Number Game’” by
Knowledge @ Wharton, “Numbers Game” speech by former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt in
1998.
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spillover effect of financial reporting frauds on peer firms’ investment and specifically
the scandal firm’s earnings overstatements are positively correlated with peer firm’s
investments. In spite of the operating and investing activities, prior research provides
evidence on the impact of peer firms on corporate financing activities. For example,
several papers discuss the peer firms’ effect on firm’s dividend policy and all suggest that
peer firms play a key role in corporate payout policies (Fang, 2009; Popadak, 2012; Qiu,
2013; Adhikari, 2013). Moreover, Mackay and Phillips (2005) find that industry,
specifically the firm’s position relative to its competitors within the industry, can
significantly influence firm’s financial leverage. Leary and Roberts (2014) also suggest
that peer firms play a more important role in determining the firm’s capital structure and
financial policies than most previous identified determinants do and specifically the less
successful firms tend to mimic the more successful peer firms.
In conclusion, economics, accounting and finance literature have the long history
in discussing the effect of peer firms on firm’s operating, financing and investing
activities. Recently, the pressure from industry peer firms plays a more important role in
shaping firm’s strategies and policies, when the market competition becomes more
severe. Because the firm’s accounting information system behaves the interactions
among managers, governments, investors, intermedia and also competitors, the impact of
peer firms on firm’s financial reporting and voluntary disclosure strategies has become an
essential question for accounting scholars to develop the complete framework of
information environment.
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3. Hypotheses Development
As mentioned above, management earnings forecast, as a typical voluntary
disclosure strategy, is significantly influenced by both macroeconomic factors and
managerial incentive. Moreover, peer firms’ behaviors on the one hand represent the
choices of macro industry and on the other hand represent the sensitive responses to the
market competition. Therefore, I conjecture that the firm’s management earnings forecast
behaviors will be significantly influenced by their peer firm’s MEF behaviors. In the
following paragraphs, I tend to use four plausible explanations to depict the impact of
peer firms on firm’s MEF behavior.
First, the signaling theory suggests that firms have the incentive to voluntarily
disclose certain private information to the public in order to distinguish themselves from
other “weaker” firms. Akerlof (1970) describes the inefficient market that the “lemon”
product may camouflage itself as good product and thus push the good product out of the
market because customers do not have the information to distinguish and “lemon”
product and good product. The management earnings forecast can reduce the information
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders and plays as a signal to indicate that the firm is
different from other “lemons”. Prior research suggests that MEF can successfully send
the signal to the investors and get rewards from the market through higher market
liquidity and lower cost of capital (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Therefore, if peer firms send
the signal to the market using the MEF and indicate themselves as good firms, other firms
have the incentive to follow the MEF behavior because non-disclosing firms will be
automatically identified as “worse” firms which want to conceal their real situation
through silence, according to the signaling theory.

107

Second, the free rider theory may also explain the effect of peer firms on the
firm’s management earnings forecast behavior. The free rider problem occurs when
people can obtain the benefits without contributing any cost. And if the good is nonexcludable and non-rival, everybody can use it without any payment. The free rider
problem also happens when managers determine the corporate policies and strategies.
Firms tend to follow the classic strategies introduced in the textbooks and the policies
developed by their industry leaders. The imitation can save firms’ expenses and time in
investigating the firm’s specific strategy and also provide some assurance on the success
because a lot of precedents have verified it. The management earnings forecast is the
good which is accessible for everyone, including the competitors. Therefore, firms can
easily access the strategies of peer firms’ voluntary disclosure and thus follow the same
strategy. Anilowski et al. (2007) find that the number of firms providing MEF increased
from approximately 10 to 15 percent in mid-1990s to 50 percent in 2004. This finding
also suggests that a lot firms may be the free riders who follow precedents’ successful
MEF strategy in order to obtain the benefits from lowering information asymmetry.
Thirdly, litigation risk may play a significant role in explaining the peer firm
influence on firm’s MEF behaviors. Prior research suggests that firms have incentive to
voluntarily provide earnings guidance in order to reduce litigation risk (Skinner, 1994;
Skinner, 1997). Moreover, Bonsall et al. (2013) suggest that management earnings
forecast is significantly influenced by macroeconomic factors. The peer firms’ view in
respect with the macro-economy reflected in their management earnings forecast will
also encourage the specific firm’s managers to have the similar expectation regarding the
macro-economy. Therefore, during economic recession, managers tend to avoid litigation

108

problem through disclosing the bad news in advance, when they find their peer firms all
have the pessimistic view on the macro-economy, because managers believe following
the majority can reduce litigation risk. For example, Floyd (2012) finds the herding of
bad news and suggests that firms are more likely to disclose bad news in the 10 trading
days following the earnings restatements announced by the industry peers. Therefore, the
herding of bad news to reduce the litigation risk may explain the impact of peer firms on
firm’s MEF behavior.
Finally, I believe the managers’ concerns about their career and reputation may
also force managers to consider their peer firms’ strategies. Baik et al. (2011) suggest the
earnings guidance contains useful information about the CEO’s ability. Moreover, prior
research finds that the firm’s MEF performance will influence managers’ job safety
because the quality of MEF is positively correlated with CEO turnover (Pereira and
Peterson, 2010; Lee et al., 2012). Hence, CEO should carefully determine their
management earnings forecast strategies to maintain their career and reputation. As
mentioned above, the relative performance evaluation is a popular method to determine
executive compensation in industry (Albuquerque, 2009). Therefore, the managers will
sensitively respond to the peer firms’ MEF behaviors and may mimic the MEF strategies
chosen by the industry peer firms.
In conclusion, I conjecture that peer firm’s management earnings forecast
behaviors will significantly influence a specific firm’s MEF strategy, based on signaling
theory, free rider theory/herding theory, litigation risk and managers’ concerns about
career and reputation. In the following paper, I will specifically examine two questions:
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(1) whether firms mimic their peer firms’ management earnings forecast behaviors; (2)
which firms mimic and which firms are mimicked.
4. Research Design
4.1 Identification Problem and Instrument Construction
Leary and Roberts (2014) suggest researchers are facing empirical challenges in
examining the peer effects, because the correlation between the specific firm’s behavior
and its peer firm’s behavior can be attributed to two potential explanations. The first
explanation suggests that firms within the same industry choose the similar actions
because they face the similar macro-economy, technology and regulation situation. The
second explanation suggests that firms within the same industry choose the similar
actions because they sensitively respond to their peers. I believe the second explanation is
the real peer effects that this paper tends to investigate. If I directly use the industry
average numbers to measure the peer firms’ actions, I cannot conclude whether the
specific firm’s action is at least partially driven by peer firms (Explanation 2) or is caused
by the same industry environment (Explanation 1). Therefore, this type of research has an
empirical problem to identify the effect of peer firms. Following Leary and Roberts
(2014), I tend to construct the instrument variables to indicate the existence of peer
effects.
In my setting, the instrument variable should be related to the peer firms’
management earnings forecast behaviors (relevance) but not related to the specific firm’s
MEF behaviors (excludability). For different variables of management earnings forecast
behaviors, I use different instruments to test the existence of peer effects. For the
frequency and horizon of management earnings forecast, I tend to implement the lagged

110

earnings non-synchronicity of peer firms as the instrument, because following two
reasons. First, earnings non-synchronicity refers the covariance between firm’s earnings
and its peers’ earnings and thus describes the firm-specific factors which explain the
firm’s earnings variation (Gong et al. 2013). The authors find that the firm’s earnings
non-synchronicity is positively correlated with the propensity to issue the management
earnings forecast. Therefore, my instrument, earnings non-synchronicity of peer firms,
satisfies the first requirement (relevance), because it’s correlated with peer firms’ MEF
behaviors. Second, the earnings non-synchronicity of peer firms is not correlated with the
specific firm’s MEF behavior and thus satisfies the second requirement (excludability),
because the instrument explains the earnings variations of peer firms excluding the
specific firm. For the management earnings expectations (good news or bad news), I tend
to implement the earnings response coefficient (ERC) of the peer firms as the instrument.
First, prior research suggests that ERC is significantly correlated with the good news and
bad news disclosed by managers (Relevance). Second, the peer firms’ ERC is not
associated with the specific firms’ management earnings forecast (Excludability). In
conclusion, I respectively use the peer firms’ earnings non-synchronicity
(Peer_Nonsynch) and the peer firms’ ERC (Peer_ERC) as instruments to test the industry
peer effects on the specific firm’s management earnings forecasts and the specific firm’s
management earnings expectations.
Following Gong et al. (2013), I calculate the earnings non-synchronicity by pairwise regressing the specific firm i’s return-on-asset (ROA) on its peers firms’ (within the
same two-digit SIC code, excluding firm i) ROA over the 16 quarters prior to quarter t. I
2
construct 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇4
as the mean of the top four highest R-squares from the regressions
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mentioned before. The earnings non-synchronicity (Nonsynch) is the logarithmic
2
2
2
transformation of 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇4
, calculated as ln((1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇4
)/𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇4
). The higher Nonsynch

indicates lower earnings covariance with its peer firms’ earnings and thus more firm’s
specific factors. Then I calculate the earnings response coefficient (ERC) through
regressing three-day cumulative market adjusted stock returns on unexpected earnings
over 36 months prior to the period t. To maintain consistency with the peer effects, I
average the Nonsynch and ERC over all peer firms (excluding the specific firm i) to
obtain the peer firms’ values, following Leary and Roberts (2014).
4.2 Measurements of management earnings forecast
I construct my measurements management earnings forecast from the Thomson
First Call’s Company Issue Guidance (CIG) database. To mitigate the coverage bias of
CIG suggested by Chuk et al. (2013), I limited the sample year after 2004. To solve the
measurement errors caused by “bundled” MEF suggested by Rogers and Buskirk (2013),
I exclude these “bundled” MEF including MEF issued concurrently with the earnings
announcements. Moreover, I remove the forecast observations with announcement dates
more than thirty days after the associated firm-quarter’s fiscal period end date, and I
exclude observations for which the MEF occurs within three days of either the analyst
survey date, or the announcement date of realized earnings for that quarter. Finally,
following Kothari et al. (2009), I also exclude the extreme one percent of management
earnings forecasts relative to analyst expectations and the extreme one percent of MEF
forecast errors relative to realized EPS to mitigate the potential effects of miscoded data.
Then I construct four variables to measure the firm’s MEF behaviors. Following
Ball et al. (2012), I respectively construct variables to proxy the frequency and timeliness
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of management earnings forecasts. First, I use the frequency of MEF (Freq) issued within
the sample year to measure the managerial incentive to release the MEF. The Frequency
is calculated as the number the quarterly and annually MEF issued by the sample firm
during the sample year. Second, the timeliness of MEF (Horizon) is measured as the one
plus the natural log of the difference between fiscal end date and the forecast date. If
firms issue multiple MEF during the sample year, I will average the Horizon for all
forecasts. The larger value of Horizon indicates the more timely MEF behavior. And the
non-disclosing firms will be excluded from the sample when I use the Horizon to
measure the firm’s MEF behaviors. I also respectively calculate the frequency of shorthorizon MEF (Freq_SH) and the frequency of long-horizon MEF (Freq_LH) disclosed by
the firm to test whether the industry peer firm effects appear differently when either short
or long horizon earnings forecasts are disclosed. Following prior research, the shorthorizon (long-horizon) MEF is defined as the management earnings forecast issued
within (more than) 90 days prior to the forecast period.
Finally, I use the difference between MEF and market expectation to measure the
managerial earnings expectation (good news versus bad news). The market expectation is
calculated as the median value of the earnings forecasts issued by financial analysts
during the same sample year for the same forecast period. 10 Then the forecast news
(NEWS) is calculated as the difference between MEF and median analysts’ forecasts,
scaled by the absolute value of median analysts’ forecasts. 11 Then it’s defined as good

2

Analyst forecasts issued after the announcement of management earnings forecast for
the same forecast period are excluded from the sample.
3

We calculate only the most recent management earnings forecast when managers issue
multiple earnings forecasts during the same sample year for the same forecast period.
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news (bad news) when the forecast news is larger (smaller) than the median of analyst
forecast. Specifically, good news (GoodNews) is defined as the max (0, News) and bad
news (BadNews) is defined as the min (0, News). Following Kothari et al. (2009), I only
include MEF where the absolute value of News is greater than 1%, and the absolute value
of Analyst_Median is greater than five cents per share.
To measure the industry peer firm’s MEF behaviors, I average the peer firm’s
frequency, horizon, frequency of short-horizon MEF, frequency of long-horizon MEF,
good news, and bad news over all peer firms excluding the specific firm i. And I add
prefix “Peer” to distinguish the peer firms’ variables from the specific firm’s variables.
4.3 Control variables
To control other factors which influence the firm’s MEF behaviors, including
forecasting environment and forecaster characteristics, I introduce my control variables in
this section. Specifically, the frequency, horizon, frequency of short-horizon MEF, and
frequency of long-horizon MEF will share the same control variables. And the
managerial earnings expectations will have different control variables from the other four
measurements of MEF behaviors.
First, to test the effect of peer firms on the frequency and timeliness of MEF, I
respectively control the firm’s institutional ownership (Inst_Owner) and the financial
analyst following (NO_Analyst). The institutional ownership is calculated as the
percentage of firm’s shares owned by the institutional investors at the period end and the
financial analysts following is the number of financial analysts following the sample firm
during the previous period. To control the firm’s information asymmetry level, I develop
the return volatility (Ret_Vol) which is measured as the standard deviation of monthly
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raw return over the 36 months prior to the period t. Higher return volatility represents the
higher level of information asymmetry. Following Gong. (2013), I use the industry level
weighted average entry costs to proxy firms’ competency to face the threat of new
entrants (MEF_Cost). I multiply this variable of proprietary costs by -1, and thus the
higher value indicates higher proprietary costs and lower propensity to issue MEF.
Moreover, prior papers suggest that higher earnings predictability and higher earnings
response coefficient will significantly increase the management’s incentive to release
earnings forecasts, and thus I include both ERC and earnings predictability as control
variables. The calculation of ERC has been introduced in the previous paragraphs. The
earnings predictability (Earn_Predict) is defined as the logarithm transformation of Rsquare from regressing return-on-assets for the period t on return-on-assets for period t-4
over a rolling window of 16 quarters prior to period t. Finally, Beyer et al. (2010) suggest
that management’s financing strategies will also influence their MEF decisions (Beyer et
al. 2010). I measure the financing strategies by constructing the dummy variable (SEO)
which is equal to 1 if the firm issues new equity in the period t+1 and zero otherwise.
To investigate the effect of peer firm’s earnings expectation (SH_NEWS and
LH_NEWS), following Matsumoto (2002) and Kothari et al. (2009), I include the control
variables, including institutional ownership (Inst_Owner), the number of financial analyst
following (NO_Analyst), earnings response coefficient (ERC), financing strategies
(SEO), growth prospects (Growth), and litigation risk (Litigation). The former four
variables are defined as the same mentioned in the previous paragraphs. I measure the
growth prospects (Growth) as the difference between current year total assets and prior
year total assets scaled by prior year total assets. Moreover, I define the litigation risk as
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the dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm is in the high-risk industry (SICs
2833-2836, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 3600-3674 and 5200-5961) and zero otherwise.
Thirdly, I add the control variable to measure the reliance on implicit claims through
constructing the dummy variable (Durable) which is equal to 1 of the firm is in the
durable goods industry (SICs 150-179, 245, 250-259, 283,301, 324-399) and zero
otherwise. Finally, I control the financial structure and profitability of firm through add
two additional control variables, including the leverage ratio (Leverage) and the dummy
variable whether the firm experience the loss during the sample year (Loss) .
Some control variables are the same for all four characteristics of MEF behaviors,
including firm size (SIZE), which is the logarithm format of total assets at each quarter
end, firm current profitability (ROA) measured as the return on assets, the changes in
earnings (∆EPS), and the firm risk level (BTM) measured as the book-to-market ratio.
Hence, I develop two major models to test the effect of peer firms on the specific firm’s
MEF behaviors:

𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 +

𝛽𝛽6 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽9 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽10 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽11 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽12 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 +
𝛽𝛽13 ∆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽14 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽15 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + ε1

(13)

where MEF and PEER refers alternatively to the frequency, horizon, frequency of shorthorizon MEF, and frequency of long-horizon MEF of specific sample firm and industry
peer firms. To test the peer firms’ impact on managerial earnings expectation I develop
the following model:

116

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 +

𝛽𝛽5 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺ℎ + 𝛽𝛽8 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽9 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿+𝛽𝛽10 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 +
𝛽𝛽11 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽12 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽13 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽14 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝛽15 ∆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽16 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 +

𝛽𝛽17 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + ε1

(14)

where the NEWS and PEER represents alternatively to the specific firm’s and peer firms’
good news and bad news disclosed by the management. All the variables in the Equation
13 and Equation 14, except dummy variables and NO_Analyst, are winsorized at top and
button 1 percent level. I control fixed time effect and fixed industry effect as well. And
both the two equations are implemented by the two-stage least square method (2SLS)
using the two instrument variables, earnings non-synchronicity of peer firms for Equation
1 and ERC of peer firms for Equation 14. All the independent variables are one period
lagged compared to the dependent variables. Finally, the standard errors are adjusted for
both firm-level and year-level clustering.
5. Sample
5.1 Data Collection
I respectively collect the management earnings forecasts from the Thomson First
Call’s Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database, the firm-level fundamental variables
from the COMPUSTAT database, and the market variables from the CRSP database. The
variable of institutional ownership and the variables related to financial analysts are
respectively obtained from Thomson Reuters database and I/B/E/S database. As
mentioned above, I limit my sample after year 2004 to increase the representativeness of
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voluntary disclosure sample. Finally, my sample year is between 2005 and 2011. The
sample sizes varies when I respectively use different measurements to capture the
management earnings forecast behaviors and use different methods to define the industry
peer firms.
5.2 Industry peer firms
In this paper, I use two methods to get the industry peer firms’ data. First,
following Leary and Roberts (2014), I define the industry peer as the firms share the
same 3-digit SIC code. Leary and Roberts (2014) find that industry peer firms’ data
obtained using 3-digit SIC code method are more close to represent the normal
distribution compared to peer firms’ data obtained using the 2-digit or 1-digit SIC code
method. Therefore, I first use the 3-digit SIC code method to define the sample of
industry peer firms. The final sample size is 9,336 when I test the peer firm effects on the
frequency of MEF, and the sample size decreases to 2,528 and 3,116 respectively when I
exclude the non-forecasting firms to test the peer firm effects on the horizon of MEF and
the management earnings expectations.
Second, I alternatively use the text-based network classification of industry
method develop by Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2015) to define the industry peer firms 12.
Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2015) develop a new time-varying method to classify industry
sectors through comparing the product similarity of different firms based on the textbased analysis of product descriptions in the 10-Ks. Under this method, each firm will
have its distinct industry peers during each year. And my final samples are slightly

4

The text-based network classification of industry data can be obtained from the Hoberg
and Phillips data library online.
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smaller than the samples obtained through the 3-digit SIC code method and the sample
size is respectively 8,866, 2,392, and 3,020 when I test the peer firm effects on the
frequency of MEF, the horizon of MEF and the management earnings expectations.
To maintain the robustness of my conclusion, I alternatively use both the 3-digit
SIC code method and text-based network classification method to define the industry
peer firms. The Table 16 illustrates the descriptive statistics of variables included in the
sample of Equation 13 and the sample of Equation 14. I contrast these variables
calculated using either the 3-digit SIC code method and or Hoberg and Phillips method,
and find that the variables calculated under the two different methods are quite similar.
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Table 16: Descriptive statistics to test the effect of industry peer firms on voluntary disclosure
Panel A: Management Earnings Forecast Sample

Variable
Mean
Freq
1.5968
Peer_Freq
2.0309
Horizon
156.6294
Peer_Horizon
154.4948
Earn_Predict
-2.6820
Nonsynch
-0.7481
Peer_Nonsynch -0.7328
ERC
12.6599
Ret_Vol
0.1240
Inst_Owner
0.6830
NO_Analyst
11.1285
MEF_Cost
-8.9153
SIZE
7.3855
ROA
-0.0007
BTM
0.6569
-0.0410

3-digit SIC Code Method
Median
25th Pctl
75th Pctl
0.0000
0.0000
2.0000
1.3778
0.0476
3.0909
155.8333
70.0000
203.2500
152.5333
109.4213
198.3040
-2.6705
-3.9865
-1.3270
-0.6413
-1.2542
-0.1487
-0.8009
-1.1075
-0.4637
5.4396
-0.2212
18.8905
0.1102
0.0769
0.1519
0.7384
0.4916
0.8931
9.0000
4.0000
16.0000
-9.2245
-9.9470
-8.0572
7.4051
6.1093
8.5622
0.0266
-0.0002
0.0682
0.5308
0.3108
0.8385
0.0700
-0.4700
0.5400

Std Dev
3.7545
2.4172
104.5659
75.4189
1.9952
0.9821
0.6981
26.7157
0.0663
0.2844
8.7275
1.6095
1.8600
0.1643
0.5907
2.1689

120

Text-based Network Industry Classification Method
Mean
Median
25th Pctl
75th Pctl
Std Dev
1.6263
0.0000
0.0000
2.0000
3.6981
2.0790
1.6452
0.2667
3.1667
2.1300
156.3935
155.7692
69.7500
203.5000
105.3312
154.0157
155.6164
101.6730
197.3810
70.5927
-2.6852
-2.6740
-3.9888
-1.3273
1.9959
-0.7479
-0.6379
-1.2503
-0.1448
0.9860
-0.7593
-0.8168
-1.0744
-0.4879
0.5773
12.7467
5.4951
-0.1709
18.8710
26.6442
0.1238
0.1097
0.0766
0.1518
0.0665
0.7001
0.7499
0.5207
0.8995
0.2722
11.1330
9.0000
4.0000
16.0000
8.7794
-8.8791
-9.2217
-9.9366
-7.9233
1.6125
7.3610
7.3917
6.0999
8.5317
1.8425
-0.0019
0.0261
0.0000
0.0666
0.1641
0.6590
0.5333
0.3148
0.8403
0.5903
-0.0380
0.0700
-0.4700
0.5400
2.1863

Table 16: Descriptive statistics to test the effect of industry peer firms on voluntary disclosure – Continued
Panel B: Management Earnings Expectation Sample
3-digit SIC Code Method
Text-based Network Industry Classification Method
Mean
Median
25th Pctl
75th Pctl
Std Dev
Mean
Median
25th Pctl
75th Pctl
Std Dev
0.1798
0.0000
0.0000
0.0385
0.5009
0.1810
0.0000
0.0000
0.0394
0.5031
0.0000
0.3053
-0.1424
-0.0070
-0.1496
-0.1414
-0.0069
-0.1443
0.0000
0.3070
0.2856
0.0997
0.0094
0.2846
2.1223
0.2855
0.1369
0.0308
0.3199
0.5815
-0.1850
-0.1055
-0.2357
0.3920
-0.2108
-0.1000
-0.2284
-0.0140
-0.0284
1.6502
19.8005
11.8424
1.5786
31.3618
30.9051
15.8596
13.5556
7.5438
21.5770
17.4847
16.4646
13.5408
5.8004
24.8237
21.7962
19.7000
11.7429
1.5519
31.3056
30.8016
0.1062
0.0974
0.0694
0.1309
0.0498
0.1065
0.0979
0.0696
0.1314
0.0501
0.8074
0.8382
0.6914
0.9436
0.2123
0.8133
0.8407
0.6983
0.9445
0.2051
13.7956
12.0000
7.0000
19.0000
8.5385
13.7796
12.0000
7.0000
19.0000
8.5581
0.2267
0.0937
0.0607
-0.0100
0.1484
0.2268
0.0948
0.0615
-0.0094
0.1491
7.6641
7.6060
6.4942
8.7712
1.7089
7.6609
7.6084
6.4942
8.7627
1.7075
0.1576
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.3644
0.1583
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.3651
0.0386
0.0493
0.0181
0.0861
0.1134
0.0379
0.0490
0.0178
0.0854
0.1130
0.5520
0.4616
0.2892
0.7020
0.4391
0.5541
0.4629
0.2910
0.7050
0.4399
-0.0482
-0.4000
0.1100
0.5400
1.9699
-0.0445
0.1100
-0.4000
0.5500
1.9804
This table illustrates the descriptive statistics of sample variables. In the Panel A, the variables are used to test the relation between industry peer firms and
the specific firm's issuance of MEF behaviors. In the Panel B, the variables are used to test the relation between industry peer firms and the specific firm's
management earnings expectation. For the first five columns, the sample of peer firms is constructed based on the SIC 3-digit method. For the last five columns,
the sample of peer firms is constructed based on the text-based network industry classification method.
Variable
GoodNews
BadNews
Peer_GoodNews
Peer_BadNews
ERC
Peer_ERC
Ret_Vol
Inst_Owner
NO_Analyst
Growth
SIZE
Loss
ROA
BTM
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6. Empirical Results
6.1 Univariate Tests
In this section, I discuss the peer effects on the firm’s voluntary disclosure
strategy. First, the Pearson Correlation results for the sample of Equation 13 and the
sample of Equation 14 are described in the Table 17. In the Panel A, I find that the peer
firm’s disclosure frequency and disclosure horizon are significantly and positively
correlated with the specific firm’s disclosure frequency and disclosure horizon as
expected. Moreover, I find the instrument variable, peer firms’ earnings nonsynchronicity (Peer_Nonsynch), is significantly associated with the endogenous
variables, peer firms’ disclosure frequency (Peer_Freq) and disclosure horizon
(Peer_Horizon), and this suggests the relevance test is satisfied. And I also find that the
Peer_Nonsynch is not significantly associated with the specific firm’s disclosure
frequency (Freq) and disclosure horizon (Horizon), and this suggests the excludability
test is satisfied. In the Panel B, I find that the bad news disclosed by peer firms are
significantly correlated with the bad news disclosed by the specific firm. In contrast, I
don’t find a significant correlation between good news disclosed by peer firms and good
news disclosed by the specific firms. Moreover, I find that the instrument variable, peer
firms’ earnings response coefficient (Peer_ERC), is significantly correlated with the peer
firms’ good news and bad news and is not significantly correlated with the specific firm’s
good news and bad news. Hence, the relevance and excludability test of instrument is
satisfied. In conclusion, the univariate test suggests that the peer firms’ disclosure
frequency, disclosure horizon and forecast of bad news will significantly influence the
specific firm’s corresponding voluntary disclosure behaviors. Then I will introduce the
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results of multivariate regressions and all the standard errors presented in the multivariate
regressions are adjusted for both firm-level and year-level clustering.
6.2 Peer Effects on the specific firm’s MEF behaviors
This section instroduces the results of multivariate tests of the peer effects on the
specific firm’s MEF behaviors. In the Panel A of Table 18, I use the 3-digit SIC code
method to define the industry peer firms. The first four columns display the OLS
regression results and the last four columns display the 2SLS regression results. I find
that peer firms’ disclosure frequency of management earnings forecast (Peer_Freq), peer
firms’ disclosure horizon (Peer_Horizon), peer firms’ disclosure frequency of shorthorizon management earnings forecast (Peer_ Freq_SH), and peer firms’ disclosure
frequency of long-horizon management earnings forecast (Peer_Freq_SH) are
significantly and positively correlated with the specific firm’s disclosure frequency
(coefficient=0.8642, P-value<0.0001), the specific firm’s disclosure horizon
(coefficient=1.0299, P-value<0.0001), the specific firm’s disclosure frequency of shorthorizon MEF (coefficient=0.9178, P-value<0.0001), and the specific firm’s disclosure
frequency of long-horizon MEF (coefficient=1.4503, P-value<0.0001).13 This suggests
that more frequency and longer horizon of MEF disclosed by its peer firms will
encourage the specific firm to disclose more frequently and to disclose the MEF with
longer horizon.

5

All the numeric results presented in the section are obtained from the 2SLS regression.
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Table 17: Pearson correlation to test the effect of industry peer firms on voluntary disclosure
Panel A: Management Earnings Forecast Sample
(1)
(1)Freq

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(2)Peer_Freq

0.2903

1

(3)Horizon

0.0991

0.099

(4)Peer_Horizon

-0.003

0.058 0.3057

1

(5)Earn_Predict

0.0914

0.13 0.0162

0.006

(6)Nonsynch

0.0628

0.097 0.0732

0.015 0.0551

1

(7)Peer_Nonsynch 0.0592

0.131 0.0119

0.161 0.0543

0.499

(8)ERC

0.1479

0.091 -0.032 -0.058 0.0643

(9)Ret_Vol

-0.165 -0.064

(10)Inst_Owner

0.2094

0.121 0.0015 -0.059 -6E-04

(11)NO_Analyst

0.1558

0.033 0.0511 -0.028 0.0214 -0.012 -0.004 0.1685 -0.182 0.3473

(12)MEF_Cost

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

1

1

1

1

0.065 0.0623

1

-0.15 -0.022 -0.153 -0.113 -0.028 -0.125

-0.09 -0.173 -0.052
0.23

0.077

0.147 0.1691

1
-0.13

1
1

0.11 -0.008 4E-04 -3E-04 0.0145 -0.119 -0.129 -0.174

(13)SIZE

0.1139 -0.083

(14)ROA

0.1261

(15)BTM

-0.112 -0.118 -0.064 -0.034 -0.023 -0.101 -0.066 -0.109

(16)

0.0242 6E-04 0.0477

1

0.08 0.0269 -0.023 -0.024 0.0253 -0.382 0.2059 0.5598 0.0841

0.038 0.0887 -0.064 0.0702

1

0.064 0.0517 0.1328 -0.379 0.2304 0.2013 0.0307 0.3586

0.06 -0.038 -0.057 -0.036 -0.022

0.11

-0.18

1

-0.2 0.2252 0.0405 -0.071

1

0.065 0.0414 0.0228 -0.038 -0.001 0.2263 -0.172
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Table 17: Pearson correlation to test the effect of industry peer firms on voluntary disclosure – Continued
Panel B: Management Earnings Expectation Sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(1)GoodNews
1
(2)BadNews

0.1664

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(14)

(15)

1

(4)Peer_BadNews 0.0044 0.058 0.0179

1

(5)ERC

0.0366 0.029

-0.005 -0.011

(6)Peer_ERC

0.0024 0.023

-0.021 0.116 0.0841

(7)Ret_Vol

-0.004 -0.185 -0.026 -0.104 -0.095 0.062

(8)Inst_Owner

0.005

(9)NO_Analyst

0.0105 0.111

(10)Growth

0.0541 0.093 0.0077 0.015 0.0474 -0.009 -0.032 0.1136 0.101

0.063

1

-0.027 -0.017 0.154

1
1

0.096 -0.016

1

-0.023 0.009 0.1099 0.014 -0.132 0.1466

1
1

(11)Labor_Intense -0.045 -0.054 -0.038 -0.105 0.0966 0.167

0.103 0.1083 0.117 0.1355

(12)Litigation

0.1455 -0.019 0.198 0.0203 0.2068

0.0273 -0.039 -0.009 -0.057 0.0446
-0.02

(13)

1

(3)Peer_GoodNew -0.006 0.018

(13)Durable

(12)

0.03

1
1

-0.019 -0.022 0.003 0.0276 0.015 0.1415 0.0998 0.058 0.0356 0.2322 0.1063

1

(14)SEO

0.0144 -0.007 0.0018 0.002

-0.002 0.017 -0.002 0.0281 -0.051 0.0251 -0.015 0.0094

(15)SIZE

-0.047 0.186 0.0015

-0.034 -0.141 -0.427 0.0073 0.537 0.0237 -0.112 -0.188 -0.132

0.09
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0.033

1
-0.02

1

(16)

(17)

(18)

(19)

Table 17: Pearson correlation to test the effect of industry peer firms on voluntary disclosure – Continued
-0.02

-0.057 -0.094 0.024 0.3232 -0.09

-0.126 -0.211 0.0662 0.1039 0.0563 -0.005 -0.228

1

(16)Loss

-0.004 -0.282

(17)ROA

0.0342 0.192 0.0053 0.028 0.1224 -0.021 -0.263 0.1399 0.165 0.2982 -0.014 -0.058 -0.029 0.0051 0.168

-0.634

(18)BTM

-0.084 -0.227 -0.018 -0.026 -0.127 -0.049 0.211 -0.079

0.3113 -0.356

-0.21

-0.171 -0.032 -0.102 -0.055 0.038

-0.01

1
1

1
(19)
0.0545 0.159 -0.019 -0.01 -0.031 0.005 -0.005 0.0349 0.046 0.163 0.0157 0.0439 0.0286 0.0041 0.005 -0.374 0.4152 -0.281
This table illustrates the Pearson correlation to test the relation between peers' MEF behaviors and the specific firm's MEF behaviors. Bold firgures indicate that the correlations are
significant at 5 percent level.
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Table 18: the effect of peer firms' MEF characteristics on the specific firm's MEF characteristics
Panel A: The SIC 3 digit industry peer firms

Intercept
Peer_Freq
Peer_Horizon
Peer_Freq_SH
Peer_Freq_LH
Earn_Predict
Nonsynch
ERC
Ret_Vol
Inst_Owner
NO_Analyst
MEF_Cost
SEO
SIZE
ROA
BTM

OLS Regression
Depedent = Freq Depedent = Horizon Depedent = Freq_SH Depedent = Freq_LH
Coefficien P-value Coefficien P-value Coefficien P-value Coefficien P-value
t
t
t
t
-2.63472 <.0001 190.2295 0.0301 -1.0159
0.004 -1.63763 <.0001
0.132425 <.0001
0.08256 0.0187
0.076291 0.0001
0.151895 <.0001
0.000511 0.0757 -0.79542 0.4298 0.000859 0.0187 -0.00063 0.9546
0.10491 0.0123 10.27869 0.0002 0.011285 0.0522 0.09275 0.0025
0.007402 <.0001 -0.02084 0.7002 0.003657 <.0001 0.003722 <.0001
-3.55573 <.0001 82.00868 0.0974 -1.42974 <.0001 -2.13172 <.0001
1.196147 <.0001 15.59663 0.1736 0.61764 <.0001 0.577591 <.0001
0.013011 0.0273 -1.07416 0.0001 0.016174 <.0001 -0.00284 0.4659
0.054696 0.2826 10.53715 0.0393 -0.01965 0.4744 0.069972 0.0303
0.916173 0.0033 57.95678 <.0001 0.323869 0.1047 0.592084 0.0005
0.247869 <.0001 12.29649 <.0001 0.021985 0.1303 0.223293 <.0001
0.807495 <.0001 36.78359 0.1792 0.414899 <.0001 0.396603 0.0003
0.016653 0.7071 -12.3313 0.069 -0.00222 0.9217 0.022088 0.4387
0.028831 0.0215
1.3725
0.3149 0.013495 0.0379 0.015403 0.0609

First Stage Multivariate F-Stat
Industry Fixed Effe
Year Fixed Effect
Observations
Adjusted R-square

Yes
Yes
9,336
0.2167

Yes
Yes
2,528
0.2226

Yes
Yes
9,336
0.2271

Yes
Yes
9,336
0.192
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2SLS Regression
Depedent = Freq Depedent = Horizon Depedent = Freq_SH Depedent = Freq_LH
Coefficien P-value Coefficie P-value Coefficien P-value Coefficien P-value
t
nt
t
t
-2.42681 <.0001 1.31969 0.9875 -1.00586 0.0046 -1.96237 0.0016
0.86419 <.0001
1.02992 <.0001
0.917794 <.0001
1.450333 <.0001
0.016724 0.3266 -0.653 0.4929 0.003433 0.6854 0.042923 0.0126
0.052212 0.0211 8.51344 0.0013 0.000642 0.0709 0.021475 0.0036
0.007607 <.0001 -0.0124 0.8092 0.003701 <.0001 0.008972 <.0001
-4.362
<.0001 39.6158 0.4188 -2.0965 <.0001 -4.35992 <.0001
1.279357 <.0001 14.8612 0.1628 0.640881 <.0001 1.387528 <.0001
0.008023 0.1802 -1.2064 <.0001 0.014476 <.0001 0.002508 0.6804
0.079393 0.1222 12.079 0.0041 -0.01347 0.6225 0.10652 0.0428
1.014236 0.0014 69.5695 <.0001 0.354251 0.0831 0.965519 0.0021
0.250888 <.0001 12.5814 <.0001 0.01975 0.1759 0.26009 <.0001
0.690183 <.0001 33.8477 0.1929 0.334948 0.0006 0.474839 0.0065
-0.09838 0.0199 -16.394 0.0124 -0.03229 0.1481 -0.04943 0.2343
0.041394 0.0008 1.6935 0.1949 0.015898 0.0128 0.029619 0.0163
36.9***

18.1***

5.21***

81.88***

Yes
Yes
9,336
0.1936

Yes
Yes
2,528
0.2087

Yes
Yes
9,336
0.2166

Yes
Yes
9,336
0.1936

Table 18: the effect of peer firms' MEF characteristics on the specific firm's MEF characteristics – Continued
Panel B: The text-based network classification of industry peer firms
OLS Regression
Depedent = Freq Depedent = Horizon Depedent = Freq_SH Depedent = Freq_LH
Coefficien P-value Coefficien P-value Coefficien P-value Coefficien P-value
t
t
t
t
Intercept
-3.21407 <.0001 36.89854 0.6442 -1.08121 0.0016 -2.11443 <.0001
Peer_Freq
0.6994
<.0001
Peer_Horizon
0.54455 <.0001
Peer_Freq_SH
0.681016
Peer_Freq_LH
0.654336 <.0001
Earn_Predict
0.009131 0.0509 -0.07127 0.9375 0.001222 0.0793 0.007571 0.0488
Nonsynch
0.130162 0.0004 6.41981 0.0026 0.027546 0.0982 0.10387 <.0001
ERC
0.00645 <.0001
0.0012
0.9816 0.003151 <.0001 0.003346 0.0002
Ret_Vol
-1.70958 0.0006 -25.2311 0.6003 -0.77688 0.0022 -1.03319 0.0022
Inst_Owner
0.688114 <.0001 20.9828 0.0356 0.341173 <.0001 0.354041 <.0001
NO_Analyst
0.010083 0.0794 -0.92001 0.0008 0.011053 0.0003 -0.00114 0.7676
MEF_Cost
-0.05918 0.2385 2.55744 0.3708
-0.032
0.252 -0.02075 0.5039
SEO
0.825496 0.0054 60.87802 0.0023 0.376351 0.0634 0.462625 0.0063
SIZE
0.241928 <.0001 9.29428 <.0001 0.052558 0.0008 0.193336 <.0001
<.0001 35.68548 0.0379 0.400475 <.0001 0.428782 0.0001
ROA
0.8272
BTM
0.020915 0.6356 -9.14823 0.1254 -0.01018 0.6551 0.029227 0.3167
0.019989 0.0971 0.99959 0.4038 0.00918 0.1383 0.011094 0.1682

2SLS Regression
Depedent = Freq Depedent = Horizon Depedent = Freq_SH Depedent = Freq_LH
Coefficien P-value Coefficie P-value Coefficien P-value Coefficien P-value
t
nt
t
t
-2.65293 <.0001 -6.1716 0.9417 -0.84662 0.0208 -2.3052 0.0004
0.857548 <.0001
0.9808 <.0001
0.925577 <.0001
1.297172 <.0001
0.01321 0.0328 -1.0299 0.2907 0.00446
0.061 0.025948 0.0126
0.078117 0.038 7.53708 0.0073 0.01027 0.0627 0.061709 0.0046
0.007837 <.0001 0.00019 0.9971 0.003719 <.0001 0.008346 <.0001
-4.47265 <.0001 61.5081 0.2285 -2.20276 <.0001 -5.01186 <.0001
0.979278 <.0001 10.5246 0.3696 0.524413 <.0001 1.034573 <.0001
0.004515 0.4698 -1.2177 <.0001 0.013668 <.0001 0.001185 0.8508
0.082103 0.121 11.4897 0.0073 -0.01672 0.5513 0.120977 0.0248
1.122871 0.0013 65.271 <.0001 0.317119 0.136 1.179117 0.0006
0.294104 <.0001 12.8517 <.0001 0.034781 0.0395 0.290114 <.0001
0.787542 <.0001 39.234 0.1312 0.377642 0.0002 0.732495 <.0001
-0.14266 0.0011 -15.745 0.0156 -0.04846 0.0369 -0.18481 <.0001
0.041645 0.0011 1.56957 0.2376 0.016095 0.0145 0.041572 0.0011
34.15***

First Stage Multivariate F-Stat

36.87***

4.29**

104.22***

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed Effe
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effect
8,866
2,392
8,866
8,866
2,392
8,866
8,866
8,866
Observations
0.2743
Adjusted R-square
0.2456
0.2408
0.2265
0.2598
0.2554
0.2783
0.2329
This table illustrates the effect of industry peer firms on the specific firm's voluntary disclosure strategy. In the Panel A, the sample of peer firms is constructed based on the SIC 3-digit method.
In the Panel B, the smaple of peer firms is constructed based on the text-based network classficiation of industry peer firms. For the first eight columns, the tests are implemented using the OLS
regression method. For the last eight columns, the tests are implemented using the 2SLS regression method and the instrument is the peer firms' earnings nonsynchronicity.
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In the Panel B of Table 18, I use the text-based network classification method
developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2015) and I find the similar results. Specifically,
the specific firm’s disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon, disclosure frequency of
short-horizon MEF, and disclosure frequency of long-horizon MEF are significantly
influenced by its peer firms’ disclosure frequency (coefficient=0.8575, P-value<0.0001),
peer firms’ disclosure horizon (coefficient=0.9808, P-value<0.0001), peer firms’
disclosure frequency of short-horizon MEF (coefficient=0.9256, P-value<0.0001), and
peer firms’ disclosure frequency of long-horizon MEF (coefficient=1.2972, Pvalue<0.0001). In conclusion, I find that the existence of peer effects in the firm’s
disclosure strategy through using alternative measurement methods and different
regressions. Specifically, the firm’s disclosure frequency and disclosure horizon are
significantly influenced by its peer firms’ disclosure frequency and disclosure horizon.
6.3 Peer Effects on the specific firm’s management earnings expectations.
In this section, I discuss the effect of peer firms’ management earnings
expectations on the specific firm. The Table 19 shows the results of multivariate
regressions. The first two columns and the last two columns respectively show the results
of OLS regression and the results of 2SLS regression. In the Panel A and Panel B, I
respectively use the 3-digit SIC code method and the text-based networking industry
classification method to define the industry peer firms. Under both industry classification
methods, I find that the bad news disclosed by peer firms is significantly and positively
correlated with the bad news disclosed by the specific firm (3-digit SIC code method:
coefficient=0.4225, P-value<0.0001; text-based network classification method:
coefficient= 0.0975, P-value=0.0025). Although in some OLS regression tests, I find that
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the peer firms’ good news is positively and significantly correlated with the specific
firm’s good news, I don’t find a significant correlation between peer firm’s good news
and specific firm’s good news after I include the instrument and use the 2SLS regression
to solve the endogeneity problem. This suggests that the specific firm tends to disclose
bad news if its peers disclose more bad news and it’s not true for the disclosure of good
news. One possible explanation is that the bad news is more likely to be influenced by the
macro economy and the good news is more likely to be influenced by the firm’s specific
characteristics. If most of the industry peer firms have the pessimistic expectation of
future earnings, due to the conservatism and litigation risk the specific firm may also tend
to disclose the bad news even if the firm still has good operations (such as the herding
theory of bad news in Floyd, 2012). In contrast, if most of the industry peer firms have
the optimistic expectation of future earnings, the specific firm may not follow the
disclosure of good news if it doesn’t have good operations. In conclusion, the robust
results suggest that the bad news disclosed by peer firms may encourage the specific firm
to disclose bad news and the good news disclosed by peer firms will not encourage the
specific firm to disclose good news.
6.4 The effect of change in disclosure strategy
In this section, I investigate how the changes in disclosure strategy of peer firms
will influence the changes in disclosure strategy of the specific firm. The change in
disclosure strategy is measured as the first difference between the current period
disclosure strategy and the prior period disclosure strategy. The Table 20 illustrates the
effect of changes in peer firms’ management earnings forecast on the changes in the
specific firms’ management earnings forecast.
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Table 19: the effect of peer firms' management earnings expectation on the specific firm's management earnings expectation
Panel A: The 3-digit SIC industry peer firms
OLS Regression
Dependent=GoodNews
Dependent=BadNews
Intercept
0.0842338 0.6079
-0.08909 0.1852
Peer_GoodNews
-0.0014
0.1457
Peer_BadNews
0.0254128 0.0138
ERC
0.0001967 0.0651
0.0000341 0.0308
Ret_Vol
0.2156691 0.3842
-0.476
0.004
Inst_Owner
0.0297542 0.5386
0.0671027 0.0245
NO_Analyst
0.0011286 0.5719
-0.001715 0.0314
Growth
0.0897644 0.0576
0.042312 0.0627
Litigation
-0.012919 0.5662
0.0059736 0.6245
Durable
-0.03478 0.0831
0.0080263 0.4972
SEO
0.1907323 <.0001
-0.02337 0.4013
SIZE
-0.008579 0.2999
0.0219955 <.0001
Loss
0.0694179 0.0304
-0.155203 <.0001
Leverage
-0.10732 0.0522
0.0958619 0.0095
ROA
0.0333245 0.7778
-0.139204 0.2091
BTM
-0.076015 0.0042
-0.103128 <.0001
0.0136164 0.0298
0.0099493 0.0339
First Stage Multivariate F-Stat
Industry Fixed Effe
Year Fixed Effect
Observations
Adjusted R-square

Yes
Yes
3,116
0.0708

Yes
Yes
3,116
0.1353
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2SLS Regression
Dependent=GoodNews
Dependent=BadNews
1.0408933 0.1409
-0.05256
0.405
-0.499547 0.5328
0.42248
<.0001
0.0006028 0.0784
0.000057 0.0776
-0.150987 0.5355
-0.40209
0.008
-0.058584 0.2611
0.056725 0.0372
0.0017654 0.361
-0.00099
0.1915
0.1224598 0.0054
0.046878 0.0293
0.0621903 0.0332
0.010675 0.3629
-0.038245 0.6397
0.000222 0.9839
0.1982163 0.0151
0.024344 0.3735
-0.006805 0.4473
0.016837 0.0008
0.0791254 0.0103
-0.14983
<.0001
-0.12249 0.0604
0.080883 0.0218
-0.083986 0.4473
-0.12349
0.228
-0.093176 0.0005
-0.10359
<.0001
0.0143376 0.0118
0.007479
0.066
3.34**

5.81***

Yes
Yes
3,116
0.0801

Yes
Yes
3,116
0.1459

Table 19: the effect of peer firms' management earnings expectation on the specific
firm's management earnings expectation - Continued
Panel B: The text-based network classification of industry peer firms
OLS Regression
Dependent=GoodNews
Dependent=BadNews
Intercept
0.6671828 0.2134
-0.176936 0.0127
Peer_GoodNews 0.0875694 0.0001
Peer_BadNews
0.0028577 0.0207
ERC
0.0006632 0.0581
-4.52E-05 0.0759
Ret_Vol
-0.223908 0.2739
-0.152341 0.3171
Inst_Owner
-0.044268 0.4405
0.0629462 0.0426
NO_Analyst
0.001406
0.479
-0.000894 0.2795
Growth
0.1125647 0.0106
0.0433462 0.052
Litigation
0.07641
0.009
-0.015265 0.5142
Durable
-0.020517 0.8079
-0.01975 0.5616
SEO
0.1871392 0.0193
0.0645828 0.0954
SIZE
-0.009696 0.2758
0.0228622 <.0001
Loss
0.0922503 0.0045
-0.148346 <.0001
Leverage
-0.130843 0.0517
0.0653003 0.0941
ROA
-0.104085 0.3667
-0.131834 0.2304
BTM
-0.092616 0.001
-0.106016 <.0001
0.0148496 0.0095
0.0087819 0.0355

2SLS Regression
Dependent=GoodNews
Dependent=BadNews
0.7009121 0.1916
-0.0632
0.3293
0.9563532 0.1002
0.097499 0.0025
0.0007104 0.0459
-3.4E-05
0.0279
-0.153557 0.5332
-0.50092
0.0015
-0.049586
0.39
0.049307 0.0931
0.002045 0.3038
-0.00103
0.1855
0.1235303 0.0065
0.042195 0.0478
0.0726822 0.0134
0.001245 0.9183
-0.03607 0.6649
0.013561 0.2243
0.1648884 0.0492
-0.01238
0.6527
-0.00969 0.2953
0.018718 0.0003
0.0808876 0.0107
-0.16141
<.0001
-0.125226 0.0592
0.086112 0.0174
-0.081872 0.4752
-0.14781
0.1682
-0.092748 0.0008
-0.0987
<.0001
0.0142429 0.0141
0.007871 0.0562
5.59**

First Stage Multivariate F-Stat

7.82***

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed Effe
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effect
3,020
3,020
3,020
3,020
Observations
Adjusted R-square
0.0884
0.1673
0.0879
0.1503
This table illustrates the effect of industry peer firms on the specific firm's management earnings expecations In the Panel A and the
Panel B, I respectively use the SIC 3-digit method and the text-based network industry classification method to define the industry
peer firms. In the first and third column, the dependent variables are the good news disclosed by the specific firm. In the second and
the fourth column, the dependent variables are the bad news disclosed by the specific firm. For the first two columns of regressions,
I implement the OLS regression method. For the last two columns of regressions, I implement the 2SLS method and the instrument is
the peer firms' ERC.
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Table 20: the effect of peer firms' MEF change on the specific firm's MEF change
Panel A: The SIC 3 digit industry peer firms

Intercept
∆Peer_Freq
∆Peer_Horizon
∆Peer_Freq_SH
∆Peer_Freq_LH
Earn_Predict
Nonsynch
ERC
Ret_Vol
Inst_Owner
NO_Analyst
MEF_Cost
SEO
SIZE
ROA
BTM

First Stage Multivariate F-Stat
Industry Fixed Effect
Year Fixed Effect
Observations
Adjusted R-square

Depedent =∆Freq
Coefficient P-value
0.638766 0.1777
1.0338355 <.0001

2SLS Regression
Depedent = ∆Horizon
Depedent = ∆Freq_SH
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
20.993669 0.8573
0.381935 0.1628
0.435722

Depedent = ∆Freq_LH
Coefficient P-value
0.2639997 0.3683

<.0001
1.0860256 <.0001

0.0084704
0.0293254
0.0014371
1.6162085
-0.283822
-0.01173
-0.022002
-0.343017
-0.046177
0.247771
-0.124468
0.0145432

0.5107
0.0876
0.187
<.0001
0.001
0.0098
0.5954
0.1383
0.047
0.0738
0.0005
0.1508

0.723325
0.744591
0.054981
26.312281
-2.949755
-0.160002
-0.416391
26.042576
2.111315
15.804764
-1.414012
0.323589

0.4073
0.0974
0.2735
0.5949
0.7295
0.5227
0.8788
0.1129
0.2407
0.4706
0.8154
0.7794

0.0024516
0.0043046
0.000696
1.0520476
-0.152659
-0.006527
0.008831
-0.143354
-0.005785
0.1047484
-0.090951
0.0052547

0.7185
0.0454
0.2562
<.0001
0.0015
0.0073
0.7189
0.3212
0.6054
0.1984
<.0001
0.3249

1.0170605
0.0059374
0.0335467
0.0007396
0.5975527
-0.131372
-0.005165
-0.030994
-0.200647
-0.040289
0.1465754
-0.03332
0.0093385

<.0001
0.512
0.0141
0.305
0.007
0.0251
0.0936
0.2493
0.0755
0.0203
0.1153
0.1624
0.2136

27.23***

14.38***

18.71***

17.59***

Yes
Yes
9,336
0.074

Yes
Yes
2,528
0.0503

Yes
Yes
9,336
0.0567

Yes
Yes
9,336
0.0562
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Table 20: the effect of peer firms' MEF change on the specific firm's MEF change – Continued
Panel B: The text-based network classification of industry peer firms

Intercept
∆Peer_Freq
∆Peer_Horizon
∆Peer_Freq_SH
∆Peer_Freq_LH
Earn_Predict
Nonsynch
ERC
Ret_Vol
Inst_Owner
NO_Analyst
MEF_Cost
SEO
SIZE
ROA
BTM

Depedent =∆Freq
Coefficient P-value
0.8884607 0.136
0.9432476 <.0001

2SLS Regression
Depedent = ∆Horizon
Depedent = ∆Freq_SH
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
0.2863032 0.3953
21.99541 0.8516
0.386371

Depedent = ∆Freq_LH
Coefficient P-value
0.6073113 0.1109

<.0001
0.9748648 <.0001

0.9592732 <.0001
0.0118723 0.4478
0.408596 0.6486
0.003238 0.6993
0.0091749 0.3987
0.0447096 0.0119
0.0076483 0.0468
0.0374223 0.0258
1.090936 0.0725
0.0008862 0.211
0.0007986 0.3406
0.00167
0.1851
0.048537 0.3528
1.1730022 <.0001
0.6317619 0.0135
1.7704142 <.0001
50.086376 0.323
-0.159378 0.1758
-0.132159 0.9887
-0.100365 0.1203
-0.062236 0.4434
-0.005466 0.1604
-0.013017 0.0239
-0.175141 0.4938
-0.007333 0.0186
-0.032417 0.3089
-0.025221 0.607
0.306508 0.9127
0.0058039 0.8423
-0.152687 0.3951
-0.23625 0.1187
-0.387387 0.1879
27.679093 0.1007
-0.078081 0.0137
2.409911 0.1952
-0.016187 0.2929
-0.062023 0.0084
0.0872383 0.3657
0.1428393 0.2012
0.2256765 0.1727
18.226239 0.4166
-0.142034 0.0005
-2.828855 0.6436
-0.099736 <.0001
-0.039113 0.1501
0.0056848 0.3678
0.007392 0.3989
0.0133166 0.2593
0.295306 0.8023
8.81***
4.01**
4.68**
21.50***
First Stage Multivariate F-Stat
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed Effect
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effect
8,866
2,392
8,866
8,866
Observations
Adjusted R-square
0.0753
0.0469
0.0551
0.0598
This table illustrates the effect of peer firms' MEF change on the changes in the specific firm's MEF behaviors. In the Panel A and Panel B, the SIC 3digit method and the text-based network industry classification method are respectively used to define the industry peer firms. The dependent variables
for each column are respectively the changes in the specific firm's disclosure frequency, the changes in the specific firm's disclosure horizon, the changes
in the specific firm's disclosure frequency of short-horizon MEF, and the changes in the specific firm's disclosure frequency of long-horizon MEF.
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In the Panel A and the Panel B, I respectively use the 3-digit SIC code method and
the text-based network classification method to define the industry peer firms. And using
the 2SLS regressions, I find the results consistent with the main conclusions. I find that
the changes in the peer firms’ disclosure frequency, the changes in the peer firms’
disclosure horizon, the changes in the peer firms’ disclosure frequency of short-horizon
MEF, and the changes in the peer firm’s disclosure frequency of long-horizon MEF are
significantly and positively correlated with the specific firm’s disclosure frequency (3digit SIC code method: coefficient=1.0338, P-value<0.0001; text-based network
classification method: coefficient=0.8885, P-value<0.0001), the specific firm’s disclosure
horizon (3-digit SIC code method: coefficient=0.4357, P-value<0.0001; text-based
network classification method: coefficient=0.3864, P-value<0.0001), the specific firm’s
disclosure frequency of short-horizon MEF (3-digit SIC code method:
coefficient=1.0860, P-value<0.0001; text-based network classification method:
coefficient=0.9749, P-value<0.0001), and the specific firm’s disclosure frequency of
long-horizon MEF (3-digit SIC code method: coefficient=1.0171, P-value<0.0001; textbased network classification method: coefficient=0.9593, P-value<0.0001). This suggests
that the firm tends to increase its disclosure frequency and disclosure horizon of
management earnings forecast, if its industry peer firms increase the MEF disclosure
frequency and disclosure horizon. In conclusion, the alternative tests of changes in
disclosure strategy suggests that the specific firm’s disclosure frequency and disclosure
horizon are significantly influenced by its industry peer firms’ corresponding disclosure
behaviors.
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The Table 21 illustrates how the changes in peer firms’ management earnings
expectations will influence the specific firms’ management earnings expectations. In the
Panel A, I calculate the industry peer firms’ variables by using the 3-digit SIC code
method. Consistent with my main conclusion, I find that the changes in the bad news
disclosed by peer firms are significantly and positively correlated with the changes in the
bad news disclosed by peer firms (coefficient=0.2786 and P-value=0.0005) and I don’t
find a significant correlation between the changes in the peer firms’ good news and the
changes in the peer firms’ good news. In the Panel B, I use the text-based network
classification method to measure the industry peer firms and find similar results. The
results suggest that the specific firm tends to increase the level of bad news disclosed to
the public, when its industry peer firms increase their disclosure level of bad news, and
that the specific firm’s disclosure level of good news is not influenced by the changes of
their industry peer firms’ good news disclosure level.
In conclusion, in this section, I test how the changes in disclosure strategy of peer
firms will influence the changes in disclosure strategy of a specific firm. Consistent with
the main results, I find that the specific firm’s change in disclosure frequency, disclosure
horizon, and disclosure of bad news are significantly and positively correlated with its
industry peer firms’ corresponding disclosure changes.
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Table 21: the effect of peer firms' management earnings expectation change
on the specific firm's management earnings expectation change
Panel A: The SIC 3 digit industry peer firms

Intercept
∆Peer_GoodNews
∆Peer_BadNews
ERC
Ret_Vol
Inst_Owner
NO_Analyst
Growth
Litigation
Durable
SEO
SIZE
Loss
Leverage
ROA
BTM

2SLS Regression
Dependent=∆GoodNews
Dependent=∆BadNews
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
0.1887707
0.0146
-0.2292384 0.0004
-0.016796
0.7939
0.2786148 0.0005
0.0004298
0.0503
0.0000297 0.0479
-0.382897
0.069
-0.3456337 0.0333
-0.002531
0.9619
0.0361121 0.2057
0.0024184
0.2428
-0.0006883 0.3555
0.1281452
0.0091
0.0341769 0.1087
-0.01158
0.6246
-0.0126312 0.275
-0.050352
0.0139
0.0023287 0.8319
0.2134189
<.0001
-0.0160464 0.5734
-0.022392
0.0065
0.0227931 <.0001
0.0212153
0.4775
-0.1349977 <.0001
-0.093184
0.1195
0.0904437 0.0109
-0.017159
0.8899
0.024949
0.8299
-0.071187
0.0097
-0.0763251 0.0003
0.0089597
0.1359
0.0041056 0.3403

First Stage Multivariate F-Stat

3.16*

5.27**

Industry Fixed Effect
Year Fixed Effect
Observations
Adjusted R-square

Yes
Yes
3,116
0.0583

Yes
Yes
3,116
0.1444
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Table 21: the effect of peer firms' management earnings expectation change on the
specific firm's management earnings expectation change – Continued
Panel B: The text-based network classification of industry peer firms

Intercept
∆Peer_GoodNews
∆Peer_BadNews
ERC
Ret_Vol
Inst_Owner
NO_Analyst
Growth
Litigation
Durable
SEO
SIZE
Loss
Leverage
ROA
BTM

First Stage Multivariate F-Stat

2SLS Regression
Dependent=∆GoodNews
Dependent=∆BadNews
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
0.0006
0.0052
-0.2159674
0.2184526
-0.079291
0.3253
0.0291
0.0412807
0.0000535
0.0365
0.0816
0.0004144
0.0645
-0.478701
0.0213
-0.3017149
0.2299
0.0362579
-0.018596
0.7482
0.3489
-0.000728
0.3044
0.002199
0.1116
0.133898
0.0071
0.0344655
0.3806
-0.0107167
0.8682
0.0041032
-0.047088
0.0093585
0.4016
0.025
0.3029
-0.0221478
0.2137789 <.0001
-0.023087
0.0223844 <.0001
0.0067
0.6466
-0.1390491 <.0001
0.0134482
0.0227
-0.102423
0.0840202
0.0927
0.9241
-0.045837
0.7133
0.0113039
0.0002
-0.082584
0.0016
-0.0796652
0.1857
0.0058202
0.0090633
0.1363
3.92**

5.93**

Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed Effect
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effect
3,020
3,020
Observations
Adjusted R-square
0.0614
0.1455
This table illustrates the effect of peer firms' changes in the management earnings expecation on the specific
firm's changes in the management earnings expecation. In the Panel A and B, the SIC 3-digit method and textbased industry classification method are respectively implemented to define the industry peer firms. For the
first columns of regressions, the dependent variables are good news. And for the last columns of regressions,
the dependent variables are bad news.
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7. Additional Tests
7.1 Which firms are more sensitive to peers’ Disclosure Strategy?
This section discuss whether certain firms are more sensitive to their peers’
disclosure strategy compared to other firms. I specifically examine which firms are more
sensitive to peers’ disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon, and disclosure of bad news.
Because the tests mentioned above show that the R-squares of tests using text-based
network classification method are slightly larger than the R-squares of tests using 3-digit
SIC code method and the former industry classification method can provide instinct peer
firms for each firm in each year, in this section my results are presented based on the
sample using the text-based network classification method14. To test which firms are
more sensitive to peers, I classify sample firms into different groups. First, I classify the
sample firms based on whether the firm has the S&P credit rating. If the answer is yeas,
the dummy variable, Rating_Firm, is equal to one and otherwise zero. Second, the sample
firms are distinguished based on their profitability, size and risk. If the sample firm’s
profitability, size and market-to-book (MTB) ratio are within the top 25 percentile within
each industry, the firm will be classified as high profitable, large size and high MTB firm
and thus the dummy variables (Profit_Firm, Large_Firm and MTB_Firm) are equal to
one. If the sample firm’s profitability, size and market-to-book (MTB) ratio are within the
bottom 25 percentile, the firm will be classified as low profitable, small size and low
MTB firm and thus the dummy variables (Profit_Firm, Large_Firm and MTB_Firm) are
equal to zero. I also construct corresponding interaction terms between the peer firms’

6

The untabulated results suggest the similar conclusions based on the sample using the 3digit SIC code method.
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disclosure frequency/horizon/bad news and the group identifications (rating, profitability,
size, and MTB ratio). The Table 22 describes the main results of 2SLS regressions. 15 In
the Panel A, I investigate whether certain firms are more sensitive to mimic the peers’
disclosure frequency. Using the peer firms’ earnings non-synchronicity as the instrument,
I find that the interaction term between peer firms’ disclosure frequency and whether it’s
a rating firm is significant positive (coefficient=0.4599, P-value<0.0001). This suggests
that rating firms are more sensitive to their industry peer firms’ disclosure frequency
compared to non-rating firms. Second, I find that the interaction between peer firms’
disclosure frequency and whether it’s a profitable firm is significant positive
(coefficient=0.4556, P-value<0.0001). This suggests that more profitable firms are more
sensitive to their industry peer firm’s disclosure frequency compared to less profitable
firms. Third, I find that the interaction tern between peer firms’ disclosure frequency and
whether it’s a large firm is significant positive (coefficient=0.4955, P-value<0.0001).
This suggests that larger firms are more sensitive to peer firms’ disclosure frequency
compared to smaller firms. Finally, I find that the interaction term between peer firms’
disclosure frequency and whether it’s a high MTB ratio firm is significant positive
(coefficient=0.5489, P-value<0.0001). This suggests that firms with high MTB ratio are
more sensitive to their industry peer firms’ disclosure frequency compared to firms with
lower MTB ratio.

7

The tabulated results are based on the characteristics of disclosure strategy. I also test
the interaction terms by using the changes in disclosure strategy. The untabulated results suggest
the similar conclusions.
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Table 22: Which firms are more sensitive to peers' voluntary disclosure strategy?
Panel A: which firms are more sensitive to mimic the peers' disclosure frequency

Intercept
Peer_Freq
Peer_Freq*Rating_Firm
Rating_Firm
Peer_Freq*Profit_Firm
Profit_Firm
Peer_Freq*Large_Firm
Large_Firm
Peer_Freq*MTB_Firm
MTB_Firm
Earn_Predict
Nonsynch
ERC
Ret_Vol
Inst_Owner
NO_Analyst
MEF_Cost
SEO
SIZE
ROA
BTM

Coefficient
-2.129565
0.438116
0.459937
-0.807854

P-value
0.001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

2SLS Regression: Dependent = Freq
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
-0.710079 0.3684
-0.833579 0.3825
0.455552 <.0001
0.4955315 <.0001

0.455552
0.968195

<.0001
<.0001
0.4955315
0.7777035

0.011794
0.083107
0.007835
-4.273837
0.971642
0.005225
0.085084
1.154652
0.295526
0.783911
-0.139957
0.042167

0.4838
0.028
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.4033
0.1084
0.001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0015
0.0009

0.031722
0.085542
0.005669
-5.224828
0.378971
-0.0114
0.105203
0.850851
0.324914
0.260866
-0.219089
0.01437

0.2254
0.1572
0.0132
<.0001
0.0486
0.1677
0.1895
0.0354
<.0001
0.2935
<.0001
0.354

0.0429859
0.0370925
0.0027349
-4.524025
0.8718327
-0.002359
0.1330008
1.2786252
0.3313783
0.9269149
-0.272741
0.0190564

<.0001
<.0001

0.1002
0.0353
0.234
<.0001
<.0001
0.7923
0.0908
0.0027
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.2801

0.548931
0.435088
0.032873
0.031917
0.005033
-5.2686
0.336363
-0.00213
0.181553
0.795326
0.280525
0.872339
-0.01802
0.037761

<.0001
<.0001
0.1469
0.0172
0.0078
<.0001
0.0529
0.7845
0.002
0.1405
<.0001
<.0001
0.7193
0.0109

34.15***

First Stage Multivariate F-State
Industry Fixed Effect
Year Fixed Effect
Observations
Adjusted R-square

Coefficient P-value
-0.7502 0.3783
0.548931 <.0001

Yes
Yes
8,866
0.2801

Yes
Yes
4,339
0.2796

Yes
Yes
4,380
0.2507

Yes
Yes
4,397
0.2581

Panel B: which firms are more sensitive to mimic the peers' disclosure horizon

Intercept
Peer_Horizon
Peer_Horizon*Rating_Firm
Rating_Firm
Peer_Horizon*Profit_Firm
Profit_Firm
Peer_Horizon*Large_Firm
Large_Firm
Peer_Horizon*MTB_Firm
MTB_Firm
Earn_Predict
Nonsynch
ERC
Ret_Vol

Coefficient
13.13682
0.90915
0.08184
-23.99255

P-value
0.8777
0.0006
0.6777
0.4193

2SLS Regression: Dependent = Horizon
Coefficient P-value
Coefficient P-value
2.69235 0.9865
31.80793
0.806
1.14807 0.0006
0.83012
0.0045

-0.06874
16.46699

0.7219
0.5434
0.02601
26.16575

-1.03783
7.39782
0.00029
55.86804

0.2864
0.0094
0.9957
0.279

-2.30685
12.04433
-0.08174
150.5251
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Coefficient P-value
-86.1505 0.5241
1.26641 0.0003

0.1909
0.0096
0.3286
0.1054

-3.15647
13.95709
-0.05984
143.31845

0.8994
0.4916

0.0796
0.0022
0.5498
0.1118

-0.03387
25.96184
-1.59168
2.37894
-0.08406
75.05082

0.8615
0.3735
0.3539
0.0055
0.3347
0.3626

Table 22: Which firms are more sensitive to peers' voluntary disclosure strategy? –
Continued
Inst_Owner
NO_Analyst
MEF_Cost
SEO
SIZE
ROA
BTM

11.8276
-1.25327
11.4876
62.80978
13.10044
41.96157
-15.69199
1.50355

0.324
<.0001
0.0075
0.0002
<.0001
0.1178
0.0163
0.2614

-6.70515
-1.22553
16.88952
63.27899
13.88481
49.03527
-17.04479
1.36558

0.7401
0.0026
0.1403
0.0155
0.0003
0.1003
0.0547
0.4079

0.5281
0.009
0.2201
0.0016
0.1267
0.2063
0.0098
0.6642

5.97659
-1.04973
8.29861
59.37858
12.53237
3.37387
-0.24112
4.21381

0.7549
0.018
0.3996
0.012
<.0001
0.931
0.9837
0.0814

36.87***

First Stage Multivariate F-Stat
Industry Fixed Effect
Year Fixed Effect
Observations
Adjusted R-square

12.31107
-1.23202
13.38213
80.63841
8.61333
47.55311
-26.93468
0.89446

Yes
Yes
2,528
0.246

Yes
Yes
1,231
0.2508

Yes
Yes
1,264
0.2392

Yes
Yes
1,104
0.2294

Panel C: which firms are more sensitive to mimic the peers' bad news

Intercept
Peer_BadNews
Peer_BadNews*Rating_Firm
Rating_Firm
Peer_BadNews*Profit_Firm
Profit_Firm
Peer_BadNews*Large_Firm
Large_Firm
Peer_BadNews*MTB_Firm
MTB_Firm
ERC
Ret_Vol
Inst_Owner
NO_Analyst
Growth
Litigation
Durable
SEO
SIZE
Loss
Leverage
ROA
BTM

Coefficien
t
-0.030823
0.002448
0.014049
-0.034717

P-value
0.6616
0.0824
0.0915
0.2088

2SLS Regression: Dependent = BadNews
Coefficien P-value
Coefficient P-value
t
0.047698 0.6995
-0.164546 0.0826
0.079957 0.0007
0.0136188 0.2117

Coefficien P-value
t
-0.04507 0.6907
0.04218 0.0507

-0.079977 0.0006
-0.074489 0.0934
-0.004675
0.0180171

5.69E-05
-0.560208
0.049552
-0.001259
0.038881
-0.000828
0.014509
-0.01718
0.019547
-0.16422
0.091942
-0.142464
-0.099223
0.008224

0.7175
0.0004
0.0951
0.1091
0.0768
0.9458
0.1952
0.5233
0.0002
<.0001
0.012
0.1848
<.0001
0.05

0.000123
-0.525963
0.02166
-0.00164
0.037243
0.016381
0.045254
-0.024491
0.016322
-0.273517
0.132317
-0.299554
-0.074581
0.006521

0.6067
0.0396
0.6525
0.1354
0.2142
0.4179
0.0122
0.4215
0.0662
0.0004
0.0232
0.0178
0.0093
0.211

-7.34E-05
-0.191231
0.0556559
-0.001693
0.0656702
-0.002001
0.0339988
-0.014997
0.0222509
-0.161058
0.0930045
-0.147272
-0.142
0.0151059

0.7515
0.7078

0.7675
0.4083
0.2778
0.1488
0.0129
0.9187
0.0742
0.6711
0.0433
0.001
0.1401
0.3056
<.0001
0.0184

-0.04499
0.034395
0.000163
-0.38934
0.014172
7.78E-05
0.067496
0.026161
0.033298
-0.02813
0.012324
-0.20953
0.161932
-0.1662
-0.03244
0.011142

0.0301
0.4655
0.447
0.1587
0.7585
0.9448
0.0391
0.157
0.0717
0.4058
0.1323
<.0001
0.0021
0.2815
0.4365
0.0994

4.1**

First Stage Multivariate F-Stat

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed Effect
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effect
3,020
1,537
1,459
1,337
Observations
0.1424
0.226
0.172
0.1948
Adjusted R-square
This table illustrates which types of firms are more sensitive to the industry peer firms' voluntary disclosure. In the Panel A, B and C, I
respectively examine which types of firms are more sensitive to the industry peer firms' disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and
disclosure of bad news. For each column of the regressions, the type of firms is respectively determined by whether it's S&P credit rated,
whether it has high profits, whether it has larger size, and whether it has higher market-to-book ratio.
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In the Panel B, I test whether certain types of firms are more sensitive to their
industry peers’ disclosure horizon. Unfortunately, I don’t find any significant interaction
terms between peer firms’ disclosure horizon and group identifications (rating,
profitability, size, and MTB ratio). This suggests there are not certain types of firms that
are more sensitive to their industry peers’ disclosure horizon. Finally, in the Panel C, I
test which firms are more sensitive to their peers’ disclosure level of bad news. I find a
significantly negative coefficient for the interaction term between peer firms’ bad news
and whether the firm is profitable (coefficient=-0.0780, P-value=0.0006) and the
interaction term between peer firms’ bad news and whether the firm has the high MTB
ratio (coefficient=-0.0450, P-value=0.0301). This suggests that firms with higher
profitability and higher MTB ratio tend to be less sensitive to the bad news disclosed by
their industry peer firms. I also find that the interaction term between peer firms’ bad
news and whether it’s a rating firm (coefficient=-0.0347, P-value=0.0915) and thus I find
the weak evidence that rating firms tend to be less sensitive to bad news disclosed by
their peers.
7.2 Leader-Follower relation
As mentioned above, certain types of firms are more sensitive to their peers’
disclosure behaviors. Hence this section tends to investigate the existence of leaderfollower relation in the mimicking peers’ disclosure strategies. In other words, if certain
firms (followers) will always mimic the leaders’ disclosure strategy and leaders don’t
mimic the followers’ disclosure strategy, the leader-follower relation exists and thus the
herding theory and free ride theory can explain this peer effects on disclosure strategy.
However, if the evidence of leader-follower relation is weak, this suggests that all the
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firms actively respond to their peers’ disclosure strategy and thus herding theory and free
ride theory will not be the major explanations for the peer effects on disclosure strategy.
In this section, I classify the leader and follower based on firm size and profitability. If
the firm’s profit or size is within the top 25 percentile, the firm is classified as the leader.
Otherwise, the firm is classified as the follower.
The Table 23 provides the main results of 2SLS regressions under the reduced
form 16. In the first three columns, the leaders and followers are classified based on the
firm profitability and in the last three columns the leaders and followers are classified
based on the firm size. In the Panel A, under both classification methods I find that the
changes in leaders’ disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and disclosure of bad news
will significantly influence the specific firm’s disclosure strategy. In the Panel B, under
both classification methods, I find that the changes in followers’ disclosure strategy will
significantly influence the specific firm’s disclosure strategy. This suggests that not only
industry leaders will influence the industry followers’ disclosure strategy but also the
followers will influence leaders’ disclosure strategy. This suggests the herding theory is
not a major reason in explaining the peer effects on disclosure strategy. Moreover, free
rider theory is also not a major reason in explaining the peer effects, because the
voluntary disclosure is pricy and industry leaders also mimic the followers’ disclosure
strategy. In contrast, I believe the signaling theory, litigation risk and manager reputation
are the major reason in explaining that every firm actively respond to its peers’ disclosure
strategy.

8

I omit the coefficients and t-statistics of control variables and intercept in the Table 8 to
make the table look more concise.
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Table 23: The leader-follower relationship in the peer firms' effect on MEF - Reduced Form
Panel A: Do followers respond to the leaders' MEF behaviors?

∆Leader_Freq
∆Leader_Horizon
∆Leader_BadNews
Firm Specific Factors
First Stage Multivariate F-Stat
Industry Fixed Effect
Year Fixed Effect
Observations
Adjusted R-square

Depedent =∆Freq
Coefficient P-value
0.413106 <.0001

Profitability
Depedent = ∆Horizon
Coefficient P-value

Dependent=∆BadNews
Coefficient P-value

Depedent =∆Freq
Coefficient P-value
0.56683 <.0001

0.282245 <.0001

0.24904
0.2731844

Yes
20.18***
Yes
Yes
4,948
0.08928

Firm Size
Depedent = ∆Horizon
Coefficient P-value

Dependent=∆BadNews
Coefficient P-value

0.0015

0.0225

0.33079

Yes
16.2***
Yes
Yes
1,305
0.07276

Yes
4.35**
Yes
Yes
1,632
0.1501

Yes
32.84***
Yes
Yes
5,041
0.08859

Profitability
Depedent = ∆Horizon
Coefficient P-value

Dependent=∆BadNews
Coefficient P-value

Depedent =∆Freq
Coefficient P-value
1.25137 0.0113

0.0183

Yes
45.15**
Yes
Yes
1,437
0.06019

Yes
5.42**
Yes
Yes
1,771
0.1478

Firm Size
Depedent = ∆Horizon
Coefficient P-value

Dependent=∆BadNews
Coefficient P-value

Panel B: Do leaders respond to the followers' MEF behaviors?

∆Follower_Freq
∆Follower_Horizon
∆Follower_BadNews

Depedent =∆Freq
Coefficient P-value
1.387553 0.0031

0.40101

0.0058

0.539303 <.0001
0.6594722 <.0001

0.235033

0.0498

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm Specific Factors
8.58***
15.84***
5.49**
4.16**
8.27***
4.01**
First Stage Multivariate F-Stat
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed Effect
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effect
1,697
2,077
Observations
6,246
1,731
2,119
6,197
0.08776
0.04804
0.1445
Adjusted R-square
0.08793
0.05759
0.1381
This Table illustrates whether certain leader-follower relationship exists in the effect of industry peer firms on the specific firm's voluntary disclosure. The control variables are ommitted
in this table. In the Panel A, the dependent variables are the followers' changes in the disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and disclosure of bad news. And the independent variables
are the leaders' changes in the disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and disclosure of bad news. In the Panel B, the dependent variables are the leaders' changes in the disclosure
frequency, disclosure horizon and disclosure of bad news. And the independent variables are the followers' changes in the disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and disclosure of bad
news. The leaders and followers are respectively defined based on the profitability and firm size in the first three columns of regressions and in the last three columns of regresssions.
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8. Conclusions
This paper introduces how industry peer firms’ voluntary disclosure strategy will
influence the specific firm’s voluntary disclosure strategy. After reviewing prior
literature, I conjecture that firm tends to mimic industry peers’ disclosure strategy based
on signaling theory, herding theory, free rider theory, litigation risk and CEO reputation.
Leary and Robert (2014) suggest the existence of endogeneity problem if researchers
directly use the industry average values to test the peer effects. Therefore, I implement
the 2SLS regression method and construct instruments, including the peer firms’ earnings
non-synchronicity and peer firms’ ERC, respectively to test the peer effects on
management earnings forecast and management earnings expectation. The results suggest
that industry peer firms’ disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and disclosure level of
bad news will significantly influence the specific firm’s disclosure frequency, disclosure
horizon, and disclosure level of bad news. Specifically, I find that the increase in the
industry peer firms’ disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and disclosure of bad news
will encourage the specific firm to increase its disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon
and disclosure of bad news. In contrast, I don’t find a significant correlation between
industry peer firms’ good news disclosure and the specific firm’s good news disclosure.
Moreover, I find that firms with S&P credit rating, higher profit, larger size and higher
MTB ratio are more sensitive to industry peers’ disclosure frequency and firms with
higher profit and higher MTB ratio are less sensitive to industry peers’ disclosure of bad
news. Finally, I test whether the phenomenon of mimicking peers’ disclosure strategy is
based on the leader-follower relation. However, through empirical results I don’t find a
leader-follower relationship existed in the peer effects of disclosure strategy. In contrast, I

146

find that each firm respond actively to its industry peers no matter its position within the
industry. This suggests the herding theory and free rider theory are not major reason in
explaining the peer effects of disclosure strategy. And due to signaling theory, litigation
risk and CEO reputation, the specific firm tends to mimic their peer firms’ voluntary
disclosure strategy.
This paper contributes to accounting literature by providing new evidence for the
managerial incentive behind of the voluntary disclosure. The results suggest that not only
internal factors but also factors outside the firm will also influence the managers’
voluntary disclosure strategy. Through examining the effects of industry peer firms on the
specific firm’s voluntary disclosure strategy, we can better understand our accounting
information system. Moreover, this paper provides theory support for the peer effects
phenomenon. The empirical results suggest that signaling theory, litigation risk and CEO
reputation are better than herding theory and free rider theory in explaining why firm
tends to mimic its peers’ disclosure strategy, and thus this enrich the framework of
voluntary disclosure research. Thirdly, through implementing the 2SLS regression and
constructing the appropriate instruments, this paper solves the endogeneity problem
which exists in most prior research of voluntary disclosure. By improving the research
design, this paper not only suggests the causal effect conclusion but also provides some
shed light on future voluntary disclosure research. Finally, this paper tries to mimic the
interactive accounting information system in the real business world and tends to
investigate how each single firm actively respond to its competitors in the market. Future
research can further examine this interactions among different firms and improve the
methodology by developing a multi-period model to mimic the vivid real business world.
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Appendix: Variable Definition

Disclosure = a dummy variable which is equal to 1, if the firm releases a sustainability
report in the sample year and the report has been recorded in GRI database; zero
otherwise.
DIS_Q1 = a dummy variable which is equal to 1, if the firm prepare the sustainability
report based on any of the GRI frameworks; zero otherwise.
DIS_Q2 = the application level of GRI framework in preparing the sustainability report
EQ = the earnings quality measured as the standard deviation of the residuals obtained
from the modified Dechow and Dichev model during the 5-year period prior to the
sample year. The variable is multiplied by -1 except in the regression of Equation 2.
IEQ = the predicted value from the regression of earnings quality on inherent firm traits.
The variable is multiplied by -1 except in the regression of Equation 2.
DEQ = the residual from the regression of earnings quality on inherent firm traits. The
variable is multiplied by -1 except in the regression of Equation 2.
CFVOL = the standard deviation of cash flows scaled by total assets over the previous
five year window
SALEVOL = the standard deviation of sales scaled by total assets over the previous five
year window
OPCYCLE = the natural logarithm of operating cycle
NEG = the frequency of negative earnings realizations during the previous five years
INT = intangible (the sum of R&D expenditures and advertisement expenditures) scaled
by total assets
INTDUM = a dummy variable which is equal to 1, if research and development
expenditure or advertising expenditure is the missing value; zero otherwise.
CAP = capital expenditures scaled by total assets
BIG8 = a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm is audited by the BIG 8 auditor;
zero otherwise
NOA =a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if firm net operating assets at the beginning
year scaled by beginning sales are above the median of corresponding industry’s net
operating assets; zero otherwise.
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Cycle = the firm operating cycle measured by the accounts receivable cycle plus
inventory cycle and minus the accounts payable cycle
SIZE = natural logarithm of firm total assets
BTM = book-to-market ratio
ROA = return on assets
Current = current assets to total assets ratio
Leverage = total liabilities to total assets ratio
Audit_Fee = the natural logarithm of total audit fees in the sample year
ACCR = the total accruals scaled by total assets
Segment = the number of business segments
Report_Lag = the time lag between earnings announcement date and financial statement
date
Loss = a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm experiences the negative income
during the sample year; zero otherwise.
DEC = a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm has a December fiscal year; zero
otherwise
ISSUE = the dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the sample firm issues at least one
quarterly MEF during the sample year, and zero otherwise
Freq = the number of quarterly earnings forecasts released by the sample firm in the
sample year
News = the difference between the management earnings forecast and the median of
financial analyst forecast for the same forecast period, scaled by the absolute value of
median of financial analyst earnings forecast
Good_News = Max (News, 0)
Bad_News = Min (News, 0)
ABJ_Sticky = the cost stickiness measured by ABJ 2003 model
Cost_Sticky = the cost stickiness measured by Weiss 2010 model, and the cost is
measured by difference between sales revenues and income before extraordinary items
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COGS_Sticky = the cost stickiness measured by Weiss 2010 model, and the cost is
measured by cost of goods sold
SGA_Sticky = the cost stickiness measured by Weiss 2010 model, and the cost is
measured by the selling, general and administrative expenses
Inst_Owner = the percentage of firm’s shares owned by the institutional investors at the
period end
Ret_Vol = the standard deviation of monthly raw return over the 36 months prior to the
sample period
MEF_Cost = the voluntary disclosure cost, measured by the industry level weighted
average entry costs to proxy firms’ competency to face the threat of new entrants. The
value is multiplied by -1
Earn_Predict = the logarithm transformation of R-square from regressing return-on-assets
for the period t on return-on-assets for period t-4 over a rolling window of 16 quarters
prior to period t
ERC = regressing three-day cumulative market adjusted stock returns on unexpected
earnings over 36 months prior to the period t.
Peer_ERC = the mean of peer firms’ ERC excluding the specific firm i
Nonsynch = the earnings non-synchronicity by pair-wise regressing the specific firm i’s
return-on-asset (ROA) on its peers firms’ (within the same two-digit SIC code, excluding
firm i) ROA over the 16 quarters prior to quarter t, following Gong et al. (2013)
Peer_Nonsynch = the mean of peer firms’ earnings non-synchronicity excluding the
specific firm i
SEO = a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm issues new equity in the period
t+1 and zero otherwise
Growth = the difference between present total assets and previous year total assets scaled
by previous year total assets
Litigation = the dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm is in the high-risk industry
(SICs 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 3600-3674 and 5200-5961), zero otherwise.
Durable = the dummy variable which is equal to 1 of the firm is in the durable goods
industry (SICs 150-179, 245, 250-259, 283,301, 324-399), and zero otherwise.
Labor_Intense = 1 minus the ratio of PPE to gross assets
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No_Analyst = the number of financial analysts following the sample firm
∆EPS = the changes in earnings from the previous year
ISSUE_SH = the dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm issues at least one shorthorizon MEF which is released within 90 days prior to the forecast period, zero
otherwise.
ISSUE_LH = the dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm issues at least one longhorizon MEF which is released more than 90 days prior to the forecast period, zero
otherwise.
Freq_SH = the frequency of short-horizon MEF issued which is released within 90 days
prior to the forecast period
ISSUE_LH = the frequency of long-horizon MEF issued which is released more than 90
days prior to the forecast period
Firm_Efficiency = data from Demerjian, Lev and McVay library.
Horizon = one plus the natural log of the difference between fiscal end date and the
forecast date
Rating_Firm = the dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm has the S&P credit
rating, zero otherwise.
Profit_Firm = the dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm’s profitability is within
the top 25 percentile within each industry and is equal to 0 if the firm’s profitability is
within the bottom 25 percentile within each industry
Large_Firm = the dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm’s size is within the top
25 percentile within each industry and is equal to 0 if the firm’s size is within the bottom
25 percentile within each industry
MTB_Firm = the dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm’s market-to-book ratio is
within the top 25 percentile within each industry and is equal to 0 if the firm’s market-tobook ratio is within the bottom 25 percentile within each industry
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